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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 March 2011
What did the Muslim citizen of the classical Islamic world mean by Islam? In what sense was it operative in his life? To what extent did an Islamic slogan signify religious commitment? The difficulty in treating these questions consists in the fact of the variety, not the dearth of answers to them. Rather than develop alternative perspectives, however, we would, in what follows, focus our study on one aspect of the life of the Muslim Umma. This is the problem of the dynamics underlying revolt, rebellion, social protest and revolution in early Islam; with reference to this aspect we would ask our basic questions. In a sense, the three questions could be resolved into one: to what extent, in what sense, and why, was Islam a factor in Muslim revolts during the first centuries? Two propositions would help treat this question, and in the course of the study, we would see if a third may also be legitimately articulated. They are as follows: first, it is possible that the disaffected Muslims in classical and medieval Islam may have tended to translate their mundane grievances into religous terms so that, for instance, the perceived threat to a particular dispensation, or the actual destruction of such a dispensation may have been interpreted as a threat to religion itself; and second, Islam may have been interpreted as the best form of propriety and justice so that those who felt themselves deprived considered it incumbent to fight for such justice, not necessarily because it would benefit them but because this was what Islam was, it being considered obligatory to strengthen, save, or reestablish Islam.
1 Two problems, related to each other and to our basic question though not treated in the present context, are: first, why did men convert to Islam; and second, why (i.e. for what reasons) did they fight for it, not in the sense of revolting, in the interest of what they perceived Islam to be, against a particular dispensation of the Muslim community in general, but rather in the sense of fighting for an extension of the dār al-Islām at the expense of the enemy, i.e. non-Muslim, territory. In each of the two problems, the vitality of the religious factor qua propter should not be underestimated; this does not, however, mean that some scepticism about such vitality cannot be sustained. Cf., for instance, the alleged remark of Ṣafwān b. Umayya: “Muḥammad was the most hateful of men to me, but he made me a gift, and at once he was the dearest of men to me.” al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad b. Jarīr, Jāmi' al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān, (Cairo, A.H. 1321, A.D. 1903), X, pp. 98–99Google Scholar, quoted in Watt, W. Montgomery, Muhammad at Medina, (Oxford, 1956), p. 348Google Scholar. Also, Ḥamāsa, 792 v. 3: “Thou hast not left home for the sake of Paradise, but for the sake of the bread and dates”, quoted in Wellhausen, J., The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, tr. Weir, M. G., (Calcutta, 1927), p. 25Google Scholar. On some scepticism about conversion, cf. al-Ṭabarī, Ta'rīkh Rusūl wa'l Mulūk, ed. de Goeje, M. J. et al. , (Leiden, 1879–1901), ser. ii. p. 1507Google Scholar; Dennett, D.C., Conversion and Poll-Tax in Early Islam, (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), chapter 6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Crone, Patricia, Slaves on Horses, the evolution of the Islamic polity, (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 52, 240CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Watt, , Muhammad at Medina, pp. 146–147Google Scholar.
2 Cf. Crone, P. and Hinds, M., God's Caliph: religious authority in the first centuries of Islam, (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 61 ff., 83Google Scholar. Crone and Hinds argue that the use of the collocation “Kitāb Allāh wa—sunnat nabiyyihi” by the rebels who denied the legitimacy of the Umayyad caliphate or the validity of its existence, signified an appeal to propriety, justice, and good practice: not that the book of God and the sunna of his Prophet would lead to propriety; rather, when used by rebels, this collocation meant propriety.
3 Cf. Weber, Max, The Sociology of Religion, tr. Fischoff, Ephraim, (Boston, 1954), p. 223Google Scholar: “To be sure, the ancient political god of the locality, even when he was an ethical and universally powerful god existed merely for the protection of the political interests of his followers' associations.” It follows that when such interests were threatened, what men perceived was not a threat to these interests but an affront or danger to their god who was responsible for the protection of such interests. Their reaction was thus in the nature of a religious, not mundane or secular, response.
4 The suggestion that when Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī and 'Amr b. al-'Ās met at Dawmat al-Jandal to arbitrate between 'Alī and Mu'āwiya (A.D. 656), the first question was not about who would be caliph, but whether 'Uthmān had been justly or unjustly killed, is plausible. Cf. Watt, W. M., Islam and the Integration of Society, (London, 1961). p. 98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 Watt, W. M., The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, (Edinburgh, 1973), p. 166Google Scholar.
