Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 March 2014
The following is a contribution to the abstract study of the model theory of modal logics. Historically, individual modal logics have been specified deductively; and, as a result, it has seemed natural to view modal logics as sets of sentences provable in some deductive system. This proof theoretic view has influenced the abstract study of modal logics. For example, Fine [1975] defines a modal logic to be any set of sentences in the modal language L□ which contains all tautologies, all instances of the schema (□(ϕ ⊃ Ψ) ⊃ (□ϕ ⊃ □Ψ)), and which is closed under modus ponens, necessitation and substitution.
Here, however, modal logics are equated with classes of “possible world” interpretations. “Worlds” are taken to be ordered pairs (a, λ), where a is a sentential interpretation and λ is an ordinal. Properties of the accessibility relation are identified with those classes of binary relational systems closed under isomorphisms. The origin of this approach is the study of alternative Kripke semantics for the normal modal logics (cf. Weaver [1973]). It is motivated by the desire that modal logics provide accounts of both logical truth and logical consequence (cf. Corcoran and Weaver [1969]) and the realization that there are alternative Kripke semantics for S4, B and M which give identical accounts of logical truth, but different accounts of logical consequence (cf. Weaver [1973]). It is shown that the Craig interpolation theorem holds for any modal logic which has characteristic modal axioms and whose associated class of binary relational systems is closed under subsystems and finite direct products. The argument uses a back and forth construction to establish a modal analogue of Robinson's theorem. The argument for the interpolation theorem from Robinson's theorem employs modal analogues of the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé characterization of elementary equivalence and Hintikka's distributive normal form, and is itself a modal analogue of a first order argument (cf. Weaver [1982]).