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‘Integrated Tool Competency’: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Role of the Absent Tools of Musical Composition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2025
Abstract
How do the tools of musical composition shape the cognitive processes of composition in absentia? In exploring the role of these absent tools, can progress be made towards an extended understanding of imagination and memory? This article posits the conceptual framework of ‘Integrated Tool Competency’ as a way of reconciling the powerful insights of externalist accounts of cognition with the fact that so much of the process of musical composition can take place without directly interacting with compositional tools. Effectively, this concept extends the integration of tools into a composer’s cognition beyond the moment of their use, including both unconscious competencies such as audiation and conscious actions such as imagining using a certain tool. This article proposes the concept of Integrated Tool Competency and discusses its potential ramifications for understanding the tools of composition.
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- © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Royal Musical Association
Footnotes
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 57th Annual Conference of the Royal Musical Association at Newcastle University on 16 September 2021. I extend my thanks to the editors of the JRMA and to the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions, and to Christopher Dingle, Howard Skempton, Edwin Roxburgh, and others at Royal Birmingham Conservatoire who have been so supportive of this research.
References
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47 This stage, and some instances of the previous stage, relate heavily to ideas of ideomotor simulation and musical imagery discussed below under the subheading ‘Audiation and musical imagery’. The important thing is how this stage of integrating competency relates to other stages.
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53 Second-order difference refers to a difference between differences. The difference between A and A is the same as the difference between C and C, but different than the difference between D and E.
54 This study was cited by Andy Clark in Natural-Born Cyborgs (pp. 70–72) which is in the bibliography of a huge number of articles and books about extended cognition published since, but few seem to have grappled with the significance of the ‘internalised, external token’ when considering more complex cognitive pursuits, such as creating a work of art.
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56 Clark, Supersizing the Mind, p. 59; Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 210. This is interesting in the context of ITC as integrated competencies remain regardless of the presence of equipment. The idea that competencies might need to be refreshed by reconnecting with the relevant tool(s) (and how much this can be done in the absence of the actual, physical, present tool) would also be interesting to explore.
57 This is not a distinction made in the literature but is useful for the purposes of this article.
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61 See also Laura Bishop, Freya Bailes, and Roger T. Dean, ‘Musical Expertise and the Ability to Imagine Loudness’, PLOS ONE, 8.2 (February 2013) https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0056052, a study which found that expert musicians were more capable of imagining loudness and changes in loudness.
62 Rolf Inge Godøy, ‘Imagined Action, Excitation, and Resonance’, in Musical Imagery, ed. by Rolf Inge Godøy and Harald Jørgensen (Swets and Zeitlinger, 2001), pp. 237–50.
63 Ibid., p. 241.
64 For non-musical examples exploring the ideomotor phenomenon, see Prinz, Wolfgang, ‘An Ideomotor Approach to Imitation’, in Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science. Vol. 1: Mechanisms of Imitation and Imitation in Animals, ed. by Hurley, Susan and Chater, Nick (MIT Press, 2005), pp. 141–56Google Scholar; Massen, Cristina and Prinz, Wolfgang, ‘Movements, Actions, and Tool-use Actions: An Ideomotor Approach to Imitation’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 364.1528, (2009), pp. 2349–58CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0059. For a musicological exploration of this relationship in both directions (motor behaviours to assist auditory imagery, auditory imagery to assist motor behaviours), see David Allen, ‘Mental Representations in Clarinet Performance: Connections Between Auditory Imagery and Motor Behaviors’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2007).
65 Mark Reybrouck, ‘Musical Imagery between Sensory Processing and Ideomotor Simulation’, in Musical Imagery, pp. 118–35 (pp. 129–30).
66 Schiavio, Andrea, Menin, Damiano, and Matyja, Jakub Ryszard, ‘Music in the Flesh: Embodied Simulation in Musical Understanding’, Psychomusicology: Music, Mind and Brain, 24 (2015), pp. 340–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar, https://doi.org/10.1037/pmu0000052.
67 Noë, Alva, Action in Perception (MIT Press, 2004)Google Scholar. See also O’Regan, J. Kevin and Noë, Alva, ‘What is it Like to See: A Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience’, Synthese, 129.1 (2001), pp. 79–103 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012699224677. Noë’s later work, on the extended mind in the process of writing and editing literary texts, also provides valuable insight into how the ‘score-produced-so-far’, and interaction with it, may influence the composer as they continue to work. See Noë, Modern Manuscripts.
68 Mikumo, Mariko, ‘Motor Encoding Strategy for Pitches of Melodies’, Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 12 (1994), pp. 175–97,CrossRefGoogle Scholar https://doi.org/10.2307/40285650.