6 Even 'Ā'isha and 'Alī accused 'Uthmān of ta'ṭīl. See Hawting, G. R., “The significance of the slogan Lā Ḥukma illā Lillāh and the references to the ḥudūd in the traditions about the Fitna and the murder of 'Uthmān”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XLI, no. 3, (1978), p. 455, n. 13Google Scholar, citing al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb al-ashrāf V, (Jerusalem, 1936), p. 34Google Scholar.
7 Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, (Leiden, 1960—.)Google Scholar, s.v. “al-Hurmuzān”, (L. Veccia Vaglieri).
8 al-Ṭabarī, , Ta'rīkh, ser. i., pp. 2840–50Google Scholar.
9 But Cf. Wansbrough, J., Quranic Studies, (London, 1977), pp. 43 ff.Google ScholarHawting, G. R., “Lā Ḥukma”, p. 463Google Scholar, suggests that 'Uthmān's attempt to standardize the Qur'ānic text may have been interpreted as an attempt to weaken the authority of the scripture. This, he argues, may be one explanation of why the murderers of 'Uthmān used the slogan La Ḥukma illā Lillāh, whereby to reassert the authority of God and His Book.
10 al-Ṭabarī, I, pp. 2995–96, cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, p. 2985.
11 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2996: “. . . innaka qad iḥdathta iḥdāthan 'izāma”, as the rebels tell 'Uthmān. Hawting's view (“Lā Ḥukma”) that 'Uthmān may have represented the viewpoint of the sunna, which was one reason why his opponents appealed to the Kitāb Allāh, does not appear to be correct.
12 Morony, M. G., Iraq after the Muslim Conquest, (Princeton, 1984), p. 436Google Scholar.
13 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2981.
14 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2981; cf. al-Jāḥiz, , “Min kitāb faḍl Hāshim 'ala 'Abd Shams”, in Rasā'il al-Jāḥiz, ed. Sandūbī, H., (Cairo, 1933), p. 68Google Scholar.
15 Cf. Watt, W. M., Formative Period, p. 10Google Scholar. Note the suggestion that when 'Uthmān allegedly sent his slave to his governor of Egypt, it was jamalun min sadaqāt al-muslimīn, which was used, al-Ṭabarī, , ser. i, p. 2994Google Scholar.
16 Cf. note 2 above.
17 Cf. Lewis, B., The Arabs in History, (London, 1960), pp. 59–60Google Scholar.
18 Gibb, H. A. R., Modern Trends in Islam, (Chicago, 1946), pp. 5–7Google Scholar.
19 al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb al-Ashrāf V, ed. Goitein, S. D. F., (Jerusalem, 1936), p. 22Google Scholar; but cf. Bravmann, M. M., The Spiritual Background of Islam, (Leiden, 1972), pp. 125–128Google Scholar. See note 43, below.
20 al-Ṭabarī, I, pp. 3000, 3024. Cf. al-Jāḥiz, , “Min risālatihi fi banī Umayya” in Sandūbī, H., ed., Rasā'il al-Jāḥiz, (Cairo, 1933), p. 292Google Scholar. That violation of the spirit of religion may be considered a greater offence than violation of the Qur'ānic ḥudūd as understood in the precise legal sense (Cf. EI(2), s.v. “Ḥadd”, [J. Schacht]), is suggested by al-Jāḥiz, himself in the same risāla, p. 296Google Scholar. Also cf. al-Ṭabarī, I, p. 3025.
21 Watt, , Integration, p. 97Google Scholar.
22 Cf. Watt, Montgomery, Muhammad at Medina, pp. 78–150Google Scholar.
23 The Islamic “variable” is emphasized in Donner, Fred McGraw, The Early Islamic Conquests, (Princeton, 1981), pp. 55–62, 255 f.Google Scholar, and passim.
