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Shapley Ranking of Wines*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2013

Victor Ginsburgh  and
Israël Zang
Victor Ginsburgh
Affiliation:
ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 50, Av. F.D. Roosevelt, CP 114/04, 1050 Brussels, Belgium and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la Neuve, Belgium. Email: [email protected].
Israël Zang
Affiliation:
Faculty of Management, The Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel. Email: [email protected].
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Abstract

We suggest a new game-theory-based ranking method for wines, in which the Shapley Value of each wine is computed, and wines are ranked according to their Shapley Values. Judges should find it simpler to use, since they are not required to rank order or grade all the wines, but merely to choose the group of those that they find meritorious. Our ranking method is based on the set of reasonable axioms that determine the Shapley Value as the unique solution of an underlying cooperative game. Unlike in the general case, where computing the Shapley Value could be complex, here the Shapley Value and hence the final ranking, are straightforward to compute. (JEL Classification: C71, D71, D78)

Keywords

Shapley valueranking of wineswine contests
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Wine Economics , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , November 2012 , pp. 169 - 180
Copyright
Copyright © American Association of Wine Economists 2013

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Footnotes

*

We are grateful to O. Ashenfelter, M. Castanheira, R. Quandt and K. Storchmann for excellent comments. This research was conducted while Israël Zang was a faculty member of the Academic College of Tel Aviv – Jaffa.

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