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Existence Puzzles and Probabilistic Explanations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2016

TYRON GOLDSCHMIDT
TYRON GOLDSCHMIDT*
Affiliation:
WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY [email protected]
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Abstract:

Why is there something rather than nothing? Robert Nozick and Peter van Inwagen have proposed a probabilistic answer: there are more ways there could have been something than ways there could have been nothing; each has an equal intrinsic probability of obtaining; and so there being something is intrinsically more probable. The author presents a few original objections to this line of thinking, focusing especially on the kinds of probability it invokes. The author also sketches a more promising probabilistic answer, one that makes relevant scientific and theological considerations that are usually quickly dismissed in this context.

Keywords

existenceprobabilityconcrete beingsmetaphysics
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , Fall 2016 , pp. 469 - 482
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016 

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