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Societal Organization in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Cambodia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

May Ebihara
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Extract

Lucien Hanks titled this symposium a “quest” into the nature of Southeast Asian societal organization prior to the eighteenth century. This paper represents such a quest in the sense of a journey of inquiry into post-Angkorean Cambodia of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to explore the basic problem posed by Hanks: whether pre-colonial society was organized into horizontal castes/classes or vertical “entourages/circles”. My attention will be directed primarily to sociopolitical organization, while David Chandler focuses more on norms and ideology.

Type
Symposium on Societal Organization in Mainland Southeast Asia Prior to the Eighteenth Century
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , September 1984 , pp. 280 - 295
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1984

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References

1 Hanks, Lucien, “The Thai Social Order as Entourage and Circle”, in Change and Persistence in Thai Society, ed. Skinner, G. William and Kirsch, A. Thomas (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), pp. 197–218Google Scholar.

2 Leclére, Adhemard, Les Codes cambodgiens, 2 volumes (Paris: E. Leroux, 1898)Google Scholar. I used in particular the following: in Volume I the “Krâm Srok” (A.D. 1693), pp. 89-122; the “Chbap Tû;mnîn Pî Bauran” (A.D. 1692), pp. 123-75. In Volume II, portions of the “Chbap Kaul Bântop” (A.D. 1693), pp. 479-501; “Krâm Sauphéa Thipdey” (A.D. 1618), pp. 502-56; and “Krâm Pohulla Tep” (A.D. 1693), pp. 357-83.

3 The following are all by Lewitz, Saveros. “Les Inscriptions modernes d'Angkor Wat”, Journal Asiatique CCLX, nos. 1–2 (1972): 107–29.Google Scholar“Inscriptions modernes d'Angkor 17-25”, Bulletin de I'École Française d'Extrême-Orient [hereafter BEFEO] 60 (1973): 163–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar“Inscriptions modernes d'Angkor 26-33”, BEFEO 60 (1973): 205–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar“Inscriptionsmodernes d'Angkor 35,36,37,39”, BEFEO 61 (1974): 301–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 The following are all by Pou, Saveros and Jenner, William. “Les Cpãp ou ‘Codes de conduite’ khmers: I. Cpãp Kerti Kãl”, BEFEO 62 (1975): 369–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar“III. Cpãp Kun Cau”, BEFEO 64 (1977):167–215.Google Scholar“IV. Cpãp Rãjaneti ou Cpãp Brah Rãjasambhãr”, BEFEO 65 (1978): 361–402.Google Scholar“V. Cpãp Krâm”, BEFEO 66 (1979): 129–60Google Scholar.

5 Monod, G.H., Contes khmirs, traduits du cambodgien (Monans-Sartoux, Alpes-Maritime: Publications Chitra, C.A. Hoegman, 1943)Google Scholar.

6 Groslier, B.P., Angkor et le Cambodge au XVI' siècle d'aprés les sources portugaises et espagnoles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958)Google Scholar.

7 In this effort, a critical background source was chapter 5, “Cambodia's Dark Ages”, in Chandler, David P., A History of Cambodia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 77–98.Google Scholar The Khmer derivative of varna is vannak, a term that is often translated as “class” (David Chandler, pers. com., 28 June 1983).

8 See also Mabbett, I. W., “Varnas in Angkor and the Indian Caste System”, Journal of Asian Studies 36 (1977): 429–42, andGoogle Scholar“Kingship in Angkor”, Journal of the Siam Society 66 (1978): 1–58Google Scholar; Dumont, L., Homo Hierarchies, rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Dumont distinguishes between varna and jati (pp. 72-75), and certainly the Indian system of jati did not exist in Cambodia; see also Dumont, pp. 215-16. I would agree with Mabbett's argument that varnas may have existed as part of an é1ite ideological model of social organization, but not as on-the-ground reality; see “Vamas”, p. 440 and “Kingship”, p. 29Google Scholar.

9 Firth, Raymond, Elements of Social Organization, 3rd ed. (London: Watts and Co., 1961), pp. 35–40Google Scholar.

10 See Chandler, History; Groslier, Angkor; Vickery, M., “The 2/K. 125 Fragment, A Lost Chronicle of Ayutthaya”, Journal of the Siam Society 65 (1970): 1–80Google Scholar; Hall, D.G.E., A History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 233–37Google Scholar; Coedès, G., The Making of Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 193–203Google Scholar.

