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The Mongol Army

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 March 2011

H. Desmond Martin
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Grenard has said, “it is largely because of human nature's delight in superlatives, that the world's famous captains have always been given perfectly fabulous hosts. Great generals must have huge armies. The names of Genghis Khan (Chinghiz Khan), Timur, Alexander, and Xerxes mount like wine to the brain of the historian. His figures become figures of speech: ‘one hundred thousand’ becomes his minimum. He soon leaps to ‘one million’. He does this with a sense of relish but also because he knows that his reader will tremble with pleasurable awe at the passing of a conqueror who leads countless warriors.”

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Articles
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Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society , Volume 75 , Issue 1-2 , January 1943 , pp. 46 - 85
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Asiatic Society 1943

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References

page 46 note 1 Fernand Grenard, Baber first of the Mongols.

page 46 note 2 Fernand Grenard, Grengis Khan.

page 47 note 1 Chinghiz Khan spent the summer of 1219 on the south side of the Altai Mountains grazing his cavalry along the Qara Irtish and Urungu Rivers. Then, resuming his march in the autumn, he probably reached the Khwarazmian frontier some time during November, 1219. In his article on Chinghiz Khan in the Encyclopaedia Islamica Barthold contends that since a considerable part of the Mongol army proper was required in the east not more than 70,000 Mongols can have participated in the war against Khwaraem. The rest of the troops, he says, came from subject peoples. The Uighur and Qarluqs we know contributed contingents, and beyond a doubt the Qirqhiz, Solon, Khitan, and Öngüt did the same. Perhaps, as with Muqali in China, there were even Jürchät troops.

page 47 note 2 Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion.

page 47 note 3 Harold Lamb, Genghis Khan.

page 47 note 4 The military power of the Mongols can be said to have reached its zenith under Möngke Khan (1251–9), for after his death parts of the Empire were intermittently torn by civil war.

page 48 note 1 These he divides as follows: Kulgan, son of Khulan Khatun, 4,000; Temüge Ochighin, youngest brother of Chinghiz Khan, 5,000; the sons of Jüchi Qassar, first brother of Chinghiz Khan, 1,000; Elchigidai, son of Qachiun Ülchi, Chinghiz Khan's second brother, 3,000; the Queen Mother Hö'elün Eke (then dead); 3,000; and supernumeraries 1,000. With the exception of the last 1,000 D'Ohsson's enumeration is the same as that of Erdman.

page 48 note 2 See Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion.

page 49 note 1 By far the largest and most efficient army of Medieval Christendom was that of the Byzantine Empire. From the time of its reorganization in a.d. 640 until its disastrous defeat by the Seljuq at Manzikert in a.d. 1071, it never numbered over 150,000 effectives and sometimes no more than 120,000. Of these 24,000 were stationed in Constantinople, 70,000 in Asia Minor, and the rest in Europe. (See Robert Byron, The Byzantine Achievement.)

page 49 note 2 Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, Great Captains Unveiled, study on Jenghiz Khan and Sübötai.

page 49 note 3 The battle of Carrhæ in 53 b.c., where the Parthian Suren utterly defeated a Roman army of 42,000 men, was the only occasion on which the Hellenistic world saw an engagement where one army was composed solely of horsemen. Then, contrary to the usual Parthian practice of combining cavalry and infantry, the Suren had nothing but mounted troops. Tarn contends that his force did not exceed 10,000 effectives, the majority of which were light armoured bowmen, the remainder heavily armoured lancers. In addition there was a corps of 1,000 camels for carrying spare arrows. Despite the brilliant success of this new type of army it disappeared with the Suren, who was murdered shortly after Carrhæ by King Orodes I. (See G. Rawlinson, The Sixth Oriental Monarchy; and Tarn, Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments.)

page 50 note 1 See The Book of Marco Polo, Yule, Cordier, vol. i, chap. liv. Marco Polo says that the Mongols living in Cathay and the Levant had much degenerated from their forbears and those living in Tatary proper (Mongolia).