24 Wellhausen, , Arab Kingdom, pp. 43–44Google Scholar. Cf. Yūsuf, Abū, Kitāb al-Kharāj tr. Shemesh, A. B., Taxation in Islam, III, (Leiden, 1969), pp. 94 ff.Google Scholar
25 Wellhausen, , Arab Kingdom, pp. 37 ff.Google Scholar; Watt, , Formative Period, p. 10Google Scholar.
26 What was important was the assumption that the Banū Hāshim was superior to the Banū Umayya; on this assumption, each privilege that was inaccessible to the Banū Hāshim would be regarded as a denial of what rightfully belonged to it. Cf. al-Jāḥiz, “Min kitāb faḍl Hāshim 'ala 'Abd Shams” in Sundūbī, (ed.), Rasā'il.
27 Morony, , Iraq, p. 436Google Scholar.
28 Weber, , Sociology of Religion, pp. 27–28Google Scholar.
29 Cf. al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2983: “lamma ra 'ā al-nās ma ṣana'a 'Uthmān kataba man bi'l Madīna min asḥāb al-nabī sl'm ilā man bi'l āfāq minhum wa kānū qad tafarraqū fī-al thaqhur: annakum innamā kharajtūm an tujāhidū fī sabīl Allah 'azza wajalla tutlibuna dīn Muḥammad sl'm qad ufsida min khalfikum wa turika, fa hallumū fa-aqimū dīn Muḥammad sl'm.”
30 One of the main arguments which, whether implicitly or explicitly 'Uthmān brought in his defence, was that of personal piety, (al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3006, 3017, 3024). Another argument was that the Muslim community would disintegrate if he were assassinated. (al-ḥabarī, i, pp. 3041 ff.) The rebels stood for Islam in the sense of a religious system, a system “threatened” by 'Uthmān after it had once flourished. (Cf. note 29, above) 'Uthmān warned that his murder would undermine the interests of this religious system (al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3023–24, 3042). This was unintelligible to the rebels who regarded 'Uthmān himself as the threat. And when 'Uthmān claimed that he ruled by divine right (al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2989, 2990, 2994, 2997, 3024), there was left no doubt that it was to preserve and enhance the interests of the caliphate that 'Uthmān invoked both his personal piety, and the argument concerning the interests of religion. Since in this, as in other instances, what 'Uthmān said could not be believed for the Caliph had lost his credibility (Cf. al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2988–89, 2992–94, 2997–98), it was easy for the rebels to reject both arguments. (Cf. note 33 below).
31 Watt, W. M., Integration, p. 97Google Scholar.
32 Gibb, H. A. R., “The evolution of government in early Islam”, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ed., Shaw, S. J. and Polk, W. R., (Princeton, 1962), pp. 36–39Google Scholar.
33 Gibb, , “Evolution”, p. 40Google Scholar. Also cf. the very interesting report in al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3024: 'Uthmān pleads that he could not have done any wrong since it was Allāh who chose him Khalīfa; and as Allāh knew beforehand, all that he ('Uthmān) would do, He would not have made him Khalīfa if anything unjust or irreligious was destined to be commissioned by 'Uthmān. To this, his opponents reply that what Allāh does is always correct and just; but the choice of 'Uthmān was made not because 'Uthmān was incapable of an impious deed, but because Allāh wanted, through him, to put Muslims to a test (ja'ala amrik baliyyatan ibtala bi-ha 'ibāduhū). It is clear that what 'Uthmān claimed was on the one hand, infallibility, which reinforced, and was reinforced by, personal piety; and on the other divine right for kingship, which would militate in the direction of strengthening the political institution (Cf. note 30, above). Conversely, the main emphasis of 'Uthmān's opponents seems to have rested upon the concept of Islam as a religious, and not a political system. Thus they argued that the caliph would be only an instrument of the religious system, not vice versa: even an evil caliph is important only in so far as he puts the vitality of the religious system to the test. Religion, not politics, is therefore not the more important, but the only point of reference.
34 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3012, 3016 ff.
35 Watt, , Formative Period, pp. 10, 76Google Scholar.
36 Cf, al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3374; Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, s.v. “Khārijites” (G. Levi Delia Vida).