11 , Chandler, History, pp. 77–79Google Scholar; , Vickery, “2/K. 125”; see also , Groslier, Angkor, pp. 143-4, 152-54, 162–63, on trade goods and tradersGoogle Scholar.

12 See , Coedès, MakingGoogle Scholar; , Groslier, AngkorGoogle Scholar; , Hall, HistoryGoogle Scholar; , Chandler, HistoryGoogle Scholar; but cf. Vickery, M., “The Composition and Transmission of the Ayudhya and Cambodian Chronicles”, in Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia, ed. Reid, A.J. and Marr, D. (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979), pp. 130–54Google Scholar.

13 , Chandler, History, p. 93Google Scholar.

14 Wolf, Eric, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 80.Google Scholar Similar points have been made also by Leclère, A., Recherches sur la législation cambodgienne (droit privé) (Paris: E. Leroux, 1890), p. 26Google Scholar; Mabbett, “Kingship”; Tambiah, Stanley, “The Galactic Polity: The Structure of Traditional Kingdoms in Southeast Asia”, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 293 (1972): 69–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scott, James C., “The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia”, Journal of Asian Studies 32 (1972): 5–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bendix, Reinhard, “Inequality and Social Structure: A Comparison of Marx and Weber”, American Sociological Review 39 (1974): 149–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Leach, Edmund, Political Systems of Highland Burma (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954)Google Scholar.

15 In this case there were not only shifts of power within the Khmer élite, but also changing relationships with other (non-Khmer) polities. See also Vickery, “2/K. 125”; , Tambiah, “Galactic”; , Wolf, Europe, p. 82Google Scholar.

16 The relatively long reign of Ang Chan in the first part of the sixteenth century may be one of those periods (see , Groslier, Angkor, p. 14). ButGoogle Scholar, Groslier (Angkor, pp. 120-21, 124) andGoogle Scholar, Chandler (History, pp. 95, 97) suggest that through the 16th and increasingly through the 17th centuries, kingly power weakened. Chandler also wonders, however, whether Angkorean kings were really as powerful as their own words would lead us to believe (History, p. 98)Google Scholar.

17 , Leclere, Codes I: 90, 91, 96, 128, 137, 138, 140, 141Google Scholar, give terms/titles for particular kinsmen of the king. But it is possible that other relatives not listed (e.g., cousins) were also considered royalty.

18 See , Groslier, AngkorGoogle Scholar; , Coedès, MakingGoogle Scholar; , Hall, History; thoughGoogle Scholar cf. Vickery, “Composition”. Given the existence of polygyny, these were, moreover, half-brothers and an uncle who was father's half-brother. Several times during this period, an incumbent king abdicated in favor of a son. This could be seen as a maneuver to avoid contest for the throne when the king died.

19 There has been debate as to whether the ancient Khmer were matrilineal, patrilineal, or bilateral; for an overview of this controversy see Ebihara, May, “Svay, A Khmer Village in Cambodia” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1968)Google Scholar, and Kirsch, A. Thomas, “Kinship, Genealogical Claims, and Societal Integration in Ancient Khmer Society: An Interpretation”, in Southeast Asian History and Historiography, ed. Cowan, C.D. and Wolters, O.W. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 190–202.Google Scholar I have long assumed, along with Kirsch, that ancient as well as modern Khmer were fundamentally bilateral at both top and bottom levels of the society. Although the term “lineage” has been used in some discussions of ancient Cambodia, I would question whether these were the sort of unilineal descent groups that anthropologists customarily designate by this term.

20 See Kirsch, “Kinship”; of various anthropological works on ambilateral descent, one good source is Firth, R., “A Note on Descent Groups in Polynesia”, Man 57 (1957): 4–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Kirsch, “Kinship”, pp. 197-98, suggests that citing of genealogy served not simply to legitimize claims to the throne but to indicate the king's kin network of support. See also Wolf, , Europe, p. 93Google Scholar.

22 See, for example, , Coedès, Making, pp. 195 ff.Google Scholar, and , Chandler, HistoryGoogle Scholar.

23 , Wolf, Europe, p. 98Google Scholar; see also p. 92 on various political and economic functions that can be served by kinship and marriage to acquire access to resources and claims to privileges.

24 Leclère, , Codes I: 123-25Google Scholar; cf. also Aymonier, Etienne, Le Cambodge (Paris: E. Leroux, 1900), I: 59, 62Google Scholar.

