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“Spectator to One's Own Life”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 May 2024
Abstract
Galen Strawson (2004) has championed an influential argument against the view that a life is, or ought to be, understood as a kind of story with temporal extension. The weight of his argument rests on his self-report of his experience of life as lacking the form or temporal extension necessary for narrative. And though this argument has been widely accepted, I argue that it ought to have been rejected. On one hand, the hypothetical non-diachronic life Strawson proposes would likely be psychologically fragmented. On the other, it would certainly be morally diminished, for it would necessarily lack the capacity for integrity.
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- Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 10 , Issue 4 , December 2024 , pp. 877 - 896
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The American Philosophical Association
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