Jockusch and Posner [4] showed that every minimal ω-degree is GL2. This is achieved by exhibiting a function f recursive in 0′ which dominates every function of minimal ω-degree. The function f has the peculiar property that for every s, f(s) is defined after a search (using 0′) over the power set of Ls (Gödel's constructible hierarchy at the level s). It can be seen that a function defined in a similar manner over an infinite successor cardinal k will not be a total function, since for example if k = ρ+, then f(ρ) will not be defined until after all the subsets of ρ have been examined, and this will take at least k steps. The following questions then naturally arise: (i) For successor cardinals k, is there a function dominating every set of minimal k-degree? (ii) For arbitrary cardinals k, is every minimal k-degree GL2 (i.e. b″ = (b ∨ 0′) for b of minimal k-degree)? In this paper we answer (i) in the negative and provide a positive answer to (ii), assuming V = L. We show in fact that if k is a successor cardinal and h ≤k 0′, then there is a function of minimal k-degree below 0′ not dominated by h (Theorem 1). This implies that any refinement of the function f described above will not be able to remove the difficulties encountered. On the other hand, we introduce the notion of ‘strong domination’ to provide a positive answer to (ii) (Theorem 2 and Corollary 1). We end this paper by indicating that for limit cardinals k, there is a function below 0′ dominating every function of minimal k-degree.

It is shown (in ZF) that every hereditarily countable set has rank less than ω2, and that if ℵ1 is singular then there are hereditarily countable sets of all ranks less than ω2.

If is a countable recursively saturated structure and T is a recursively axiomatizable theory that is consistent with Th(), then it is well known that can be expanded to a recursively saturated model of T [7, p. 186]. This is what has made recursively saturated models useful in model theory. Recursive saturation is the weakest notion of saturation for which this expandability result holds. In fact, if is a countable model of Pr = Th(ω, +), then can be expanded to a model of first order Peano arithmetic P just in case is recursively saturated (see [3]).

In this paper we investigate two natural sets of Turing degrees that tell a good deal about the expandability of a given structure. If is a recursively saturated structure, I() consists of the degrees of sets that are recursive in complete types realized in . The second set of degrees, D(), consists of the degrees of sets S such that is recursive in S-saturated. In general, I() ⊆ D(). Moreover, I() is obviously an “ideal” of degrees. For countable structures , D() is “closed” in the following sense: For any class C ⊆ 2ω, if C is co-r.e. in S for some set S such that , then there is some σ ∈ C such that . For uncountable structures , we do not know whether D() must be closed.

Quine has shown that set theory may be based on inclusion and abstraction [1937], [1953]. He quantifies over (or abstracts upon) sets of all kinds, of course, including sets of sets. Here I confine Quine's approach to quantification over (abstraction upon) individuals alone, or at any rate their unit classes. Forsaking quantification over sets undercuts Quine's definition of negation, however. Smullyan sketches a first-order restriction of Quine's approach with no bound class variables for which inclusion and abstraction alone are adequate logical primitives [1957, n. 10]. However, the definition of negation requires more than one element in the universe of discourse. This requirement is met for Smullyan because he is doing arithmetic. Here, on the other hand, I presuppose only that the universe is nonempty. Accordingly, I assume a third primitive notion, the empty class. I will show that this threefold basis suffices both for classical first-order logic and for a version of “free” many-sorted logic. The monadic fragment, which I call Boolean logic with abstraction, is intermediate in strength between Boolean class logic and Lesniewski's Ontology. It affords a novel perspective on descriptions, particularly in their generic use.

We show that one can solve Post's Problem by constructing generic sets in the usual set theoretic framework applied to tiny universes. This method leads to a new class of recursively enumerable sets: r.e. generic sets. All r.e. generic sets are low and simple and therefore of Turing degree strictly between 0 and 0′. Further they supply the first example of a class of low recursively enumerable sets which are automorphic in the lattice ℰ of recursively enumerable sets with inclusion. We introduce the notion of a promptly simple set. This describes the essential feature of r.e. generic sets with respect to automorphism constructions.

The following problem is studied: How large and how small can the Löwenheim and Hanf numbers of unbounded logics be in relation to the most common large cardinals? The main result is that the Löwenheim number of the logic with the Härtig-quantifier can be consistently put in between any two of the first weakly inaccessible, the first weakly Mahlo, the first weakly compact, the first Ramsey, the first measurable and the first supercompact cardinals.