25 Polygyny was clearly practiced at this time {see , Leclère, Codes, vol. I, p. 125Google Scholar; , Groslier, Angkor, pp. 14, 160)Google Scholar, and I assume that concubinage also occurred. It is therefore likely that there were marital alliances between the king and elite famines for mutual benefit, such as reported for earlier and later periods of Cambodian history; see, e.g., Mabbett, “Kingship”, pp. 28, 30; Kirsch, “Kinship”; , Aymonier, Cambodge 1: 59–60Google Scholar.

26 , Coedès, Making, pp. 198ff. The sons of the Vietnamese wife ultimately deposed their half-brother (the Laotian, wife's son) with support from their Vietnamese cousins. King Satha also may have had a LaotianGoogle Scholar wife (, Groslier, Angkor, p. 18)Google Scholar.

27 , Wolf, Europe, p. 83Google Scholar.

28 See in particular many of the chbap in Pou and Jenner, “Les Cpap” and Chandler's paper on chbap in this symposium.

29 See, e.g., Récit 23 in , Leclère, Codes 1: 140. Indeed, disrespectful or disobedient behavior toward the king's emissaries or even servants of royalty was also punished; seeGoogle Scholar, Leclère, Codes I: 128f. and passimGoogle Scholar.

30 See, e.g., , Leclère, Codes I: 100:Google Scholar “Un gouverneur… doit être aveceux [des habitants] comme unpere a l'egard de ses enfants”; see also p. 101 and passim. See also Pou and Jenner, “Les Chãp”, as well as Mabbett, “Kingship”, on the moral ideals of kingship and officialdom. While such norms were not necessarily reality, it could be to powerholders' advantage not to be overly oppressive.

31 , Groslier, Angkor, p. 155.Google Scholar Such audiences were also held in 13th-century Angkor. (It is unclear, however, how open such audiences actually were; i.e., did people have to go through lower officials to get there?) Chandler (personal communication 19 May 1983) believes that kings were out and about the countryside during the 16th and 17th centuries more than in the 19th century.

32 See various cases in , Leclère, Codes, vol. IGoogle Scholar, the “Chbap Tûmnîn Pî Bauran”, passim. Cf. also Mabbett, “Kingship”, p. 39, on Angkorean kings.

33 , Leclère, Codes I: 91Google Scholar, gives the general term namoeun for “dignitaries”, who are than subdivided into four broad “classes”: (1) pohau sakh who belong to the royal family, (2) borana sakh whose father or grandfather were dignitaries, (3) réachéa sakh who were “elevated by the reigning king to the rank of dignitary”, (4) piphûp sakh (“grade accidental, occasionel”) who were “named and compensated for services rendered and from families that had never furnished dignitaries to the kingdom” (my translations). On various titles, positions, and duties, see , Leclère, Codes 11: 91ff, 98ff, 115-18; Lewitz, “Les Inscriptions” (1972), p. I l lGoogle Scholar; , Groslier, Angkor, p. 156Google Scholar.

34 See , Leclère, Codes I: 100ffGoogle Scholar, and various chbap in Pou and Jenner, “Les Cpãp”. See also , Leclère, Codes I: 104 and passim, on punishments for dereliction of duties or misconduct in officeGoogle Scholar.

35 For example, Barom Reachea II granted titles and provinces to Diego de Velosa and Bias Ruiz (, Groslier, Angkor, p. 155Google Scholar), and they were also given Khmer princesses as wives (, Chandler, History, p. 85)Google Scholar.

36 Mabbett, “Varnas”, p. 40. See also Recit 18 in , Leclère, Codes I: 134–37, for an example of multiple and overlapping administrative and patron-client relationships.Google ScholarWebster, David, “On Theocracies”, American Anthropologist 78(1976): 812–28, discusses some historic polities and offers points that areCrossRefGoogle Scholar relevant to Cambodian sociopolitical organization; see, for example, pp. 818-19,822 on dispersal of titles among the elite and on relations between elite and local leaders.

37 , Leclère, Codes I: 184Google Scholar. The specific term mohat is given for “des esclaves d'Etat descendants des fonctionnaires révoqués et condamnés à l'esclavage d'État” (ibid., p. 99).

38 , Chandler, History, p. 94Google Scholar.

