Scholarly discussions of the eighteenth-century luxury controversy invariably acknowledge the important role of David Hume, usually identifying him as one of the first to have made a strong case against the traditional view that luxury is morally corrupt and inimical to the survival of the state. But, having said this, they tend to treat Hume rather summarily, often focusing exclusively on the 1752 essay “Of Refinement in the Arts” and generally agreeing with one leading commentator that “Hume's arguments are straightforward, and can be dealt with briefly.” On closer examination, however, it appears that Hume's treatment of luxury was more complex in its historical development, and more subtle in its final form, than some have supposed. The first part of the following discussion considers the historical progression of Hume's thinking while the second consists in an analysis of “Refinement,” with particular attention to an important but overlooked distinction between the appropriate moral and political responses to luxury.

In a recent paper, R. Ekelund and D. Walker (1996) argue that, “[i]ncentives, utilitarian principles, and the diffusion of property rights are the key to understanding Mill on the statics and dynamics of ‘equity and justice’”(p. 576). Their paper, which deals with John Stuart Mill's views on taxation, reads very much like a modern defense of popular capitalism. From the static point of view, it is imperative not to interfere with the internal relationship between economic variables and thus, distort incentives (proportional income tax). From the dynamic point of view, “inheritance taxes [are] the essential mechanism of an evolutionary change towards an efficiently functioning capitalism” (p. 578, italics added).

In December 1913, William Ernest Johnson (1858–1931), a Cambridge logician, published a famous article on demand theory in the Economic Journal (EJ) entitled “The Pure Theory of Utility Curves.” Although Johnson's treatment of the subject was in some ways original, in others it strongly resembled the analysis set forth by Vilfredo Pareto in earlier contributions, particularly in the Manuel d'économie politique (Italian edition 1906, French edition 1909). Despite this resemblance, Johnson did not cite Pareto. This failure to acknowledge Pareto's precedence aroused resentment and some suspicion of plagiarism among the Italian Paretians. In the end, however, the Paretian economists of the period generally assumed that Johnson was unfamiliar with Pareto's works and had obtained his results independently. For example, in 1916, Luigi Amoroso published a review of Johnson's 1913 paper in the Giornale degli Economisti, in which he wrote, “From Johnson's article it comes out that Johnson does not know Pareto's work” (Amoroso 1916, p. 410, author's translation). Amoroso attributed Johnson's ignorance of Pareto's work to a more general ignorance on the part of English economists, “Johnson's lacuna, more than particular to him, is a lacuna of the area in which he lives” (Amoroso 1916, p. 410, author's translation).

E. E. Slutsky, the originator of the eponymous equation and part-inventor of the Slutsky-Yule effect, is perhaps the Soviet/Russian/Ukrainian economist most quoted by mainstream economists today, although his fame in the West rests on only two of his articles that have been translated into English. These are the 1915 article on the theory of consumer budgets, and the 1927 article on the random causes of business cycles. Many more papers remain available only in their original Russian versions, although a few were published first in other languages such as German. Presented here is a modest effort to bring more of Slutsky's work to an English-speaking audience. In a chronological bibliography of Slutsky's writings published in 1960, sandwiched between items four and six—“On the Criterion of Goodness of Fit of the Regression Lines” (1914) and “On the Theory of the Budget of the Consumer” (1915)—sits an item originally published in 1914, an “Essay on the Economic Views of William Petty.” This item is translated below.

This essay was originally read at the conference of the Society of Economists at the Kiev Institute of Commerce on November 14, 1913, to mark the 250th anniversary (in 1912) of the appearance of William Petty's first economic treatise. It was subsequently published in the Student Bulletin of the same institute (1914, Numbers 16, 17, 18).

Publishing this essay in the form of a separate pamphlet I, of course, acknowledge its extreme incompleteness in many respects, but think that the extreme poverty of Russian literature about such a wonderful economist justifies its worth.

In this essay we are going to closely analyze the importance of Allyn A. Young's theory of increasing returns. In truth, we could also discuss his position on economies of scale, in that the analytical definitions suggested by the theory, as we shall shortly see, are not that helpful in understanding exactly what this writer meant by (the principle of) increasing returns: in fact, the latter are always linked to the more general, all-pervasive concept of economic progress, as is evident from the title of his most famous work. Young's contribution to the debate (one only has to think of the cost controversy of the 1920s) over returns and economies (and diseconomies) of scale, was in truth somewhat marginal. His only work that dealt with these questions, besides his 1928 celebrated paper (Young 1928), dates back to 1913, when in an important critical note (Young 1913), which we shall briefly analyze in section 2, he criticized a number of economic policy rules deriving from Arthur C. Pigou's (1912) famous work. To put it more precisely, Young did not have any substantial role to play in the construction and perfection of the neoclassical theoretical paradigm; in fact, as we argue in section 3, there is significant evidence to suggest that he was probably moving increasingly further away from such a position. The essence of Young's work, summarized in the article written in 1928, would seem to consist in the request for a theoretical redirection, in the analysis of the dynamics of capitalist economies, along the lines of some of the classical economists, thus carrying the various suggestions on this matter already present in Alfred Marshall's theoretical contribution to extremes. In sections 4 and 5, dedicated to the discussion of this article and of its appendix respectively, we maintain that the logic of Young's analysis is based on a multi-sectoral model subject to qualitative and quantitative transformations, i.e., to structural change. Such a view enables us to understand: (1) the author's emphasis on the proportionality among different productive branches needed in order to ensure balanced economic expansion; (2) the attempt (made by the author in the appendix to his 1928 article) to explain the dynamics of the economic system in the presence of different intersectoral growth rates. In the concluding section we maintain that it is the alternative nature of his position compared with the “standard theory”—the reference here is particularly to Pigou's transcription of Marshall's economics—that represents the main feature of Young's work.