Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-t5tsf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T06:23:24.520Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand (Part Two)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Nantawan Haemindra
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

After the riots and bloody clashes between the Malays and the Thai Police in 1948, there were no movements of a similar scale. Nevertheless, Muslim irredentist sentiments persisted in certain quarters. An event which contributed to the increasing dissatisfaction of Thai Muslims was the mysterious disappearance of Haji Sulong in 1954. After his disappearance, Sulong's relatives and followers did not remain inactive. Tension continued and separatist movements have spread quietly up to the present time. Complaints about governmental discrimination against Thai Muslims have been heard from time to time.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , March 1977 , pp. 85 - 105
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1977

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The prevailing opinion in Bangkok and among the Malay nationalists held that Haji Sulong, together with three of his followers (one of whom was his eldest son Wan Muhammad), had been killed by Thai police under General Phao Siyanond, then Director-General of the Police Department, on the night of 13 August 1954. They were said to have been tied to heavy stones and drowned in the sea behind the Nu Island. See Suara Siswa No. 2 (December 1970) and The Bangkok Tribune, 11 January 1958.

2 For example, in 1957 an underground movement led by energetic nationalist leaders submitted a petition concerning Malay grievances to the Interior Ministry. It demanded that a university for Muslims be established in the southern provinces; that the Ministry of Interior transfer Thai-Muslim government officials to the four southernmost provinces; that ten seats in the police academy be reserved for Thai Muslim students each year; and that separate contests for posts in government be held among Thai-Muslims only, for they feared that they would not be able to win in a general contest. Chao Thai, 31 July 1957.

3 In early 1958, Amin Dato Minal published 10,000 copies of a book written by Haji Sulong entitled Gugusan Chahaya Keselamatan (The Lights of Safety). The book insisted on the necessity of struggling for independence and co-operation among the Malays. This book was believed to have been seized and burnt by the Thai government after 5,000 copies had been printed.

4 Police Colonel Chintavirot, Gampanat, Notes on the Separatist Movement in the South (Bangkok: Phothi Sam Ton, 1974), pp. 78–82Google Scholar. The irredentist activities were engineered by Thai-Muslim politicians in the southern border provinces and supported by those who resented Thai rule. But the Malay leaders of the region and members of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand reaffirmed, in the same year, their allegiance to the country.

5 In 1965 there appeared again the idea of a merging of the four southernmost Thai provinces with Kelantan; but it was strongly opposed by the governments of Malaysia and Thailand. See Freyn, Hubert, “Sensitive South”, Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) XLIX, 8 (19 August 1965), 23Google Scholar.

6 Gampanat, op. cit., pp. 212–213.

7 Kuala Lumpur is known to want the best of relations with Thailand, and to discourage attempts to stir up separatist feeling among Thai Muslims. It wants Thai co-operation in the suppression of the Malayan Communist terrorists. In the 1960s, Tengku Abdul Rahman, then Prime Minister of Malaysia, indicated several times that his country did not want any present Thai territory. The Malaysian Government has not shown any sympathy for the separatist movement in South Thailand, and Malaysians were urged not to get themselves involved in this movement. The Straits Times, 2 July 1966.

8 This information was obtained in informal discussion between the author and some Pattani Malay teachers in March 1974.

9 To be called the Republic of Pattani, consisting of the four border provinces plus a large part of the province of Songkhla in order to prevent Setul from being isolated.

10 Gampanat, op. cit., pp. 213–215.

11 Bapa Idris, the actual leader of the separatist government declared: “Our struggle to free Pattani cannot be achieved by spreading flowers, but only by flying bullets” (Suara Siswa, op. cit.).

12 Gampanat, op. cit., p. 103.

13 Prachathipatai, 26 June 1974. Among items seized from Front members by Pattani provincial police in early 1970 were a pistol and cloth bearing the name of the movement and members of the different clans (The Bangkok World, 22 March 1970).

14 The number of clans that existed and their membership figures are difficult to estimate, although it is known that six of the more significant ones numbered only ten to twenty persons each. Of these six, four carried out most of their activities in Pattani, and one each operated in Yala and Narathiwat. Ibid.

15 It is believed among the Thai police that Poh Yeh, who started his struggle together with Haji Sulong in 1948 and claimed to work for the Kelantan group, has become chief of the Army after the surrender of its former leader, Poh Su Vamaedisa, a Narathiwat school teacher, to the police for court judgment in 1966. Poh Su publicly announced that he could disprove charges of communism in open court, and claimed to be simply a Muslim community leader. He was released for lack of evidence. Gampanat, op. cit., pp. 103–105.

16 “Pattani's Threat”, Suara Siswa (December 1970).

17 Rumours circulated that the Front took on the shape and colour of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

18 The movement had no assured source of income besides banditry. Its finances came entirely from protection money paid by threatened rubber plantation owners. Demands for protection fees accompanied by threats were common occurrences. Many people paid the money, which was assessed on the basis of their property and ranged from 20 to several thousand baht to avoid the penalty (e.g. assassination in broad daylight). As a result, the practice escalated quickly and spread throughout the South. See articles in The Bangkok Post, 1973; Siam Rath, 1973–1974; Prachathitai, 1973–1974.

19 The Government is attempting to discredit much of the recent publicity given the separatist movement as the false glorification of common banditry.