39 See the categories of piphûp sakh and réachéa sakh in Note 33.

40 , Grostier, Angkor, p. 155. It is possible that this was meant to refer to what Wolf, following Weber, has called a prebendal domain in which land was given to an official to provide income during his term of office; the reversion of property to the king asserts “the eminent domain of the ruler” andGoogle Scholar“curtail[s] heritable claims to land and tribute”; Wolf, Eric, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 51.Google Scholar, Aymonier, Cambodge, p. 85Google Scholar, speaking of a later period, also notes a “curious right of retaking by the king [which] must go back to a very distant past”, whereby the king inherits from an official or someone with a “succession of some importance” who dies without male children. Nonetheless, he also notes that “one part [?] is left to daughters and possible heirs” and the widow is given “usufruct”.

41 , Leclère, Codes I: 91Google Scholar.

42 , Leclère, Codes II: 460-62, 525-27, 550–55. While the nature of property ownership in ancient Cambodia has been debated (see Ebihara, “Svay”, p. 346 for some of the participants in this discussion), various scholars believe that an effective system of private land ownership existed. See, e.g.,Google Scholar, Groslier, Angkor, p. 155Google Scholar; Mabbett, “Kingship”, p. 14; Ricklefs, M.C., “Land and the Law in the Epigraphy of Tenth Century Cambodia”, Journal of Asian Studies 26 (1967): 411–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wheatley, P., “Satyãnrta in Suvarnadĩpa: From Reciprocity to Redistribution in Ancient Southeast Asia”, in Ancient Civilization and Trade, ed. Sabloff, J. and Lamberg-Kariovsky, C. C. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), p. 265, n. 34Google Scholar.

43 See , Leclère, Recherches, p. 29Google Scholar; see also , Aymonier, Cambodge, p. 65 on a later periodGoogle Scholar.

44 I say “and/or” because, following a point made by Mabbett in “Kingship”, p. 30, for the Angkorean period, it seems not unlikely that there were families with property and relative wealth but no titles or official positions. See also a statement in a 17th century law code that distinguishes between “dignitaires” and “des gens riches” (, Leclère, Codes I: 99)Google Scholar.

45 , Chandler, History, p. 79Google Scholar.

46 For the Susiana Plain region of Iran, where Johnson has conducted archaeological investigations, 19th century travellers' accounts had indicated that forty kilometers was about the maximum distance one could cover in one day, given the terrain and primitive modes of travel. Hence, it was hypothesized that in earner times one could get from an administrative center to settlements twenty kilometers distant and back to the center in one day, and that these settlements could then be fairly closely linked to (and superintended by) central authorities. This hypothesis seems to be supported by archaeological evidence from the Middle Uruk period in the Susiana Plain. Gregory Johnson, personal communication 2 Feb. 1983, and “Structure Protostatali: Cambiamenti Organizzativi Nella Amministrazione della Pianura di Susiana Dorante el Periodo Uruk (c. 38-4n00 A.C.)”, in Annali dell Instituto Univerisitario Orientate de Napoli, pp. 1–62, in press. A similar point is made also inGoogle ScholarRenfrew, Colin, “Trade as Action at a Distance: Questions of Integration and Communication”, in Ancient Civilizations and Trade, ed. Sabloff, J. and Lamberg-Karlovsky, C. C., pp. 12–21Google Scholar, on “administrative modules” in early states. The ease of travel and communication in 16th and 17th century Cambodia is not clear; e.g., was the road system constructed during the Angkorean period maintained? But it is likely that areas distant from the capital may have been relatively independent of strong central control.

47 Mabbett, “Varnas”, p. 440.

48 Chandler, personal communication 28 Jan 1983. Several laws prohibited unauthorized mobilization of manpower (i.e., without approval by the king or central ministers) and the levying or seizing of troops by “princes”, dignitaries, and officials; see , Leclère, Codes I: 107–109. The existence of such articles suggest fear of rival concentrations of power. See also Mabbett, “Kingship”, p. 37, on “great men of the provinces” in the Angkorean period, and Scott, “Erosion”, pp. 12-37 on patron-clientage in pre-colonial Southeast Asian statesGoogle Scholar.

49 Chandler, David P., “The Tragedy of Cambodian History”, Pacific Affairs 52 (1979): 417CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 See, e.g., several cases in , Leclère, Codes I: 139, 145-46, 161–62, in which titles, etc. were revoked, but also restored in two instancesGoogle Scholar.