37 El(2), s.v. “Azārika” (R. Rubinacci); Watt, , Formative Period, p. 22Google Scholar.
38 Cf. El(2), s.v. “Ḥarūra” (L. Veccia Vaglieri). See note 42, below.
39 Why else should a Khārijī confront 'Alī with his ears stuffed with his fingers: if Mu'āwiya's men could raise the Qur'ān on their lances and “deceive” the proto-Khawārij, was it not possible that 'Alī, by quoting from the scriptures, might do the same? Cf. al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3363. The reluctance of the Khawārij to argue with 'Alī, immediately before most of them were massacred at al-Nahrawān, is also suggestive. al-Ṭabari, , ser. i, pp. 3379–80Google Scholar: “fatanādau' lā tukhātibūhum wa-la tukallimū-hum wa-tahayya'ū li'l-liqā'al-rabba; al-rawāḥ al-rawāḥ ilā, al-janna.”(see notes 47, 48 below).
40 Freud maintains that in the behaviour of some character-types, the sense of guilt may be prior to the transgression. Such people, he describes as “criminals from a sense of guilt”. In case of the Khawārij, a sense of guilt did precede the transgressions, but the guilt itself, we believe, was derived from an act of transgression, namely the murder of the Caliph 'Uthmān. See Freud, Sigmund, “Some character-types met with in psycho-analytic work” (1915), The Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud, IV, pp. 318–44Google Scholar, reproduced in Rickman, John, (ed.), A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud, (Allahbad, 1941), pp. 136–138Google Scholar.
41 That those who murdered 'Uthmān were not necessarily the men who later became known as the Khawārij, is an important consideration. While some members of Tamīm and 'Abd al- Qays may have been involved or implicated in the murder (Morony, , Iraq, p. 469)Google Scholar and it was, interalia, from them that support for the Khawārij seems to have come, (Morony, , Iraq, p. 473Google Scholar; al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3353), “the precise nature of importance,” as Professor Watt has maintained, “of the continuity [which the Khawārij claimed with the murderers of 'Uthmān] is not obvious.” (Formative Period, p. 9). We have assumed that the Khawārij may have been afflicted with a sense of guilt. But if they had not murdered 'Uthmān (which, for purposes of argument may be taken as another assumption), why did they feel guilty? It is in the “communalistic” way of Khārijī thinking (Watt, , Formative Period, pp. 35–36Google Scholar), that the answer lies. Salvation was a collective enterprise. Thus, if any member of the community sinned, there were only two alternatives which were available to the community at large: either to disown that member, and deny that he was any longer a member of the community or qualified to become one, which is to say that he had ceased being a Muslim, and was therefore liable to the death penalty; or to maintain that the act was not in fact a sin, and that the whole community, and not a particular individual, was responsible for it (al-Ṭabarī, ser. i. p. 3376). It is clear why the communalistic way of thinking should have underlined both attitudes or alternatives: if a man was damned because of his sin, he would endanger the salvation of the whole community; it was therefore imperative either to demonstrate his error and dissociate from him, or to claim that his act was not an error, and to dissociate from those who thought it was. Clearly, therefore, the question of who exactly had made the transgression was irrelevant for the Khawārij. This attitude would explain their nervousness about salvation, their aggressiveness, and if there was a subconscious sense of guilt, the universality of such a sense.
42 Cf. the rebels' argument at Ḥarūra, summarized by Vaglieri, EI(2), s.v. “Ḥarūra”: “When we had shed the blood of 'Uthmān, we were in the right path because he had made innovations (aḥdāth); so too when we shed the blood of Ṭalḥa, al-Zubayr and their adherents on the Day of the Camel because they were rebels; and also when we shed the blood of the supporters of Mu'āwiya and 'Amr because they were rebels and transgressors against the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet.”
43 Watt, , Formative Period, p. 20Google Scholar; Gibb, , “Evolution of government”, in Studies, p. 40Google Scholar, suggests that 'Alī may have had his “vision of a structure of government”, which he sought, though unsuccessfully, to implement. Cf. al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3367, where one Rab ī'a b. Shaddād al-Khath'amī is reported to have demanded, as the condition of his bay'ā for 'Alī, fidelity not only to the Kitāb Allāh and Sunnat rasūl Allāh, but also to the Sunna of Abū Bakr and 'Umar; and al- Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3377, where the Khawārij recall with nostalgia, the person and caliphate of 'Umar I.
