Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 July 2014
Albeit with some deterioration in recent years, Malaysia has a state with high levels of capacity that has achieved sustained economic growth through a commitment to macroeconomic stability and other pro-business measures. Recent comparative historical work argues that this state capacity is an institutional legacy of a specific model of British colonisation. While Malaysia is an amalgam of areas formerly under direct and indirect rule; the former – a model of colonisation characterised by the construction of a legal-rational bureaucracy with extensive geographic reach – was more prevalent. Prior to the transition to independence, the British increased the “direct” nature of their rule by creating a powerful central government that brought the various territories together. And, a concerted transition of power to a cohort of “bureaucrats-turned-politicians” ensured that the new nation's leaders inherited an intact state apparatus. However, a disproportionate number of these senior bureaucrats hailed from Johor, a state formerly under indirect rule - a colonial model associated with small, neo-patrimonial states with limited capacity. By using colonial sources to map the contours and composition of the Malayan state under British and, subsequently, Japanese rule, this article will explore the reasons for this paradox.
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59 The corresponding figures for Kedah, the second-wealthiest UMS, were smaller, but of a similar proportion: 61 members of the Kedah Civil Service (excluding cadets); and 6 British MCS Officers. State of Kedah, Estimates of the Revenue and Expenditure for the year AD 1939 (Alor Star, 1939); The Malayan Establishment Staff List as on 1st July, 1941 (Singapore, 1941). Interestingly, Kedah did not have a Mentri Besar or a Deputy until after the War. Until then, the senior-most position was that of Secretary to Government, followed by a Chief Malay Judge.
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70 L. Horner, “Japanese Military Administration in Malaya and the Philippines”, PhD Dissertation, University of Arizona (1974), p. 56. Available evidence indicates that a similar process of restructuring began in Penang in June. Lim Beng-Kooi, “The Japanese Occupation in Penang, 1941–45”, BA Academic Exercise, University of Singapore (1974), p. 13.
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85 In contrast, despite their early rise to power under the Japanese, left-wing Malay nationalist groups such as the KMM were subsequently marginalised. The Japanese sought to discourage political organisations they did not control and did not foresee, at least initially, making Malaya independent. Akashi, Y. and Yoshimura, M., “Introduction” in New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 1941–1945, (eds.) Akashi, Y. and Yoshimura, M. (Singapore, 2008), p. 18 Google Scholar.
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89 At 306 literate people per 1,000 population, Johor was considerably ahead of the other UMS, whose rates were: 236 (Kedah); 104 (Kelantan); 115 (Terengganu); and 234 (Perlis). del Tufo, M.V., Malaya Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore: A Report of the 1947 Census of Population (London, 1947), Table 52Google Scholar.
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100 CO 537/1581, no. 11 “The Inaugural conference of UMNO”: HQ Malaya Command weekly intelligence review, no. 28.
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103 Onn had a complex personal relationship with the Sultan of Johor. Being a member of Johor aristocracy and from a family of senior civil servants, Onn was raised in close proximity to the latter. However, their relationship had notable ups and downs, with Onn being sacked from the Johor civil service and living in “exile” in Singapore for his outspokenness. There, in his work as a journalist, the Sultan was a frequent target for criticism. In 1935, the two had a rapprochement, and Onn moved back to Johor and was made a member of the State Council. Onn did not support the deposition of the Sultan, much to the disappointment of the Johore Malay Union. It is possible that both personal and political interests coincided. Some have maintained that he wanted to maintain a united front among Malays at this period. Zainah, Legacy of Honour, p. 113. This caused serious disagreement between Onn and Abdul Rahman as well as his sons Suleiman and Ismail. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, pp. 66–68.
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107 Ooi, The Reluctant Politician, p. 46.
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109 In the immediate post-war period, Kedah had two leading Malay political organisations, Saberkas and the Kedah Malay Union (KMU), which both joined UMNO in varying capacities. Khir, Mahadzir bin Mohd, “The Kedah UMNO-PAS Struggle: Its Origins and Development” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1980 (Singapore, 1980)Google Scholar. As a member of Kedah royalty, a senior civil servant, founder and patron of Saberkas and, subsequently, Chairman of the KMU, Tunku Abdul Rahman emerged as the state's preeminent leader. The KMU became an UMNO branch organisation, and while Tunku then attained a certain amount of prominence in UMNO, he left Malaya to study in the UK from late 1946–1948, precisely when the party's structures were being established. Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua, Palace, Political Party and Power: A Story of the Socio-Political Development of Malay Kingship (Singapore, 2011), p. 247 Google Scholar. Furthermore, upon his return to Malaya and his work in the Attourney-General's Office, he was banned from political participation. Following his election as UMNO President, he retired to participate in politics. Miller, H., Prince and Premier (London, 1959), pp. 99 Google Scholar, 108. For its part, Saberkas was a socially progressive association and differed with the more conservative UMNO leadership. However, while Saberkas was an UMNO associate member, the group remained outside the party's mainstream and eventually dissolved itself. Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, p. 123; Kamar, Ahmad, “The Formation of Saberkas’” in Darulaman: Essays on Linguistic, Cultural, and Socio-Economic Aspects of the Malaysian State of Kedah, (ed.) Omar, Asmah Haji (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), p. 182 Google Scholar. Following Tunku Abdul Rahman's assumption of the UMNO presidency in 1951, the influence of Kedahans at the party's highest levels increased with the participation of former Saberkas members Mohd Khir Johari, Senu Abdul Rahman, and Mohd Ismail Yusof. Ahmad Kamar “The Formation of Saberkas”, p. 182.
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