The wine market in the European Union is heavily regulated. Despite the many distortions in the wine market as a consequence, reforming the regulations has proven difficult. This paper analyzes the political economy mechanism that created existing wine regulations. We document the historical origins of the regulations and relate these to political pressures that resulted from international integration, technological innovations, and economic developments. (JEL Classifications: K23, L51, N44, N54, Q13)

In this paper, we use unique data from the market for Bordeaux wine to test the hypothesis that consumers are willing to pay for expert opinion because it is accurate. Using proprietary indicators of the quality of the vintage, which are based on both publicly and privately available information, we find that additional publicly available information on the weather improves the expert's predictions of subsequent prices. This establishes that the expert opinions are not efficient, in the sense that they can be easily improved, and that these opinions must be demanded, at least in part, for some purpose other than their accuracy. (JEL Classification: D8, Q13)

This paper conducts a meta-analysis of price and income elasticities for wine and distilled spirits, which correct for outliers and publication bias. The sample of wine elasticities is obtained from 104 primary studies, and the sample of spirits elasticities is obtained from 111 primary studies. Robust weighted-means and meta-regressions are reported that correct for outliers, heterogeneity, heteroskedasticity, dependence, and publication bias. Compared to unweighted averages previously reported in the literature, the analysis yields less-elastic demands for both price and income. Average price elasticities obtained using cumulative meta-analysis are −0.45 for wine and −0.55 for spirits. Average income elasticities are 1.0 for both beverages. Bias due to publication selectivity is important. Country-level differences also are noted for both wine and spirits. Policy implications are discussed for pricing and taxation of alcohol beverages. (JEL Classifications: Q11, C18, I12)

We present a framework for measuring the information content or, more subjectively, the meaningfulness of wine tasting notes. Our analysis is based on developing a summary statistic related to Theil's uncertainty coefficient. The methods we develop can be used for the comparative analysis of tasting notes against a benchmark tasting system. An analysis of the examples of real and “fake” tasting notes in Quandt (2007) illustrates the method. We argue that the categorization of wine jargon leads to informative tasting notes. (JEL Classification: A12, C65, C83, D83)

Recent research in psychology and sociology has established a connection between political beliefs and unhealthy behaviors such as excessive alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drug consumption. In this study, we estimate the relationship between political ideology and the demand for beer, wine, and spirits using a longitudinal panel of fifty U.S. states from 1952 to 2010. Controlling for various socioeconomic factors and unobserved heterogeneity, we find that when a state becomes more liberal politically, its consumption of beer and spirits rises, while its consumption of wine may fall. Our findings suggest that political beliefs are correlated with the demand for alcohol. (JEL Classifications: D3, D12, I1)