44 Cf. Izutsu, T., Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'ān, (Montreal, 1966), p. 105Google Scholar: “the Qur'ānic outlook divides all human qualities into two radically opposed categories, which . . . we might simply call the class of positive moral properties and the class of negative moral properties respectively. The final yardstick by which this division is carried out, is the belief in the one and only God the Creator of all beings. In fact, throughout the Qur'ān there runs the keynote of dualism regarding the moral values of man: the basic dualism of believer and unbeliever.” Quoted in Keddie, N. R., (ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500, (Berkeley, 1972), p. 358Google Scholar.
45 Cf. At the Diet of Worms, Luther “stipulated that there should be no judgement except by the standard of Scripture. [The Council] . . . replied that it stood to reason, and could not be made the object of a special condition. They meant different things, and the discussion came to naught.” What Luther “had said about the use and abuse of indulgences had not inflamed the nation. But the appeal to Scripture was definite and clear, and it met many objections and many causes of opposition.” Luther “admitted, in the end, that Councils as well as Popes might be against him, and that the authority by which he stood was the divine revelation. That is how ‘the Bible, and the Bible only,’ became the religion of Protestants.” Acton, Lord, Lectures on Modern History, (London, 1960), “Luther”, pp. 104, 101, 100Google Scholar.
46 al-Jāḥiz, , Kitāb al Bayān wa'l Tabyīn, (Cairo, 1948), II, pp. 124–125Google Scholar, as quoted in Rahman, Fazlur, Islam, (London, 1966), p. 168Google Scholar.
47 But cf. al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3361–62, 3388.
48 See Parsons, Talcott' “Introduction” to Weber, Max, The Sociology of Religion, pp. xlix ffGoogle Scholar
49 Weber, Sociology of Religion, index, s.v. “Salvation”.
50 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i. pp. 3363–64, 3379–81.
51 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p . 3374; EI(2), s.v. “Khāridjites”; the Khārijī doctrine of the grave sinner, and of his exclusion from the community, was based on their doctrine of works: cf. Watt, Formative Period, passim; Weber, , Sociology of Religion, p. 199Google Scholar.
52 The need for salvation, and the nervousness about it, would account for what has been identified as the “petty and fissiparous character of Khārijī thought.” Watt, W. M., Free-Will and Predestination in Early Islam, (London, 1948), p. 36Google Scholar. Their unquestioning faith in the righteousness of their cause, and their desire to banish all scepticism and doubt, seems to have been a thin veil for their nervousness. Cf. al-Mas'ūdī's, report, Al-Tanbih wa'l-Ishrāf, (Beirut, n.d.), [1936], pp. 256–57Google Scholar, about why a considerable number of the Khawārij abandoned 'Abdallāh b. Wahb at Nahrawān: “wa qīla inna al-sabab fi tafarruqu man tafarraqa 'anhu an- al- Khawarij tanādū 'inda iḥaṭata asḥab 'Alī 'alayhi al-salām wa iṣrā 'ihim fīhim: 'yā ikhwatīna, asra ‘ū bina al-rawḥa ila-al-janna’; fa qāla 'Abdallāh b. Wahb: fa la 'allahā ilā 'al-nār. Fa qāla man fā raqahumurā'iyyan: nuqātilu ma'ā rajul shākk; fā-fāraqūhu.” (See notes 39, 40,41 above; and note 53, below).
53 This nervousness, and the ferocity to which it leads, comes out very strongly in al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3373 ff., where the murder of 'Abdallāh b. Khabbāb at the hands of the Khawārij is reported.
54 It is possible that the slogan lā ḥukma illā lillāh may have been raised, if it be established that it was raised before the two parties accepted the principle of arbitration, to call for and not to protest against the arbitration.
55 That 'Alī actually lost the battle of Ṣiffīn has also been suggested. Cf. Wellhausen, , Arab Kingdom, p. 82Google Scholar, who doubts this suggestion (which comes from Theophanes) and Crone, P., Slaves on Horses, pp. 203, 214Google Scholar, who is inclined to accept it. Cf. al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3349.
56 See note 4 above.
57 See note 41, above.
58 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3369, 3377.
59 They were called al-Shurāt, the vendors, “those who have sold their soul for the cause of God.” EI(2), s.v. “Khāridjites”. Cf. al-Qur'ān, 9: 111.