page 51 note 1 Carruthers, , Unknown Mongolia, vol. ii, p. 133Google Scholar.

page 51 note 2 D'Ohsson; Djuwayni.

page 51 note 3 Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, Great Captains Unveiled, study on Jenghiz Khan and Sübötai.

page 51 note 4 Batu's invasion was of course made largely on horses drawn from the Volga, and the steppes north of the Black Sea, but in all essentials these were the same as those from Mongolia.

page 51 note 5 See Mêng Hung; the Mêng Ta Pei-lu.

page 51 note 6 See The Journey of Friar John Plano Carpini, chapters 15 and 16, Beazley, Hakluyt.

page 52 note 1 See Mêng Hung. Among the Hsiung-nu babies were taught to ride on sheep and to shoot rats and birds with small bows and arrows. (See Parker, A Thousand Years of the Tartars.)

page 52 note 2 Mêng Hung, The Mêng Ta Pei-lu.

page 52 note 3 Harold Lamb, Tamerlane, note on bows in the East and West. Grenard, Gengia Khan. Murdoch, , History of Japan, vol. iGoogle Scholar.

page 52 note 4 Describing the equipment of the Khitan army, which was very like that of the Mongols, Parker says that each soldier had to keep in readiness four bows and 400 arrows. (See A Thousand Years of the Tartars.)

page 53 note 1 In the same notice Mêng Hung asserts that most of the iron was in the shape of coins formerly circulated by the Sung in Ho-Tung (Shan-bsi), but after the conquest of this province by the Chin the money was abolished and the inhabitants sold it to the T'a-T'a.

page 53 note 2 Mêng Hung says from the age of 15 to 61, but the Chinese regard a child as one year old at its birth. Parker, see A Thousand Tears of the Tartars, says that among the Hsiung-nu every male strong enough to draw an ordinary bow was liable for military service.

page 54 note 1 On one memorable occasion Chinghiz Khan gave such a banner to his general Muqali, who in 1217 was made commander-in-ehief of all forces in China and whose orders were to be obeyed as his own. (See T'u Chi, The Mêng-wu-êrh Shih, Biog. of Mu-hua-li (Muqali).)

page 55 note 1 The Khitan imperial guard numbered 5,600 men; see Parker, A Thousand Years of the Tartars.

page 56 note 1 Information on the organization and strength of the Guard has come from Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion; Vladimirtsov, The Life of Chinghiz Khan; and Palladius' translation of the Yüan Ch'ao Pi Shih.

page 57 note 1 These regulations are taken from the translation pf the Yüan Ch'ao Pi Shih by Palladius.

page 57 note 2 Vladimirtsov, The Life of Chinghiz Khan.

page 58 note 1 The principal refugees received by Chinghiz Khan were Li Tsao and T'ien Kuang-ming, who having been punished by the Chin emperor, fled to the Mongols in 1209. (See Wu Kuang-ch'êng, The Hsi Hsia Shu Shih.)

page 58 note 2 Mêng Hung says that sometimes as many as six or seven spare horses were led.

page 58 note 3 In 1299, when Ghazan (1295–1304), the greatest of the Il-Khans of Persia, was preparing to invade Syria, he sent out instructions for the mobilization of 100,000 troops—half his entire army. These he ordered to come fully equipped and each man to have five horses. Six months' provisions were collected and 5,000 baggage camels were called up for their transport, all of which were ready at the appointed time. (See Howorth, The History of the Mongols, part iii.)

page 60 note 1 Help from Manchuria was also extremely difficult. The Khitan Yeh-lü Liu-kê had revolted, and after submitting to the Mongols early in 1212, fought vigorously on their behalf. (See the Mêng-wu-êrh Shih, the biog. of Yeh-lü Liu-Kê.)

page 60 note 2 The most detailed account of this campaign is to be found in the Mêng-wu-êrh Shih of T'u Chi. The location of many of the places in the accompanying map have been taken from the Chung Kuo Ku-chin Ti-ming Ta Tzu-Tien.