51 , Leclère, Codes I: 99, my translationGoogle Scholar.

52 The two terms are from , Leclère, Codes I: 91, 104. Réas is translated “gens du peuple” and may include more than simply free personsGoogle Scholar.

53 The two terms are from Lewitz, “Lesinscriptions” (1972), pp. 113,116.

54 Chandler, personal communication 28 Jan. 1983. Brail prey and anakjalneak chea are evidently different transcriptions of the two terms. With regard to bralprey, cf. the Thai term phrai (see, e.g., Rabibhadana, Akin, “Clientship and Gass Structure”, in Change and Persistence in Thai Society, ed. Skinner, G. W. and Kirsch, A.T., p. 95).Google Scholar Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 116, has an interesting commentary on the polysemy of brailprey, which can also mean “uncultivated lands ”, “rustic” person, or “second-class person”.

55 Chamkar are fields growing vegetables, fruits, and various crops other than rice. The “Krâm Pohulla Tep” mentions sugar palms, areca, beans, bananas, sugar cane, potatoes, cucumbers, gourds, cotton, maize, eggplant, mangoes, and other cultigens; the keeping of oxen, buffalo, horses, elephants, pigs, ducks, and chickens; and various implements/traps for catching fish; see , Leclère, Codes II: 357–84Google Scholar passim. Various sources refer to wet-rice agriculture; Pou and Jenner, “Les Cpap” (1975), p. 383, note 10, state that there was also dry rice cultivation in “terres hautes”. I think it not unlikely that swidden cultivation was practiced in frontier lowland areas as well.

56 See also , Leclère, Codes I: 129, 142–43, on land disputes between ordinary persons; one case also indicates the existence of tenancyGoogle Scholar.

57 In addition to free person peasants, there were also of course slaves involved in agricultural production, whether privately owned slaves or those attached to royal and temple estates (see below; also , Leclère, Codes I: 102 on pol tep)Google Scholar.

58 Also exported were betel, fish, and meat, as well as luxury items such as ivory; see , Groslier, Angkor, pp. 153, 162Google Scholar.

59 Royalty and officials were not exempt from this tax; neither were certain kinds of slaves, although they were taxed less. See , Leclère, Codes I: 102–103Google Scholar, for aspects of taxation. Two interesting points are raised in this section. First, proper tax collection received religious sanctions insofar as misconduct in this regard was considered a sin that would leave the guilty officials without any fund of merit. Second, it was forbidden to requisition a number of items essential to peasant existence, e.g., oxcarts, boats, domestic animals, poultry, the produce of kitchen gardens and trees, etc.

60 , Leclère, Codes I: 105–109. The importance of keeping track of people for tax and corvee purposes is implied by the extremely severe punishment inflicted on a census-taker who draws up an incorrect list: if errors or omissions were found, he would be beaten and, along with his family, reduced to slaveryGoogle Scholar; see , Leclère, Codes I: 104–105Google Scholar.

61 Pou and Jenner, “Les Cpãp”(1975), p. 343, n.3. Chandler, however, wonders how many persons were so registered, especially in hinterland areas, given a small “patronage class” (personal communication 28 Jan. 1983).

62 Various cases in the “Chbap Tûmnîn Pî Bauran”, , Leclère, Codes, vol. I, involve persons going to what appear to be their patrons for aid in legal matters and other problems. See alsoGoogle Scholar, Aymonier, Cambodge, p. 91, on the 19th century; Scott, “Erosion”Google Scholar; Wolf, Eric, “Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies”, in The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, ed. Banton, M. (London: Tavistock, 1966). Passing comments in two sources suggest that patrons and clients were sometimes spoken of as “uncles” and “nephews”; see Lewitz, “Inscriptions” (1974), p. 323, andGoogle ScholarHickey, Gerald, Sons of the Mountains (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 138–39.Google Scholar Such use of what anthropologists call a “kinship idiom” would reinforce the moral ideal that those in power should be paternalistic toward their subordinates; it also expresses conceptions of superiority-inferiority and nurturance-dependence that inhere in the relationship between elder and younger kinsmen.

63 , Leclère, Codes I: 101Google Scholar; brackets in the original; my translation. See also various chbap in Pou and Jenner, e.g., “Les Cpãp” (1975), p. 383 (no. 6) and p. 388 (no. 30), and Chandler's paper on chbap in this symposium.

