Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T10:24:42.287Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Skeptical Theism Proved

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 June 2020

PERRY HENDRICKS Open the ORCID record for PERRY HENDRICKS [Opens in a new window]
PERRY HENDRICKS*
Affiliation:
PURDUE [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Many hold that it undermines a key inference often used by such arguments. However, the case for skeptical theism is often kept at an intuitive level: no one has offered an explicit argument for the truth of skeptical theism. In this article, I aim to remedy this situation: I construct an explicit, rigorous argument for the truth of skeptical theism.

Keywords

problem of evilskeptical theismthe preclusion argumentGod
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , Summer 2020 , pp. 264 - 274
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

For comments on this paper, thanks to Paul Draper and Brett Lunn. And thanks especially to G.L.G.—Colin Patrick Mitchell—for particularly insightful comments.

References

Alston, William. (1991) ‘The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition’. Philosophical Perspectives, 5, 29–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benton, Matthew, Hawthorne, John, and Isaacs, Yoaav. (2016) ‘Evil and Evidence’. In Kvanvig, Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1–31.Google Scholar
Bergmann, Michael. (2001) ‘Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil’. Nous, 35, 278–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bergmann, Michael. (2009) ‘Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil’. In Flint, Thomas P. and Rea, Michael (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press), 375–99.Google Scholar
Bergmann, Michael. (2012) ‘Common Sense Skeptical Theism’. In Clark, Kelly James and Rea, Michael (eds.), Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga (New York: Oxford University Press), 9–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cullison, Andrew. (2014) ‘Two New Versions of Skeptical Theism’. In Dougherty, Trent and McBrayer, Justin (eds.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press), 250–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DePoe, John. (2017) ‘Positive Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Divine Deception’. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 82, 89–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Draper, Paul. (2013) ‘The Limitations of Pure Skeptical Theism’. Res Philosophica, 90, 97–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Durston, Kirk. (2000) ‘The Consequential Complexity of History and Gratuitous Evil’. Religious Studies, 36, 65–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gale, Richard. (1996) ‘Some Difficulties in Theistic Treatments of Evil’. In Howard-Snyder, Daniel (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 206–18.Google Scholar
Hasker, William. (2008) The Triumph of God Over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering. Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press Academic.Google Scholar
Hendricks, Perry. (2018) ‘Sceptical Theism and the Evil-god Challenge’. Religious Studies, 54, 549–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hendricks, Perry. (2019) ‘The Nature of Skeptical Theism: Answering Nonstandard Objections to Skeptical Theism’. Philosophia Christi, 21, 105–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hendricks, Perry. (2020) ‘Skeptical Theism Unscathed: Why Skeptical Objections to Skeptical Theism Fail’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 101, 43–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hendricks, Perry. (Forthcoming) ‘We are not in the Dark: Refuting Popular Arguments Against Skeptical Theism’. American Philosophical Quarterly.Google Scholar
Howard-Snyder, Daniel. (1996) ‘The Argument from Inscrutable Evil’. In Howard-Snyder, Daniel (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 286–310.Google Scholar
Howard-Snyder, Daniel. (2009) ‘Epistemic Humility, Arguments from Evil, and Moral Skepticism’. In Kvanvig, Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 17–57.Google Scholar
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Bergmann, Michael. (2004) ‘Does Evil make Atheism more Reasonable than Theism?’. In Peterson, Michael and Arrogan, Raymond Van (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 13–25.Google Scholar
Hudson, Hud. (2006) ‘Beautiful Evils’. In Zimmerman, Dean (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 387–96.Google Scholar
Hudson, Hud. (2011) ‘A Metaphysical Mix: Morphing, Mal, and Mining’. Philosophical Perspectives, 25, 223–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hudson, Hud. (2013) ‘Best Possible World Theodicy’. In McBrayer, Justin and Howard-Snyder, Daniel (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 236–50.Google Scholar
Hudson, Hud. (2014a) The Fall and Hypertime. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hudson, Hud. (2014b) ‘The Father of Lies?’ In Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 147–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hudson, Hud. (2017) A Grotesque in the Garden. San Bernardino, CA: Xerxes Press.Google Scholar
Maitzen, Stephen. (2014) ‘Agnosticism, Skeptical Theism, and Moral Obligation’. In Dougherty, Trent and McBrayer, Justin (eds.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press), 277–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mooney, Justin. (2019) ‘The Problem of Evil: A Deontological Solution’. Faith and Philosophy, 36, 442–462.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rea, Michael. (2013) ‘Skeptical Theism and the ‘Too Much Skepticism’ Objection’. In McBrayer, Justin and Howard-Snyder, Daniel (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 482–506.Google Scholar
Rowe, William. (1979) ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’. American Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 335–41.Google Scholar
Rowe, William. (1991) ‘Ruminations About Evil’. Philosophical Perspectives, 5, 69–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rowe, William. (1996) ‘The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look’. In Howard-Snyder, Daniel (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 262–85.Google Scholar
Rowe, William. (2006) ‘Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil’. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 59, 79–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubio, Daniel. (2018) ‘God meets Satan's Apple: The Paradox of Creation’. Philosophical Studies, 175, 2987–3004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sullivan, Meghan. (2013) ‘Peter van Inwagen's Defense’. In McBrayer, Justin and Howard-Snyder, Daniel (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 396–410.Google Scholar
van Inwagen, Peter. (2006) The Problem of Evil. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wielenberg, Erik. (2010) ‘Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies’. Religious Studies, 46, 509–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wykstra, Stephen. (1984) ‘The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of “Appearance”’. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 16, 73–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wykstra, Stephen. (1996) ‘Rowe's Noseeum Arguments from Evil’. In Howard-Snyder, Daniel (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 126–50.Google Scholar