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Adaptive Preferences Are a Red Herring

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 May 2018

DALE DORSEY
DALE DORSEY*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF [email protected]
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Abstract:

Current literature in moral and political philosophy is rife with discussion of adaptive preferences. This is no accident: while preferences are generally thought to play an important role in a number of normative domains (including morality, the personal good, and political justice), adaptive preferences seem exceptions to this general rule—they seem problematic in a way that preference-respecting theories of these domains cannot adequately capture. Thus, adaptive preferences are often taken to be theoretically explanatory: a reason for adjusting our theories of the relevant normative domains. However, as I shall argue here, the relentless focus on the phenomenon of preference adaptation is a mistake. While I do not take a stand on whether typical examples of adaptive preferences are or are not problematic, I argue here that if they are problematic, it cannot be because they are adaptive.

Keywords

well-beingPolitical philosophyjusticemoralityadaptive preferences
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 3 , Issue 4 , Winter 2017 , pp. 465 - 484
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2018 

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