64 See, e.g., , Leclère, Codes I: 128-29, 137-38, 157–58.Google Scholar Also of interest are folktales which, if one can assume they are the creation of a Little Tradition, offer an interesting view from the bottom up. In the “Thmenh Chey” stories (Monod, Contes, pp. 51-97), the commoner hero consistently outwits his social betters (including the Cambodian monarch and even the Emperor of China) with his superior intelligence. In the tale of “SopheaTonsai” (, Monod, Contes, pp. 21–50) the hero is a rabbit (a small and vulnerable creature) whose sagacity makes him a renowned jurist consulted by eminent people. In both folktales, the “lowly” protagonist outsmarts those ofGoogle Scholar greater strength and superior status.

65 , Leclère, Codes I: 104, my translationGoogle Scholar.

66 Scott, “Erosion”, p. 27.

67 Hanks, Lucien, “Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order”, American Anthropologist 64 (1962): 1250. See also Scott, “Erosion”, p. 16, n. 24: “leaders who fail to establish legitimacy and generosity … are likely to findGoogle Scholar their clientele switching to other leaders or simply striking out on their own”.

68 However, it would probably be invalid to conceive of ordinary commoners as constituting a homogeneous, and generally poor, stratum. Doubtless there were gradations of relative wealth within this level, and it may well have been possible to improve one's socioeconomic position to some extent.

69 Chandler, personal communication 28 Jan. 1983; Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 113; , Aymonier, Cambodge, p. 99. (Google Scholar, Leclère, Codes I: 107, 108, 113, translates prey ngier as free persons, but this would seem to be an error; elsewhere, p. 104, he gives prey nhéa as “les hommes libres”.)Google Scholar

70 See , Leclère, Codes I: 148-50, 159–60Google Scholar, and “Thmenh Chey” in , Monod, Contes, pp. 54-55, for instances of what Akin Rabibhadana, speaking of Thailand, has calledGoogle Scholar“interest-bearing slaves” in The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873 (Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 74, 1969), p. 108.Google Scholar Such debt slaves could be ceded to others for payment of debt and could also be “owned” by one or several persons; see Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 114. It has been suggested that the term “slavery” may be inappropriate for this practice; see, e.g., Rabibhadana, Akin, Organization, p. 109, andGoogle ScholarTurton, Andrew, “Thai Institutions of Slavery”, in Asian and African Systems of Slavery, ed. Watson, James L. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 263Google Scholar.

71 , Leclére, Codes I: 148–50Google Scholar, recounts an interesting case in which various authorities are called in to force a creditor to release a female debt slave whom he will not relinquish when her parents try to redeem her.

72 Chandler, personal communication 19 May 1983; but cf. the preceding note.

73 In addition to the general terms for slaves given earlier, , Leclère, Codes, vol. IGoogle Scholar, notes a number of specific terms for state/royal slaves: mohat, descendants of officials condemned to slavery (p. 99); pol of various kinds (pp. 95,96,102,131,134); and kômlas (pp. 105,108,109). Leclere does not define the latter, but , Aymonier, Cambodge, p. 99Google Scholar, speaks of “kamloh” as “‘young, strong, vigorous’ royal slaves/serfs”. Lewitz, “Inscriptions” (1974), p. 323, states that bal (cf. pot) seems to designate state slaves, but that the topic needs further research. Another term mentioned in Hickey, Sons, p. 140, is nak-na for slaves “descended from condemned persons and … subject to corvee for the king”, Terms given for temple slaves are pol prah (, Hickey, Sons, p. 140) and Bal Brahman sriGoogle Scholar (, Aymonier, Cambodge, p. 100)Google Scholar.

74 Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 114; , Leclère, Codes I: 114 and passimGoogle Scholar; , Monod, Contes, p. 55Google Scholar.

75 The number of specific positions/occupations for pol serving the king was particularly extensive; see , Leclère, Codes, vol. I, e.g., pp. 95-96, 102, 131, 134.Google Scholar There were also pol and kômlas assigned to members of the royal family.

76 See, e.g., various pol connected with the palace who filled non-productive functions such as “keeper of the palace doors” or “carrier of the royal parasol” (, Leclere, Codes I: 95, 127Google Scholar). In the folktale of Thmenh Chey, when the hero is a debt slave, one of his tasks is to carry his master's betel paraphernalia on visits to court (, Monod, Contes, p. 55). See also Turton, “Thai”, p. 280, and James Watson,Google Scholar“Introduction. Slavery as an Institution: Open and Closed Systems”, in Asian and African Systems of Slavery, p. 8Google Scholar.

