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Two Ethical Ideals in Spinoza's Ethics: The Free Man and The Wise Man

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2019

SANEM SOYARSLAN
SANEM SOYARSLAN*
Affiliation:
NC STATE [email protected]
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Abstract

According to Steven Nadler's novel interpretation of Spinoza's much discussed ‘free man’, the free man is not an unattainable ideal. On this reading, the free man represents an ideal condition not because he is passionless, as has often been claimed, but because even though he experiences passions, he ‘never lets those passions determine his actions’. In this paper, I argue that Nadler's interpretation is incorrect in taking the model of the free man to be an attainable ideal within our reach. Furthermore, I show that Spinoza's moral philosophy has room for another ideal yet attainable condition, which is represented by the wise man. On my reading, becoming a wise man consists not in surmounting human bondage, but in understanding ourselves as finite expressions of God's power and, thereby, coming to terms with the ineliminability of bondage for us due to our very human or modal condition in the Spinozistic universe.

Keywords

early modern philosophySpinozaethical idealsfree manwise man
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , Fall 2019 , pp. 357 - 370
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2019 

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