page 60 note 3 See the biog. of Mu-hua-li (Muqali) in the Yüan Ch'ao Ming-ch'êng Shih-liao of Su T'ien-chiao.

page 60 note 4 For information on the garrison, fortifications, and resistance of Chung Tu during the beginning of 1214 see the Yüan Shih Hsin-pien.

page 61 note 1 At the beginning of the invasion of 1211 the Chin failed to engage either of the two Mongol armies on their arrival in the prairies north of the Great Wall. But Chinghiz Elhan, anxious to fight a field action where the terrain was favourable to his troops, waited over three months (from May to August) for the Chin to give him battle. Then, at Wu-sha pao in August and at Huan-êrh-Tsui and Hui-ho pao in September or early October (all in the vicinity of present Kalgan) he won three crushing victories.

page 62 note 1 For a very able explanation of the strategic reasons responsible for the Khwarazm Shah's policy of defence; see Walker, C. C., “The Mongol Invasion of Khwarazm,” The Canadian Defence Quarterly, 04, 1932Google Scholar.

page 62 note 2 Chinghiz Khan must have crossed the Khwarazmian border some time in November, 1219.

page 62 note 3 See The Canadian Defence Quarterly, April, 1932.

page 64 note 1 Juwaini reports that Samarkand contained 110,000 defenders, 60,000 Turks and 50,000 Tajiks. When referring to the surrender and subsequent massacre of the Turks by the Mongols, he says that they numbered 30,000, so the Shah must have taken about half of the original 60,000 with him when he fled. (For Juwaini's report see Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion.)

page 65 note 1 According to Mêng Hung scouting detachments marched as much as 100 li and 200 li (35 and 70 miles) ahead of the army. Their duty was to inform the commander-in-cluef of hostile troops in the area, towns, and villages and their means of defence, localities containing provisions, good camping grounds, and suitable sites for an engagement. Additional information was obtained from local inhabitants captured for the purpose.

page 65 note 2 Fêng Ch'êng-chün, Ch'êng-chi-ssu Han.

page 66 note 1 See Siren, The Old Cities of Pei King; also Bretschneider, Archaeological & Historical Researches on Pei King & its environs.

page 66 note 2 Chung-hsing stood on or near the site of present Ning-hsia, which is smaller than its famous predecessor. Though the Tangut capital was a hard nut to crack it was equal to Chung Tu in neither size nor fortifications.

page 67 note 1 Colonel Yule, in a long note in The Book of Marco Polo, says that whereas in the Occident the largest Trebuchets were operated by a counterpoise, those in China were worked by man-power. Consequently the largest engines of this kind were built for the Mongols by Moslems. At the siege of Hsiang-yang and Fan ch'êng (1268–1273), one of the longest in history, two engineers, 'Ala ad-Din of Mosul and Isma'il of Hilla, built machines that hurled 166 Ib. projectiles with such force that they penetrated the beaten clay walls to a depth of 7 or 8 feet.

page 67 note 2 See Gaubil, , Histoire de Gentchiscan et de Unite La Dinstie des Mongous ses suceeeseurs conquérans de La Chine, published in Paris, 1739Google Scholar.

In his Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources Bretschneider informs us that during the twelfth century the siege corps of the Chin army included a special company of troops practised in the use of inflammable projectiles. This body, he says, consisted of foreigners, probably Moslems. When the Mongols invaded China the Chin still used such troops, so Chinghiz Khan must have organized a similar force from deserters, one of whom will have been the officer of foreign extraction from Chung Tu (Peiking) mentioned by Gaubil.

page 67 note 3 See Schlegel, , The Invention of Gun-powder and Fire-arms in China Prior to the Arrival of Europeans, the T'oung Pao, 1902Google Scholar.

page 68 note 1 See D'Ohsson.

