Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gxg78 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T20:53:50.212Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Are there Forms of Sensible Qualities in Plato?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 November 2018

PETER D. LARSEN
PETER D. LARSEN*
Affiliation:
TRINITY COLLEGE [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of whether, according to Plato, there are forms of sensible qualities; it is also addressed to the wider question of whether there are forms of physical and material things more generally. In particular, it considers the tension raised by the following theses: (1) a Platonic form is the essence of some thing; (2) for Plato those essences that are forms are imperceptible and are knowable through reasoning alone; (3) knowing the essence of a particular color (e.g., red) requires presentation with the relevant perceptible quality and hence requires sense perception; and (4) if a sense perceptible quality has an essence, then that essence is a form. The solution I defend to this puzzle basically consists of accepting theses (1) through (3) but denying thesis (4). Sensible qualities, according to Plato, do have essences, but specifying their essences does not require that one postulate a separate form.

Keywords

Platometaphysicsessenceformssense perception
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , Summer 2018 , pp. 225 - 242
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

I am grateful to audiences in Manchester (NH), Dublin, Uppsala, and Beijing for their comments on previous versions of this paper. I would especially like to thank Vasilis Politis for his incisive and constructive criticism. I am also grateful for the perceptive and helpful suggestions provided by the two anonymous readers from JAPA.

References

Ademollo, Francesco. (2011) The Cratylus of Plato: A Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Barney, Rachel. (2001) Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Fine, Gail. (1987) ‘Forms as Causes: Plato and Aristotle’. In Graeser, Andreas (ed.), Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle (Bern: P. Haupt), 69–112.Google Scholar
Politis, Vasilis. (2010) ‘Explanation and Essence in Plato's Phaedo’. In Charles, David (ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 62–114.Google Scholar
Politis, Vasilis. (2015) The Structure of Enquiry in Plato's Early Dialogues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Rowe, Christopher. (1993) ‘Explanation in Phaedo 99c6–102a8’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 11, 49–69.Google Scholar
Sedley, David. (1998) ‘Platonic Causes’. Phronesis, 43, 114–32.Google Scholar
Taylor, C. C. W. (1969) ‘Forms as Causes in the Phaedo’. Mind, 78, 45–59.Google Scholar
White, F. C. (1981) Plato's Theory of Particulars. New York: Arno Press.Google Scholar