60 Cf. Watt, , Formative Period, pp. 88, 244Google Scholar; but see Wensinck, A. J., The Muslim Creed, (Cambridge, 1932), p. 52Google Scholar.
61 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p . 3353.
62 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3349, 3352. Note the suggestion (al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3354) that 'Abdallāh b. 'Abbās was in charge of both the religious and the temporal matters of the men from 'Alī's camp with whom he went for parleys with the Khawārij: “wa-huwa yuṣalli bihim wayala umūrahum.”
63 For “Shi'ism, as it is described by the heresiographers, did not exist before the last quarter of the ninth century”. Watt, , Formative Period, p. 38Google Scholar.
64 Watt, , Integration, p. 5Google Scholar.
65 Watt, , Integration, p. 96Google Scholar.
66 Shaban, M. A., The 'Abbāsid Revolution, (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 141–142Google Scholar.
67 Watt, , Integration, p. 96Google Scholar.
68 Cf. Crone, , Slaves on Horses, pp. 30–31Google Scholar; EI(2), s.v. “Khiṭṭa” (P. Crone); Wellhausen, , Arab Kingdom, p. 125Google Scholar.
69 Cf. Crone, , Slaves on Horses, pp. 49–57Google Scholar; Wellhausen, , Arab Kingdom, pp. 71–73Google Scholar; Lewis, , Arabs in History, pp. 70–73Google Scholar.
70 Cf. al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3359: “. . . thumma-inṣarafa 'Amr wa ahl al-shām ila Mu'āwiya wa sallamū 'alahyi bi'l-khilāfa”.
71 See references to al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr in Watt, , Integration, p. 98Google Scholar.
72 Gibb, , “Evolution”, in Studies, p. 40Google Scholar.
73 Cf. the statement Imāmī Shī'ī tradition ascribes to 'Alī: “. . . the common people of the community . . . are the the pillars of religion: the power of the Muslims and the defence against the enemies. Your leanings should therefore be towards them and your inclination with them.” Nahjul Balāgha: sermons, letters and sayings of Imam Ali, (Rome, 1984), p. 536Google Scholar.
74 al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3387.
75 As Muḥriz b. Shibāb al Tamīmī tells 'Alī: “. . . nakhāfū fī khidhlānik wa'l takhalluf 'anka shiddat al-wabāl. al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3373.
76 This would explain the words in which the supporters of 'Alī made the earliest articulation of their creed: nahnu awliya'u man wālai'ta wa ā' dā'u man'ādai'ta. al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3350. The idea of salvation, whether this-worldly or other-worldly, through complete submission to the leader, had already been pronounced in the Qur'ān (for example, 7.157), with reference to Muḥammad.
77 The weary bitterness with which 'Alī addressed his followers when, out of a Baṣran garrison of 60,000 strong, only 3,200 joined his array for the projected march against Syria (al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3370–72); or when his troops said they wanted to crush the Khawārij before they proceeded to Syria (al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3372–73); or when, after the battle of Nahrawān, the troops almost explicitly refused to march against Mu'āwiya (al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3385–87); clearly underscores the self-righteous but completely helpless state of 'Alī. These were situations when 'Alī may have, most explicitly, brought home the suggestion that it was because of the fickleness of his followers that he had failed. 'Alī's lieutenant, 'Abdallāh b. 'Abbās, leading 'Alī's deputation to the arbitration court had already complained about the same thing: al-Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3354.
78 Lewis, , Arabs in History, p. 62Google Scholar.
79 Cf. Morony, , Iraq, pp. 486, 494Google Scholar.
80 Cf. Weber, , Sociology of Religion, p. 102Google Scholar. Also compare al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb, V, pp. 220.21–221.2Google Scholar.
