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The Experience Machine Objection to Desire Satisfactionism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2017

DAN LOWE  and
JOSEPH STENBERG
DAN LOWE
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT [email protected]
JOSEPH STENBERG
Affiliation:
HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITÄT ZU [email protected]
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Abstract:

It is widely held that the experience machine is the basis of a serious objection to hedonistic theories of welfare. It is also widely held that desire satisfactionist theories of welfare can readily avoid problems stemming from the experience machine. But in this paper, we argue that if the experience machine poses a serious problem for hedonism, it also poses a serious problem for desire satisfactionism. We raise two objections to desire satisfactionism, each of which relies on the experience machine. The first is very much like the well-known experience machine objection to hedonism. The second asks whether someone who accepts desire satisfactionism should want to form a desire to plug into the experience machine.

Keywords

welfarehedonismdesire satisfactionismthe experience machine
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , Summer 2017 , pp. 247 - 263
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2017 

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