For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation between back transfers and second-order beliefs of the trustor: while reciprocity models predict a negative correlation, guilt-aversion models predict a positive one. This paper tests the hypothesis that the inconclusive results in the previous studies investigating the reaction of trustees to their beliefs are due to the fact that reciprocity and guilt aversion are behaviorally relevant for different subgroups and that their impact cancels out in the aggregate. We find little evidence in support of this hypothesis and conclude that type heterogeneity is unlikely to explain previous results.

We compare different implementations of the Stochastic Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (SBDM) belief elicitation mechanism, which is theoretically elegant but challenging to implement. In a first experiment, we compare three common formats of the mechanism in terms of speed and data quality. We find that all formats yield reports with similar levels of accuracy and precision, but that the instructions and reporting format adapted from Hao and Houser (J Risk Uncertain 44(2):161–180 2012) is significantly faster to implement. We use this format in a second experiment in which we vary the delivery method and quiz procedure. Dropping the pre-experiment quiz significantly compromises the accuracy of subject’s reports and leads to a dramatic spike in boundary reports. However, switching between electronic and paper-based instructions and quizzes does not affect the accuracy or precision of subjects’ reports.

Ponzi-like investment schemes were popular in many transition economies. Often, some government officials had inside information about the viability of such schemes and used this information to their own advantage. We introduce a novel experimental design that allows us to study the extent to which this kind of abuse of information is possible and what consequences it has for those without such information. In particular, we investigate how the proportion of informed versus uninformed investors and the promised dividends affect the way in which informed investors can exploit the investments of uninformed investors. Our results show that uninformed investors follow the observed choices of the informed even more than predicted by theory. This adds to the devastating effects that this kind of underground activity can have on the uninformed.

We conduct an experiment on an online game, exploring the effect on gameplay behavior of voluntary commitment devices that allow players to limit their gameplay. Approximately 25% of players use the devices. Median and 75th percentile device users use devices approximately 60 and 100% of the time, respectively. Players who chose to use the device were those who had previously played longer and more frequently than those who chose not to use the device. Offering the commitment devices decreased session length and session frequency by 2.8 and 6.1%, respectively, while increasing weeks of play by 5.5%. Our results are consistent with some players having self-identified self-control problems, leading to longer and more frequent play than they would prefer, and to demand for commitment, and also with commitment devices creating a more rewarding experience, leading to longer-lasting involvement with the game. Our results suggest incentivizing or requiring commitment devices in computer games.

Our research addresses the effect of shared vs. mixed group identities in an information cascade game. We vary whether subjects always choose after a decision maker who shares the same identity or after a decision maker with a different identity. We find that subjects’ inclination to follow their predecessor is stronger in groups uniquely consisting of ingroup members compared to mixed groups. We relate this result to recent social cognition research.

The literature on rent-seeking primarily focuses on contests for achieving gains, although contests for avoiding losses are also omnipresent. Examples for such ‘reverse’ contests are activities to prevent the close-down of a local school or the construction of a waste disposal close-by. While under standard preferences, investments in ‘reverse’ and ‘conventional’ contests should not be different, loss aversion predicts contests for avoiding losses to be fiercer than conventional ones. In our experimental data, the difference in investments between conventional and reverse Tullock contests is small and statistically insignificant. We discuss several explanations for this remarkable finding.

In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488–503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.