81 Lewis, , Arabs in History, p. 71Google Scholar.
82 Watt, , Formative Period, p. 42Google Scholar.
83 Ibid., pp. 43–44.
84 Morony, , Iraq, pp. 486, 492Google Scholar.
85 The second letter of the Khārijī Ibn Ibāḍ (later first century Hijra) addressed to Caliph 'Abd al-Malik contains probably the first comprehensive Khārijī denunciation of the Shī'a religion:
“. . . They abandoned the judgement of their Lord and took ḥadīths for their religion; they claimed to have obtained knowledge other than from the Kor'ān, including a raising of the dead before the Day of Resurrection. They believed in a book which was not from God, written by the hands of men. . . . Then they adopted this house [sc. the 'Alīds] as their religion. . . . they abandon the fear of God, not calling [people] to it, they followed the soothsayers and hope for revolutions . . . at a raising of the dead before the Day of Resurrection.. . . They dissociated from Abū Bakr and 'Umar . . . [and] claimed that the Apostle of God had ordered both of them to obey 'Alī. . .” Quoted in Cook, M., Early Muslim Dogma, a Source Critical Study, (Cambridge, 1981) pp. 9–10Google Scholar. Even if Cook is correct in arguing that this letter was not written by Ibn Ibāḍ, and was not addressed to Caliph 'Abd al-Malik, the fact that a letter was indeed written by a Khārijī, concerning the Shī'a and at a very early date, is what would be important in the present context.
86 Weber, , Sociology of Religion, p. 188Google Scholar.
87 Cf. al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb, V, pp. 205–206Google Scholar.
88 al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb, V, pp. 214–273Google Scholar, passim. The question of from whom revenge is to be sought, and for what inevitably changes. But the Iranian Revolution of 1979 has shown that the need for revenge remains relevant to Shī'ī consciousness. Cf. the following report in Time (17 August, 1987): “They jammed Revolution Avenue in the heart of Tehran last week, a million Iranians raising their fists and shouting as if with one voice, Revenge! Revenge! Revenge! The clutches of women dressed in black chadars, the phalanxes of men bearing placards that said DOWN WITH U.S.: the angry scene had been played out before.” It is clear that this revenge motif reinforces the martyrdom hysteria, so pronounced in the revolutionary consciousness: this helps to conceive of the world in terms of the present. To avenge oneself is an obligation; so long as the oppressor continues to scheme, and he would continue to scheme as long as he exists, the sense of destiny generated by the duty to march forward, remains. And the sacrifices that are made in the process ensure that there is no turning back: this is the basic explanation of why the original zeal has been retained even eight years after the revolution occurred, and even after more than 300,000 men have been killed in the war against 'Irāq.
89 Besides other indicators, including the use of the title “al-Mahdī” for Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya, cf. the following report: “fa-qāla al-Mukhtār li-Ibn al-Zubayr . . . innī la-a'lamu qawman law anna lahum rajullan lahu rifqun wa 'alima bimā ya 'ti wa yadhar, la-ustakhrija laka minhum jundan tuqātilu bihim ahlal-Shām; qala man-hum; qāla Shī'atu 'Alī wa banī Hāshim bi'l- Kūfa.” al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb, V, pp. 271–272Google Scholar.
90 The clearest indicator of this is the messianic content of 'Abbāsid propaganda. Cf. Lewis, Bernard, “The regnal titles of the first 'Abbāsid Caliphs” in Dr. Zākir Hussain Presentation Volume, (Delhi, 1968)Google Scholar; EI(2) s.v. “'Abbāsids”, (B. Lewis).
91 On religious suspicions concerning al-Mukhtār, see al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb V, pp. 221, 231, 242, 260, 265, 272Google Scholar. As for suspicions concerning the 'Abbāsids, see Abū Ḥanīfa Aḥmad b. Dāwūd al-Dināwarī, al-Akhbār al-ṭiwāl, ed. Guirgass, V., (Leiden, 1888), p. 360Google Scholar; also al-Ṭabarī, ser. ii, 1965.
92 Cf. Watt, , Formative Period, p. 47Google Scholar.
93 Watt, , Formative Period, pp. 47–50Google Scholar.
94 Weber, , Sociology of Religion, pp. 108–117Google Scholar.
95 Cf. EI(2), s.v. “al-Mahdī”, (W. Madelung); al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb, V, pp. 214–273Google Scholar, passim.
96 al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb, V, pp. 231–32, 251, 262–63Google Scholar; Morony, , Iraq, pp. 489–90Google Scholar.
97 Cf. al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb, V, p. 223Google Scholar; Crone, , Slaves on Horses, pp. 264–65Google Scholar; but pace Shaban, , 'Abbāsid Revolution, p. 145Google Scholar; idem., Islamic History, a new interpretation, I (Cambridge, 1970), p. 95.
