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The seeds of success: the pivotal role of first round cooperation in public goods games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Mehmet Y. Gürdal Open the ORCID record for Mehmet Y. Gürdal [Opens in a new window] ,
Orhan Torul Open the ORCID record for Orhan Torul [Opens in a new window]  and
Mustafa Yahşi
Mehmet Y. Gürdal
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Boğaziçi University, Bebek, 34342 Istanbul, Turkey
Orhan Torul*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Boğaziçi University, Bebek, 34342 Istanbul, Turkey
Mustafa Yahşi
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Koç University, Rumelifeneri Yolu, Sarıyer, 34450 Istanbul, Turkey
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper examines cooperation and punishment in a public goods game in Istanbul. Unlike prior within-subject designs, we use a between-subject design with separate no-punishment and punishment conditions. This approach reveals that punishment significantly increases contributions, demonstrating the detrimental effect of having prior experience without sanctions. We highlight two critical factors—heterogeneous initial contributions across groups and how subjects update their contributions based on prior contributions and received punishment. An agent-based model verifies that the interaction between these two factors leads to a strong persistence of contributions over time. Analysis of related data from comparable cities shows similar patterns, suggesting our findings likely generalize if using a between-subject design. We conclude that overlooking within-group heterogeneity biases cross-society comparisons and subsequent policy implications.

Keywords

Public goods experimentPunishmentCooperationCulture

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D81: Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior J16: Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination
Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , June 2024 , pp. 113 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Economic Science Association 2023.

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