77 Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 114. Chandler suggests the possibility that the lowest rungs of slaves were made up of non-Khmer tribal people and war captives (personal communication 28 Jan. 1983); see also Lewitz, ibid., p. 113.

78 It is uncertain what were laws regarding marriage/mating between slaves and free persons, or what status would be given the offspring of such unions (cf. an ambiguous statement in , Leclère, Codes I: 122).Google Scholar It seems more than likely that sexual relations occurred between masters and slave women, and there are several cases in , Leclère, Codes, vol. I, e.g., pp. 127-28 of fornication between slaves and free persons. For 19th-century laws regarding such matters, seeGoogle Scholar, Aymonier, Cambodge, pp. 99, 101Google Scholar.

79 Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), pp. 114–15Google Scholar, and specific examples in “Inscriptions” (1973,1974).

80 , Lewitz, “Les inscriptions”, p. 117Google Scholar. Lewitz notes (p. 116) specific terms that were used for liberated slaves, and the latter also formed a distinct category in population registers (see , Leclère, Codes I: 104). But I do not know whether freed slaves were otherwise treated differently than ordinary free personsGoogle Scholar.

81 See, e.g., Michael Aung-Thwin's and David Chandler's papers in this symposium; Turton, “Thai”; Akin Rabibhadana, “Organization”; and Kopytoff, Igor, “Slavery”, in Annual Review of Anthropology Vol. 11, ed. Siegel, B.J., Beals, A., Tyler, S. (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews Inc., 1982), p. 221Google Scholar.

82 , Turton, “Thai”, p. 263; see also pp. 266-67,278. Also pertinent areGoogle Scholar, Kopytoff, “Slavery”, p. 221, andGoogle Scholar Chandler's paper in this symposium.

83 See, e.g., cases in , Leclère, Codes I: 128-29, 137–38Google Scholar.

84 , Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 114Google Scholar.

85 , Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), pp. 114–15,Google Scholar“Inscriptions” (1973), p. 205.Google Scholar“Inscriptions” (1974), pp. 184–85, notes an instance in which a woman adopted a freed slave whom she sent into the sangha. See also chbap such asGoogle ScholarJenner, Pou and, “Les Cpap” (1975), p. 386Google Scholar.

86 For example, Jenner, Pou and, “Les Cpap” (1975), p. 385Google Scholar: “To have trust in your slaves is like being totally blind” (my translation). , Leclère, Codes I: 151, gives the case of a slave who runs away from her master because of a severe beatingGoogle Scholar.

87 It is, however, difficult to discuss these points further, given lack of data. The question of “property” is in itself problematical (see, e.g., , Kopytoff, “Slavery”, pp. 219–21), and I have no information on the labor demands made on different kinds of slaves during the 16th-17th centuries as compared to the Angkorean period or 19th centuryGoogle Scholar.

88 See, e.g., , Leclère, Codes I: 95-96, 102.Google Scholar, Turton, “Thai”, p. 268, suggests that since slaves could not enter the sangha they were considered less than humanGoogle Scholar.

89 , Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 120. See alsoGoogle Scholar, Groslier, Angkor, p. 160, and numerous allusions toGoogle ScholarLewitz, Buddhism in, “Lesinscriptions ” (1973, 1974)Google Scholar, Jenner, Pouand, “LesCpãp”, andGoogle Scholar, Leclère, Codes, vol. IGoogle Scholar.

90 , Groslier, Angkor, p. 160Google Scholar.

91 , Groslier, Angkor, pp. 159–60Google Scholar; , Leclère, Codes I: 163–75 and passimGoogle Scholar; , Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 112Google Scholar.

92 See , Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), pp. 121–22 on religious offeringsGoogle Scholar.

93 Such linkages, which are far more complicated than indicated here, have been noted for the Angkorean period; see, e.g., , Mabbett, “Kingship”, pp. 19, 25.30–32Google Scholar; , Wheatley, “Satyanrta”, p. 242; andGoogle ScholarHall, Kenneth, “Temples as Economic Centers in Early Cambodia”, paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, 1981. Hall also cites works by M. VickeryandL.A. Sedov that I have not seen. I do not have the data to say whether temple estates in the 16th-17th centuries operated in the same manner, but I would nonetheless propose the aboveGoogle Scholar.

