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Seller Reputation: Individual, Collective, and Institutional Factors*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 July 2012

Stefano Castriota  and
Marco Delmastro
Stefano Castriota
Affiliation:
Università di Perugia, Department of Economics, Via A. Pascoli 20, 06123 Perugia, Italy. e-mail: [email protected], Tel. +39 328 8879095.
Marco Delmastro
Affiliation:
Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Viale Isonzo 21b, 00198 Rome, Italy. e-mail: [email protected], Tel. +39 06 69644207.
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Abstract

In this paper, we study firm reputation by investigating the interaction between individual reputations of Italian wineries and a large set of (possible) determinants. With respect to winery reputation, we find a positive effect for firm age and size and producer's intrinsic motivations and a negative effect for outsourcing, while horizontal differentiation, ownership status, and hiring well-known consultants play no role. Further, collective reputation and institutional regulation exert a significantly positive effect on individual reputation. (JEL Classification: L14, L15)

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Wine Economics , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , May 2012 , pp. 49 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © American Association of Wine Economists 2012

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