page 68 note 2 The Mongols were not the first to resort to this inhuman practice. In 947, when the city of Chang-Tê revolted, the Khitans, not only made unlimited use of captives to retake it, but exterminated the population when this was accomplished.

page 69 note 1 Mêng Hung affirms that on occasions 1,000 men would stretch across a front of 100 li (approximately 35 miles), but probably one should read 10,000 men instead of 1,000 men.

page 69 note 2 Ma Tuan-lin (see Ethnographie de peuples étranges à la Chine, section on the Nü-chin or Nü-chih) states that in the days of Akuda (1113–1123) the forces of the Nü-chih (Jürchät) were drawn up for battle in squadrons of fifty horsemen, twenty men with heavy cuirasses and long lances in front and thirty with light cuirasses and bows behind.

A Mongol squadron numbered 100 men, and from Piano Carpini one learns that these were arranged at intervals with the heavily armoured troops of each stationed in front of the others. Mêng Hung, although he omits to give the ratio between the heavy and light troops in a squadron, specifically says that shook action was the duty of the front ranks.

B. H. Liddell Hart, in his study on Chinghiz Khan and Sübötai in Oreat Captains Unveiled, reports that the Mongol “battle formation was comprised of five ranks, the squadrons being separated by wide intervals. The troops in the two front ranks wore complete armour, with sword and lance, and their horses also were armoured. The three rear ranks wore no armour, and their weapons were the bow and the javelin.” However, he does not say from where he got his information.

page 70 note 1 Plano Carpini reports that suoh enveloping manœuvres frequently misled opponents into believing that the Mongols were far more numerous than they really were. But King Hayton of Armenia, remarking on the close and regular order of the Mongol ranks, says that their numbers were often under-estimated.

page 70 note 2 In one of his commentaries in the Mêng Ta Pei-lu Wang Kuo-wei includes a note on the Khitan method of fighting an enemy in the open. The army of the Khitan, he tells us, was built up on a decimal basis. Five hundred or 700 men constituted a squadron, ten squadrons a division, and ten divisions an army corps, this last being under the orders of a senior commander.

When a general action was expected scouts were sent to make a careful reconnaissance of the local topography and lines of communication. This done the army formed its ranks and covered its advance with skirmishers.

As soon as contact was made with the enemy the attack was begun by the first of the ten squadrons. If this was successful the other nine squadrons were launched forward to its support and a charge was pressed home. But if the first squadron failed it was called to the rear to rest and water its horses while the second took its place. If necessary this tactic was repeated until all ten squadrons had charged forward and retired, when the first again resumed the attack and the whole procedure was carried out once more. Were a day of this insufficient to break the enemy the same thing went on for two or three days. Finally, when the opposing troops had become tired, the Khitan commander instructed his men to tie grass to the tails of their horses and set in motion yet another series of charges. At the end of it the enemy were almost sure to be overcome with dust and fatigue and would collapse before a determined onset by all ten squadrons.

page 71 note 1 The Chin army may have numbered 150,000 troops, while the Mongols on the field can hardly have exceeded 65,000.

page 71 note 2 The army of Ghazan at Salamiyet was undoubtedly the larger of the two, perhaps 50,000 strong, whereas that of the Mamluks according to Wassaf, Nuwari, and Makrizi respectively, numbered 40,000, 25,000, and 20,000. (See Howorth, The History of the Mongols, part iii.)

page 72 note 1 See Vambéry, History of Hungary.

page 72 note 2 According to the Yüan Ch'ao Pi Shih the battle seems to have been fought to the north of Qara Qorum in the valley of the Upper Orkhon. The two armies numbered perhaps 50,000 to 60,000 men each, with an advantage of a few thousand on the side of the coalition.

page 72 note 3 See D'Ohsson.

page 73 note 1 The Mongol victory at Lignitz was one of those which medieval chroniclers ascribed to overwhelming numbers. Actually the Mongol troops on the field cannot have exceeded those of Prince Henry.

