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Show no quarter: combating plausible lies with ex-ante honesty oaths

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

J. Jobu Babin Open the ORCID record for J. Jobu Babin [Opens in a new window]  and
Haritima S. Chauhan Open the ORCID record for Haritima S. Chauhan [Opens in a new window]
J. Jobu Babin*
Affiliation:
Behavioral Economics and Organization Research Group (BEORG), Macomb, IL, USA School of Accounting, Finance, Economics, and Decision Sciences, Western Illinois University, Macomb, IL, USA
Haritima S. Chauhan*
Affiliation:
Behavioral Economics and Organization Research Group (BEORG), Macomb, IL, USA School of Accounting, Finance, Economics, and Decision Sciences, Western Illinois University, Macomb, IL, USA
*
[email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Misreporting—a form of lying—is common in online labor and remote work settings. We execute an experiment on Amazon MTurk to determine how ex-ante honesty oaths and worker beliefs impact lying behavior across a range of plausible and implausible lies. Using a novel quantile-style exposition of the types of lies reported, we find that oaths elicit more truthful behavior, reducing both small, plausible lies and large, implausible ones. Shirking is reduced under oath. Worker expectations of group reporting are positively related to individual reporting of plausible lies.

Keywords

OathsSelf-reportingLyingBeliefsPlausible liesExperiment

JEL classification

D90: General‡ C93: Field Experiments D91: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , June 2023 , pp. 66 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2023.

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