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71 For further exploration of the role of instruments other than the voice in aiding musical cognition, see Mark Reybrouck, ‘Music Cognition and the Bodily Approach: Musical Instruments as Tools for Musical Semantics’, Contemporary Music Review, 25.1–2 (2006), pp. 59–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/07494460600647451, and see also de Souza, Instruments at Hand.
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74 ‘I started composing in my head to relieve boredom while playing football [at school.]’ Christopher Dingle and Julian Anderson, Julian Anderson: Dialogues on Listening, Composing and Culture, (Boydell Press, 2020), p. 276.
75 Godøy, ‘Imagined Action, Excitation, and Resonance’
76 See Le Guin, Elisabeth, Boccherini’s Body: An Essay in Carnal Musicology (University of California Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a study of this relationship in reverse. This book was a major part of the journey towards developing the ideas discussed in this article. In examining how the connection Le Guin felt with a long-dead composer might be understood from the perspective of a composer with a performer, the question of the role of absent compositional tools — as well as performers — became an increasingly important problem to solve.
77 See, for example, Eve Klein, ‘Feigning Humanity: Virtual Instruments, Simulation and Performativity’, IASPM Journal, 6.2 (2016), pp. 22–48, doi: https://doi.org/10.5429/2079-3871(2016)v6i2.3en. Exploring virtual instruments would also be particularly impactful when it comes to understanding the role of tools in the cognitive processes involved contemporary composition for film and media.
78 See Boyle, Michael, ‘Empathetic Embodiment in the Compositional Process: A 4E Perspective on the Relationship between Composer and Performer’, Journal of Interdisciplinary Music Studies, 10 (2020), pp. 59–72 Google Scholar, https://doi.org/10.25364/24.10:2020.1.4 for an approach to this idea, one which might be better re-articulated in light of the ITC concept and other related work.
79 Cook, Music: A Very Short Introduction, p. 67.
80 Kirsh, ‘The Intelligent Use of Space’, pp. 61–62.
81 See Malafouris, ‘At the Potter’s Wheel’.
82 For very recent examples, see , Daniel Walzer, , ‘Blurred Lines: Practical and Theoretical Implications of a DAW-based Pedagogy’, Journal of Music, Technology & Education, 13.1 (2020), pp. 79–94 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, https://doi.org/10.1386/jmte_00017_1; Luciana Hamond, Evangelos Himonides, and Graham Welch, ‘The Nature of Feedback in Higher Education Studio-based Piano Learning and Teaching with the Use of Digital Technology’, Journal of Music, Technology & Education, 13.1 (2020), pp. 33–56, https://doi.org/10.1386/jmte_00015_1.
83 Thor Magnusson, ‘Of Epistemic Tools: Musical Instruments as Cognitive Extensions’, Organised Sound, 14.2 (August 2009), pp. 168–76, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355771809000272.
84 Strachan, Robert, Sonic Technologies: Popular Music, Digital Culture and the Creative Process (Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 68 CrossRefGoogle Scholar — although it’s worth noting that this can mean that these tools become suddenly very opaque the moment a composer attempts to use them in a way other than was intended by their designer.
85 John Sutton, ‘Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process’, in The Extended Mind, pp. 189–226 (p. 194).
86 Latour, Reassembling the Social, p. 210. Relatedly, see Betsy Sparrow, Jenny Liu, and Daniel M. Wenger, ‘Google Effects on Memory: Cognitive Consequences of Having Information at our Fingertips’, Science, 5 August 2011, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1207745 for an exploration of a phenomenon regarding search engines, whereby users know they have access to information and therefore don’t remember it, they just remember the steps they have to take to access it.
87 Strachan, Sonic Technologies, pp. 67–69.
88 Ibid., p. 62.
89 Henrik Sinding-Larsen, ‘Musical Notation as the Externalisation of Imagined, Complex Sound’, in The Oxford Handbook of Sound and Imagination, vol. 2, pp. 191–218.
90 Marc Duby, ‘Affordances in Real, Virtual, and Imaginary Musical Performance’, in The Oxford Handbook of Sound and Imagination, vol. 2, pp. 97–116 (p. 104).
91 See Corcoran and Spiro, ‘Score-dependency’ for an example of this happening to certain classical performers with regards to notation.
92 Riemann, ‘Ideas for a Study’, p. 82.
93 Clark and Chalmers, ‘The Extended Mind’. Otto (outside) and Inga (inside) are two characters used in a thought experiment to argue that we consider cognitive use of ‘memories’ written in a notebook in the same way that we consider cognitive use of ‘memories’ in an agent’s head.