94 Nineteenth-century sources have noted the existence of court brahmans called baku who performed special ritual functions at court, enjoyed special privileges, and are said to have constituted a hereditary group with patrilineal descent; see , Aymonier, Cambodge, pp. 63–64Google Scholar, , Leclere, “Recherches”, p. 8Google Scholar; , Leclère, Le Bouddhisme au Cambodge (Paris: E. Leroux, 1899), p. 498. While often spoken of as a “caste” (and thought to be the descendants of an ancient Brahman caste), it appears that they were not strictly endogamous (seeGoogle Scholar, Aymonier, Cambodge, p. 63Google Scholar; Chandler, personal communication 19 May 1983). The 16th-century “pandit” or “paraecclesiasticals” mentioned by , Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 113, who served as masters of religious ceremonies at court, were similar to the baku (Chandler, personal communication 19 May 1983); but details of their organization are not known to me. Chandler notes a decline of the “brahmanical priestly class” during the 16th-17th centuries (History, p. 97). See alsoGoogle Scholar, Groslier, Angkor, pp. 157–59Google Scholar.

95 This is in contrast to Burma; see M. Aung-Thwin's paper in this symposium; also cf. Dumont, Homo, on India.

96 For details, see Hickey, Sons, chap. 4. Also involved in this relationship was an interesting conception that the Kings of Fire and Water were caretakers of a sacred ceremonial sword that is a “palladium of the Khmer kingdom” (p. 127).

97 , Hickey, Sons, p. 143Google Scholar.

98 Cambodia's export trade included forest products such as ivory, wax, skins, and lac; see , Groslier, Angkor, p. 162. While Leclere, Codes 1f96, mentions that certain pol royal slaves were charged with collection of forest produce, I would assume that some of these items were also obtained through tradeGoogle Scholar.

99 , Lewitz, “Les inscriptions” (1972), p. 113Google Scholar; , Hickey, Sons, p. 141Google Scholar; Vickery, , “2/K. 125”, pp. 62, 63.The latter also mentions “ethnic Pear” as monks, astrologers, or magicians (pp. 72-73).Google Scholar

100 , Leclère, Codes I: 114–15Google Scholar; zx, Groslier, Angkor, pp. 162–63Google Scholar; , Chandler, History, pp. 79-80, 85Google Scholar.

101 , Leclère, Codes I: 114–15Google Scholar; , Chandler, History, pp. 85–86Google Scholar.

102 , Wheatley, “Satyanrta”, pp. 225ffGoogle Scholar.

103 On the anthropological concept of “broker”, see, e.g., Wolf, Eric, “Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico”, American Anthropologist 58 (1956): 1075ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

104 , Groslier, Angkor, p. 155, states that the king controlled all foreign trade. Moreover, as Wheatley notes for earlier times in his “Satyãnrta”, pp. 238,242, rulers can manipulate trade to their own advantages and are the ultimate beneficiaries of tradeGoogle Scholar.

105 See in particular Groslier, Angkor, on Spanish and Portuguese involvement in Cambodia, and , Coedès, Making, p. 198, on Prince Chan/Reameathipdei's conversion to Islam and involvement with Malay and Javanese immigrantsGoogle Scholar.

106 , Chandler, History, p. 80Google Scholar.

107 , Chandler, History, p. 86Google Scholar.

108 See, e.g., Summers, Laura, “Cooperatives in Democratic Kampuchea”, paper presented at the Social Science Research Council Conference on Kampuchea, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 1981, p. 17Google Scholar.

109 Each of these is, in itself, a complex topic, and there is also the question of the articulation between the emic (native) and etic (analyst's) points of view. Aymonier, for instance, notes that one could differentiate seven “classes” or three for 19th-century , Cambodia (Cambodge, p. 102)Google Scholar.

110 , Hanks, “Merit”, p. 1252Google Scholar.

111 See also , Chandler, History, p. 94Google Scholar.

112 Mabbett, “Kingship”, p. £9, has proposed a “cyclic pattern” of change in Angkorean politics that seems quite applicable to the 16th-17th centuries as well.

113 See, e.g., Tambiah, “Galactic”, Akin Rabibhadana, “Organization”, and Hanks, “Thai Social Order”, on Thailand; Scott, “Erosion”, on Southeast Asia generally; , Wolf, Europe, pp. 79–83Google Scholar, and Webster, Theocracies, on other societies.