We show that every formula of Lω1P is equivalent to one which is a propositional combination of formulas with only one quantifier. It follows that the complete theory of a probability model is determined by the distribution of a family of random variables induced by the model. We characterize the class of distribution which can arise in such a way. We use these results together with a form of de Finetti’s theorem to prove an almost sure interpolation theorem for Lω1P.

A set of gödel numbers is invariant if it is closed under automorphisms of (ω, ·), where ω is the set of all gödel numbers of partial recursive functions and · is application (i.e., n · m ≃ φn(m)). The invariant arithmetic sets are investigated, and the invariant recursively enumerable sets and partial recursive functions are partially characterized.

We study reducts of Peano arithmetic for which conditions of saturation imply the corresponding conditions for the whole model. It is shown that very weak reducts (like pure order) have such a property for κ-saturation in every κ ≥ ω1. In contrast, other reducts do the job for ω and not for κ > ω1. This solves negatively a conjecture of Chang.

A semantics for the lambda-calculus due to Friedman is used to describe a large and natural class of categorical recursion-theoretic notions. It is shown that if e1 and e2 are gödel numbers for partial recursive functions in two standard ω-URS's which both act like the same closed lambda-term, then there is an isomorphism of the two ω-URS's which carries e1 to e2.

Ever since Craig-Beth and Addison-Kleene proved their versions of the Lusin-Suslin theorem, work in model theory and recursion theory has demonstrated the value of classical descriptive set theory as a source of ideas and inspirations. During the sixties in particular, J.W. Addison refined the technique of “conjecture by analogy” and used it to generate a substantial number of results in both model theory and recursion theory (see, e.g., Addison [1], [2], [3]).

During the past 15 years, techniques and results from recursion theory and model theory have played an important role in the development of descriptive set theory. (Moschovakis's book [6] is an excellent reference, particularly for the use of recursion-theoretic tools.) The use of “conjecture by analogy” as a means of transferring ideas from model theory and recursion theory to descriptive set theory has developed more slowly. Some notable recent examples of this phenomenon are in Vaught [9], where some results in invariant descriptive set theory reflecting and extending model-theoretic results are obtained and others are left as conjectures (including a version of the well-known conjecture on the number of countable models) and in Hrbacek and Simpson [4], where a notion analogous to that of Turing reducibility is used to study Borel isomorphism types. Moschovakis [6] describes in detail an effective descriptive set theory based in large part on classical recursion theory.

The structure (D, ≤) of the Turing degrees under Turing reducibility is quite complicated. This is true even if we restrict our attention to the substructure (R, ≤) of r.e. degrees. However, the theorems which imply that these structures are complicated all involve ad hoc constructions of sets having the desired reducibility relations. The complexity disappears when we turn to degrees occurring in nature. Of the degrees in R, only 0 and 0′ seem natural. In D, only 0, 0′, 0″, …, 0ω, 0ω+1, … (and on into the transfinite) seem natural. Thus the natural degrees appear to be wellordered, with successors given by Turing jump.

If this is true, one would like to prove it. Of course the first problem is to make the concept of naturalness more precise. The following requirements seem plausible: a natural degree should be definable, its definition should relativise to an arbitrary degree, and this relativisation should preserve reducibility relations among natural degrees. Thus to each natural degree c is associated a definable fc: D → D so that fc(0) = c and ∀d(d ≤ fc(d)). Moreover, b ≤ c iff ∀d(fb(d) ≤, fc(d)). To be specific, let us take the definability of fc to mean that fc ∈ L(R).

If P is a property of degrees, we say P holds almost everywhere (a.e.) iff ∃c∀d ≥: c P(d). For f, g: D → D, let f ≤mgiff f(d) ≤ g(d) a.e. Define f′ by f′(d) = f{d)′, and let M = {f: D → D/f ∈ L(R) ∧ d ≤ f(d) a.e.}. The following conjecture is due to D. A. Martin:

Conjecture. M is prewellordered by ≤m. If f ∈ M has rank α in ≤m, then f′ has rank α + 1.

Supercompactness is usually defined in terms of the existence of certain ultrafilters. By the well-known procedure of taking ultrapowers of V (the universe of sets) and transitive collapses, one obtains transitive inner models of V and corresponding elementary embeddings from V into these inner models. These embeddings have been studied extensively (see, e.g. [3] or [4]). We investigate the action of these embeddings on cardinals. In particular, we establish a characterization, based upon cofinality, of which cardinals are fixed by these embeddings.

