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The Varieties of Instantiation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 June 2021
Abstract
Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take to be mind-dependent: sensible qualities like color and bodily sensations like itches. Given that the mind is never itself literally red or itchy, we cannot explain the instantiation of these qualities as a matter of their having a mental bearer. Appealing to insights from Berkeley, I defend a view on which a property can be instantiated not in virtue of having a bearer—mental or material—but rather in virtue of being the object of a conscious act of perception. In the second half of the paper, I suggest that the best account of sensible qualities and bodily sensations ultimately makes use of both varieties of instantiation.
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- Copyright © American Philosophical Association
Footnotes
Versions of this paper were presented at colloquium series at NYU and the CUNY Grad Center. I would like to thank the audiences at these events for helpful comments. I am deeply indebted to John Campbell, Mike Martin, and Hannah Ginsborg for extensive discussion of this material. I would also like to thank Austin Andrews, Adam Bradley, Jim Hutchinson, Alex Kerr, Berislav Marušić and two anonymous referees at The Journal of the American Philosophical Association for their comments. Finally, thanks to Peter Epstein for his unwavering support.
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