98 Crone, , Slaves on Horses, pp. 264–65Google Scholar.
99 Le Monde,17 October, 1978; English version in Nobari, Ali Reza, ed., Iran Erupts, (Stanford, 1978), p. 22Google Scholar.
100 Cf. al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb, V, p. 235Google Scholar.
101 EI(2), s.vv. “Kaysāniyya” (W. Madelung); “'Abbāsids”, (B. Lewis).
102 Lewis, , “Regnal titles”, pp. 16–17Google Scholar.
103 Lewis, , “Regnal titles”, p. 17Google Scholar
104 Lewis, , “Regnal titles”, pp. 15–16Google Scholar; Mas'ūdī, , Tanbih, p. 292Google Scholar; cf. EI(2), s.v. “Mahdī”, (W. Madelung).
105 EI(2), s.v. “Mahdī”, (W. Madelung).
106 Cf. notes 69 and 97 above; also, Goldziher, Ignaz, Muhammadanische Studien, tr. Stern, S. M. and Barber, C. R., Muslim Studies, I, (London, 1967), pp. 112–118Google Scholar; note that the mawālī would not fight unless convinced that what they fought for were religious ideals: al Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1291; also consider the degree to which the Mawālī seem to have monopolized control of the religious offices of the caliphate: Goldziher, , Muslim Studies, I, pp. 109–110Google Scholar.
107 Shaban, 'Abbāsid Revolution, believes this class and this grievance to have been the fundamental force behind the 'Abbāsid movement; also cf. Gibb, , “The social significance of the Shu'ubiya”, in Studies, p. 62Google Scholar.
108 Shaban, , 'Abbāsid Revolution, pp. 72–75Google Scholar.
109 Cf. EI(2), s.vv. “Kaysāniyya”, (W. Madelung); “Khidāsh”, (M. Sharon); Morony, , Iraq, pp. 497–502Google Scholar.
110 Cf. Amoretti, B. S., “Sects and Heresies”, in Frye, R. N., ed., The Cambridge History of Iran, IV, (Cambridge, 1975)Google Scholar.
111 Crone, and Hinds, , God's Caliph, pp. 59–60Google Scholar, write: “The sources present every major revolt from the time of 'Uthmān until the fall of the Umayyads as having invoked a call to, or an oath of allegiance on, ‘the book of God, and the sunna of his Prophet.’”
112 For Muslims, this has always been, and remains so. For some observations on this point in a different context, see Lewis, B., The Muslim Discovery of Europe, (London, 1982), pp. 171–74Google Scholar.
113 See note 2, above.
114 This is how Dā'ud b. 'Alī denounces al-Marwān II in his speech at the inauguration of 'Abbāsid rule. al-Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 32.
115 Wellhausen, , Arab Kingdom, p. 25Google Scholar.
116 Cf. EI(2), s.v., “al-Mahdī”, (W. Madelung).
117 al-Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 33.
118 Madelung, W., “New documents concerning al Ma'mūn, al-Faḍl b. Sahl and 'Alī al-Riḍā” in Studia Arabica et Islamica: Festschrift for Iḥsan 'Abbās, al-Qādī, W., ed., (Beirut, 1981)Google Scholar, quoted in Crone, and Hinds, , God's Caliph, p. 94Google Scholar.
Note that in his propaganda, al-Mukhtār uses the expression “ākhar al-dahr”, al-Balādhurī, , Ansāb, V, p. 228Google Scholar. Compare what the Khurāsānīs have to say while boasting of their role in the 'Abbāsid Revolution: “wa'l anṣāar ansārān: al-Aws wa'l Khazraj nasarū al-nabī. . .fī awwal alzamān wa ahlu-Khurasān nasarū warathatahu fī ākhar al-zamān. “Risāla ila' l Fath b. Khaqān fī manaqib al-Turk wa 'āmmat jund al-Khilāfa”, in Hārūn, A. S. M., ed., Rasā'il al-Jāḥiz, I, (Cairo, 1964), p. 15Google Scholar.
119 Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, (Lahore, 1954), p. 231Google Scholar.
120 Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, (rep. Lahore, 1971), p. 179.
121 Report, p. 219.