G is the system of propositional modal logic whose axioms are all tautologies and all sentences □(A → B) → (□A → □B) and □(□A → A) → □A and whose rules are modus ponens and necessitation. For the connections between G and provability in formal systems, see [3] and [2].

A letterless sentence is a modal sentence that contains no sentence letters at all. In [1] the author showed (in effect) the existence of simple normal forms in G for letterless sentences: every letterless sentence is equivalent in G to a truth-functional compound of sentences ⋄r ⊤ (⋄0B = B; ⋄r+1B = ⋄ ⋄r+1 B. ⊤ is the 0-ary connective that is always evaluated as true; we assume that the language contains ⊤ as a primitive.)

A family of sets {Hn}n∈ω of modal sentences that contain no sentence letters other than some fixed one (say p) was introduced by Solovay in [3]: H0 = the set of sentences equivalent in G to one of p, −p, ⊤, and ⊥; Hn+x = the set of sentences equivalent in G to a truth-functional combination of sentences ⋄rB, where r ∈ ω and B ∈ Hn. (This definition of the Hn's differs inessentially from the one given in [3].) Since r may = 0, Hn ⊆ Hn+1 and thus if m ≤ n, Hm ⊆ Hn; every modal sentence containing no letter other than p is in some Hn. It follows from the normal form theorem for letterless sentences that every letterless sentence is in H1.

In [3] Solovay stated without proof a result about the sets Hn: for every n, Hn ⊊ Hn+1; equivalently, for every n, there is a sentence containing no letter other than p not in Hn. Thus the existence of a normal form for letterless sentences is a very special feature of these sentences, for Solovay's result shows that normal forms like those obtainable for letterless sentences are not to be found in general. He takes this result to be one reason for regarding the Lindenbaum algebra in G of sentences containing no letter other than p as much more complicated than that of letterless sentences.

A set J of Turing degrees is called an ideal if (1) J ≠ ∅, (2) for any pair of degrees ã, , if ã, ϵ J, then ã ⋃ ϵJ, and (3) for any ⋃ ϵ J and any , if < ⋃, then ϵ J. A set J of degrees is said to be closed if for any theory T with a set of axioms of degree in J, T has a completion of degree in J.

Closed ideals of degrees arise naturally in the following way. If is a recursively saturated structure, let I() = { for some ā ϵ }. Let D() = {: is recursive in d-saturated}. (Recursive in d-saturation is defined like recursive saturation except that the sets of formulas considered are recursive in d.) These two sets of degrees were investigated in [2]. It was shown that if is a recursively saturated model of P, Pr = Th(ω, +), or Pr′ = Th(Z, +, 1), then I() = D(), and this set is a closed ideal. Any closed ideal J can be represented as I() = D() for some recursively saturated model of Pr′. For sets J of power at most ℵ1, Pr′ can be replaced by P.

Assuming CH, all closed ideals have power at most ℵ1, but if CH fails, there are closed ideals of power greater than ℵ1, and it is not known whether these can be represented as I() = D() for a recursively saturated model of P.

In the present paper, it will first be shown that information about representation of closed ideals provides new information about an old problem of MacDowell and Specker [6] and extends an old result of Scott [8] in a natural way. It will also be shown that the representation results from [2] answer a problem of Friedman [1]. This part of the paper is aimed at convincing the reader that representation problems are worth investigating.

We distinguish between two kinds of mathematical assertions: objective and constructive. An objective assertion describes the universe of mathematical objects; a constructive one describes the (idealized) mathematician's ability to find mathematical objects with various properties. The familiar formalizations of classical mathematics are based on formal languages designed for expressing objective assertions only. The constructivist program stresses, on the contrary, the importance of constructive assertions; moreover, intuitionism claims that constructive activities of the mind constitute the very subject matter of mathematics, and thus questions the semantic status of objective assertions.

The purpose of this paper is to show that classical mathematics can be extended to include constructive sentences, so that both objective and constructive properties can be discussed in the framework of the same theory. To achieve this goal, we introduce a new property of mathematical objects, calculability.

The word “calculable” may be applied to objects of various types: natural numbers, integers, rational or real numbers, polynomials with rational or real coefficients, etc. In each case it has a different meaning, so that actually we define not one, but many new properties.

Supercompact cardinals are usually defined in terms of the existence of certain normal ultrafilters. It is well known that there is a natural partial ordering on the collection of all normal ultrafilters associated with a super-compact cardinal, that of normal ultrafilter restriction. Using this notion, we define a tree structure T on the collection of normal ultrafilters associated with a fixed supercompact cardinal. Many results already appearing in the literature can be conveniently phrased in terms of structural properties of T (see, e.g. [4] or [6]). In this paper, we establish additional structural facts concerning T.

