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Mereological Composition in Analytic and Buddhist Perspective
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 March 2021
Abstract
Comparing Buddhist and contemporary analytic views about mereological composition reveals significant dissimilarities about the purposes that constrain successful answers to mereological questions, the kinds of considerations taken to be probative in justifying those answers, and the value of mereological inquiry. I develop these dissimilarities by examining three questions relevant to those who deny the existence of composite wholes. The first is a question of justification: What justifies denying the existence of composite wholes as more reasonable than affirming their existence? The second is a question of ontology: Under what conditions are many partless individuals arranged composite-wise? The third is a question of reasonableness: Why, if there are no composites available to experience, do “the folk” find it reasonable to believe there are? I motivate each question, sketch some analytic answers for each, develop in more detail answers from the Theravādin Buddhist scholar Buddhaghosa, and extract comparative lessons.
- Type
- Article
- Information
- Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , Summer 2021 , pp. 173 - 194
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association
Footnotes
I thank the journal's referees for their helpful comments. When possible, I cite to English translations of ancient Buddhist texts. In doing so, I include, for specialists, the standard book, chapter, or other identifying information in addition to the page numbers of these modern editions.
References
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