Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2015
The body of enquiry known as economics grew out of the practical needs of economic life and statesmanship, and also out of philosophical speculation on the nature of man and society. Adam Smith reflects both aspects, but I would locate him predominantly in the philosophical wing. When he switched from considering the theory of moral sentiments to dealing with the causes of the wealth of nations, I don't believe that he saw himself as engaging in a fundamentally different mode of enquiry. He was, of course, concerned with practical questions--of ethical behaviour in the one case and of economic policy in the other--but discussion of both was from a broad philosophic viewpoint. Ricardo, on the other hand, seems to me to exemplify, and at a high level, someone who falls predominatly in the other wing. Although his thought was abstract, it was much more an attempt to deal pragmatically with important issues of practice than it was an attempt, in the philosophical tradition, to understand the general nature of men's interaction in society. Indeed, utilitarianism by then offered a strictly philosophic rationale for concern with practice (albeit a piggish one in some eyes) which did much to confound and confuse the dual origins of economics. Mill and Sidgwick, among others, maintained the tradition of a close connection between philosophical and economic enquiry, within the framework of a broadened utilitarianism, and the continuing affinity of the two disciplines has been exemplified more recently in the work of writers such as Rawls and Sen, not to mention the recent upsurge in discussion of economic methodology.
This presidential address was delivered to the 1984 meeting of the History of Eonomics Society at the University of Pittsburgh on May 23, 1984. I have left the text essentially unchanged but added a few footnotes and a closing paragraph.
2 Letter to the editor Science, Vol. 217, July 9, 1982, pp. 104-5, reproduced in Eichner, Alfred S. (edited) Why Economics is Not Yet a Science (M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 In particular, I wish to evade the question of defining the precise boundary between scientific knowledge and other kinds of knowledge.
4 These tighter professional “rules of the game” do not banish all conceptual ferment and controversy from physics, but some exaggeration may perhaps be permitted when painted with a very broad brush.
5 McCloskey, Donald N., “The Rhetoric of Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 21 (June, 1983), pp. 481–517.Google Scholar
6 Ibid., p. 482. Actually this is only one of several definitiions proposed by Booth that McCloskey cites. Another is “the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared discourse” (p. 483). The 20 percent figure was proposed by McCloskey in a siminar at the University of Virginia, February, 1984.
7 Polanyi, Michael, The Tacit Dimension (Doubleday, New York, 1966)Google Scholar.
8 Were I to rewrite this address, I would probably wish to emphasize that meterology, not physics, is probably the physical science most nearly analogous to economics. But the anology to physics may still be the more illuminating, even though less precise, because the character and history of physics are much more widely known.