page 74 note 1 For the Mongol invasions of India see Sir Wolseley Haig, Cambridge History of India, part iii, Turks and Afghans; also Ferishta, History of Hindoustan. The latter, who was Haig's source of information for the battle, believed or pretended to believe that the Mongol left was broken by Zafar and only rallied afterwards, but a critical examination of the action convinces one that the Mongols carried out a deliberate retreat to draw the general after them. The reported numbers of the contending armies are fantastic, 200,000 for that of the Mongols, and 300,000 cavalry and 700 elephants for the army of the Sultan.

page 74 note 2 See Howorth, History of the Mongols, part iii.

page 75 note 1 See the Mêng-wu-êrh Shih, biog. of Mu-hua-li (Muqali).

page 76 note 1 See Vambéry, History of Hungary.

page 76 note 2 See Howorth, History of the Mongols, part iii.

page 76 note 3 Hsüan-Tê Chou is the present Hsûan-hua fu and is approximately twenty miles south-east of Kalgan.

page 77 note 1 Stringent as such regulations may seem they were less severe than those enforced by the Jürchät or Chin during the twelfth century. Ma Tuan-lin states that among them, should the leader of five perish in battle, the four men under him were punished by decapitation, should the leader of ten fall the two officers of five were slain, while the loss of a leader of 100 was punished by the execution of all the leaders of ten under him. (See Ethnographie de peuples étranges à La Chine.)

page 77 note 2 Howorth, History of the Mongols, part iii.

page 77 note 3 See Mêng Hung, Mêng Ta Pei-lu.

page 78 note 1 This excerpt from the Bilik, as well as those from the Yasa, have been taken from Riasanovsky's Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law.

page 78 note 2 Owen Lattimore, author of Manchuria Cradle, of Conflict, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, etc., believes that Chinghiz Khan regarded the Darqan as a valuable means of counterbalancing the hereditary aristocracy.

page 79 note 1 See Sung Lien, Yüan Shih, the biog. of Su-pieh-u-T'ai (Sübötai).

page 80 note 1 Vladimirtsov, The Life of Chinghiz Khan.

page 81 note 1 Mêng-wu-êrh Shih, biog. of Po-lu (Boru) of Wu-mu-hu.

page 81 note 2 T'ung-chien Kang-mu.

page 81 note 3 In this famous battle, which gave them Asia Minor, the Mongols are reported by King Haython to have numbered 30,000, while Malakia says that the army of the Seljuqs was 150,000. Friar Rubruk gives the Mongols only 10,000, but reduces the Seljuqs to 100,000. The figures for the Seljuq army must be vast exaggerations. (See Howorth, History of the Mongols, part iii.)

page 83 note 1 For the economic situation in the Chin empire, see Mabel Ping Hua Li, The Economic History of China, agrarian conditions and measures under the Chin. For the activities of the Red Coats see the Chin Shih.

page 83 note 2 See Hitti, History of the Arabs.

page 83 note 3 Under the Umayyad Dynasty the Arabs thrice repulsed attempts by the Turks to establish their authority over Transoxiana. In 707 and 712 the armies sent by Mo-ch'o (691–716) seem to have been too small for the undertaking. A more formidable attack came in 731 when the Türgesh Khan Sulu aided a revolt and drove the Arabs over the Amu (Oxus). Not until 738 did the Umayyads defeat him and force his withdrawal. Then, fortunately for them, a rebellion, which resulted in Sulu's death and the break-up of the Türgesh empire, put an end to the possibility of another attack. But on none of these occasions was the invading army to be compared with that of the Mongols. In his final invasion Sulu's army numbered no more than 30,000. See Rene Grousset, L'Empire des Steppes, also The Arab Conquests in Central Asia, by H. A. R. Gibb.

page 85 note 1 One of the apochryphal stories illustrating this belief is still current in the Ordos country. According to it Chinghiz Khan was once on the verge of defeat in battle with the Chinese when suddenly he received a sword from heaven, and charging upon the enemy won an overwhelming victory. (See Van Oost, Au Pays des Ortos.)