In §1 we standardize our notation and review some of the basic facts and methods that will be used throughout. §2 begins with a presentation of an important technique, due to Solovay, which will be an important tool for us. Also in §2, we begin a detailed study of the structure of T in terms of branching and the existence of many successors to branches at limit levels. §3 contains results proving the existence of many nodes of T which do not have successors above certain levels of T. This complements work of Magidor [6] who established the existence of many nodes which have successors at all higher levels of T.

Si vous ne gardez du calcul des prédicats classique (que j'appellerai Lω) que les formules qui ne font intervenir, tant en occurences libres que liées, que les n premières variables, vous obtenez le langage Ln. Avant de poursuivre, et de façon un peu cavalière, je vous invite à résoudre l'exercice suivant:

Exercice 1. Dans le langage comprenant seulement un symbole de relation binaire, caractériser à isomorphisme près la chaîne à n éléments au moyen d'un seul énoncé de L2.

Vous avez vu que Ln a plus de possibilités d'expression que vous ne l'aviez d'abord pensé, qu'il est ennemi de la forme prénexe, que sa force au contraire réside dans l'utilisation d'une même variable en différentes places d'une formule.

Ces langages ont été étudiés par Léon Henkin dans [1]; il y remarque que L1 est très pauvre: c'est le “calcul des classes”, on y peut seulement exprimer que des combinaisons booléennes de formules atomiques sont vides ou non, et nous n'en parlerons plus; il montre ensuite que tout théorème de L2est prouvable par une suite de déductions (d'un système classique) qui ne fait intervenir que des énoncés de L3. Dans [2], Donald Monk construit pour tout n un théorème de L3 dont toute preuve utilise des énoncés avec au moins n variables. Dans [3], Dana Scott prouve que L2 est décidable; ce résultat est précisé par Michael Mortimer dans [4], qui montre que tout énoncé consistant f de L2 a un modèle fini, de cardinal borné effectivement en fonction de f. Pour n supérieur ou égal à 3, Ln n'est plus décidable car il a même pouvoir d'expression que Lω, comme il est montré dans l'exercice suivant.

Les arbres sont les ordres partiels qui vérifient l'axiome supplémental ∀x∀y∀z(y ≤x ∧z ≤ x → y ≤ z ∨ z ≤ y), i.e. l'ensemble des minorants de chaque élément est totalement ordonné.

Le principal résultat de cet article concerne l'instabilité des arbres: nous prouvons (§2) qu'aucune théorie d'arbre n'a la propriété d'indépendance, ce qui généralise un theoreme de Poizat [3] sur les ordres totaux. II s'en suit au moyen d'un resultat d'interprétation [4] qu'aucune théorie de structure arborescente n'a la propriété d'indépendance; en particulier ceci vaut pour les arbres colorés.

Le §3 est consacré aux arbres stables. II est prouvé qu'un arbre est stable ssi il est superstable ssi il est de hauteur bornée. Sous l'hypothèse de stabilité, les arbres premiers, minimaux, et strictement minimaux sont caractérisés en termes d'al-gébricité.

A recent result of J.P. Burgess [1] states:

Theorem 0. Let F be a multifunction from an analytic subset T of a Polish space to a Polish space X. If F is Borel measurable, Graph(F) is coanalytic in T × X and F(t) is nonmeager in its closure for each t Є T, then F admits a Borel measurable selector.

The above result unifies and significantly extends earlier results of H. Sarbadhikari [8], S.M. Srivastava [9] and G. Debs (unpublished). The reader is referred to [1] for details.

The aim of this article is to give an effective version of Theorem 0. We do this by proving a basis theorem for Π11 sets which are nonmeager in their closure and satisfy a local version of the measurability condition in Theorem 0. Our basis theorem generalizes a well-known result of P.G. Hinman [4] and S.K. Thomason [10] (see also [5] and [7, 4F.20]). Our methods are similar to those used by A. Louveau to prove that a , σ-compact set is contained in a , σ-compact set (see [7, 4F.18]).

The paper is organized as follows. §2 is devoted to preliminaries. In §3, we prove the basis theorem and deduce as a consequence an effective version of Theorem 0. We show in §4 how our methods can be used to give alternative proofs of some known results.

Discussions with R. Barua, B.V. Rao and V.V. Srivatsa are gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to J.P. Burgess for drawing my attention to an error in an earlier draft of this paper.