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Basic modal logic
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 March 2014
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As anyone who is familiar with the literature knows, there is a great deal of controversy concerning which, if any, of the extant theories of propositional modal logic correctly formalizes the logic of certain logical concepts such as analyticity and logical necessity. Most of the controversy concerns certain principles that involve iterated modalities (where one modal operator occurs within the scope of another). For example, there is considerable disagreement about whether the principle (□p⊃□□p) should be considered valid. However, when philosophers and logicians apply modal logic to concrete problems, they rarely need principles which involve iterated modalities. For most practical purposes, principles involving only one layer of modalities are all that are needed. This suggests that if we try to construct a theory of modal logic in which there are no iterated modalities, we can avoid most of the controversy and still have a theory that is strong enough for all of the normal uses to which modal logic is put.
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- Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1967
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