20 The Bangkok World, 2 May 1971.

21 Nai Phauang Suvannarat, then Undersecretary of State for Interior, expressed doubts on whether the students were from Thailand. He suggested that Thai people living in Kelantan who were Malaysian by law might have been wrongly identified as coming from the four southern border provinces of Thailand. He conceded that certain merchants in the region might have provided the school with financial assistance, and added that “This is a very difficult problem to control because we have no clear-cut evidence that money has been sent for such a purpose.” See The Bangkok Post, 5, 8, 26, 29, 30 September 1971.

22 With this money (which sometimes amounted to 50,000 baht a month from only two districts in Narathiwat), the Front could afford to procure effective modern weapons like M16 rifles similar to those used by the Thai army and police.

23 The Front attempted to create fear among the people by continuing to rely on force to achieve its aims. Terrorism was unquestionably on the increase. Despite bold beginnings, it never attracted a mass following and never had much support from the local population. The people were probably scared away by the reputations as bandits which the Front's members had earned; something of a reign of terror has been established. See Nehr, Clark D., “Thailand; The Politics of Continuity”, Asian Survey, XI, 2 (February 1970), p. 163Google Scholar.

24 The Interior Minister at the time, General Praphas Charusathian, said that the guerrillas had tried to do what the Communist Chinese did in Yunnan before they gained power in China, that the Thai Army would not allow such things to happen, and it is difficult for the guerrillas to achieve their ambition due to the Army's large-scale operations to wipe them out. See Utusan Melayu, 5 November 1970.

25 Bangkok had launched an all-out campaign to wipe Communist elements and terrorists from the region, including the “Ram Kamhaeng Operation” in 1969, but it was a failure. The Malay-dominated provinces were placed under the authority of the Army under the Commander-in-Chief of the Fifth Military Zone, and peace-keeping director for the South, from 1974. See Siam Rath, 1974.

26 The Front claimed to have sent an official letter to the former UN Secretary-General, U Thant, dated 10 November 1970, urging him to pay attention to the Pattani Muslims, comparing their fate to those in Angola and Mozambique. See Suara Siswa, op. cit.

27 The Front stresses 5 fundamental principles as follows: “(1) We will not commit injustice or abuse women and children; (2) Will never rob properties, destroy or disturb the people's legal way of earning a living from the point of view of the country's law or Islamic Law; (3) Will respect the people's way of life and will co-operate with them; (4) Will fight with courage, respect the purpose of our struggle with our own effort and energy, and all the weapons we got or seized will be kept in secrecy; and (5) All the decision (sic) taken during the meeting must based (sic) on majority votes; Education in revolution and guerrilla warfare training should be conducted.” Ibid.

28 Suspicion of Malayan complicity extends not only to the aristocrats but also the new ultranationalists, particularly the socialist far left and the Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), formerly the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), of the religious far right.

29 To counter the Communist subversion that might be capable of mobilizing the Malays into a full scale anti-government campaign, the Border Agreement was signed in March 1965. The aim was to join forces in the elimination of Communist terrorists along the border, including joint border patrols and the right of hot pursuit across the border. See Close, Alexandra, “Thailand's Border Alarms,” FEER, XLVIII, 9 (27 May 1965), 396Google Scholar.

30 These insurgents, referred to by the Thai and Malaysian governments as the CTO, are the experienced remnants of the Communist terrorists, mainly Chinese, who fought against the Malayan Government during the Emergency from 1948 to 1960, and are said to be still directed by Chin Peng.

31 The CTO finds its support base in the Chinese population which supplies it with recruits and much of its money. It has also developed unwilling contributors—local businessmen, plantation and mine owners—from whom it extorts funds and supplies. See Fifield, Russell H., The Diplomacy of South East Asia: 1945–1958 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 259Google Scholar.

32 The Thai Government forces, comprising soldiers, police, and civilian volunteers, were working in co-operation with Malaysian troops operating on the other side of the border. The Thai forces concentrated their campaign on jungle-covered areas along the Betong highway in the part of Thai territory which juts into Malaysia. Information obtained from Major-General Pison Surarerks, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Fifth Military Zone. (Editorial Note: Despite the changes in the political leadership in Malaysia and Thailand in 1976, and difficulties in the co-ordination of Thai-Malaysian military operations, the two Governments continued to work in co-operation throughout the year).

33 The Bangkok Post, 1971–1972. (There was a significant joint Thai-Malaysian offensive in January 1977—Ed.)

34 The most characteristic figure of extremism is Haji Yusho Japa Giya, a Muslim school teacher at Ban Khok Sator in Khok Pho district of Pattani province, for he represents the improbable combination of Communist and Islamic revolutionary ideas. He created an atmosphere of militant patriotism, which fosters hostility towards all Thai. Gampanat, op. cit., pp.212–219.

35 The Front failed continually to generate the support for its organization that any movement needs in order to expand. It stayed away almost completely from the political reality which it was trying to effect. The closest it ever got to trying to influence the politics of the border region was by issuing leaflets ‘prohibiting’ the people from voting for members of the then government party (Sahaprachathai or the United Thai People's Party), since it supported the opposition party candidates (Prachathipat or the Democrat party); but all the UTPP candidates defeated their Democrat opponents. Its only real success was in gaining the co-operation of other outlaws and plantation bandits who were already alienated from the authorities. The Front was dealt a severe blow early in 1970 when most of its members were either arrested or killed in battles with the Thai authorities. However, the leader, Haji Yusoh Japa Giya, has been neither arrested nor killed. His whereabouts are still unknown although his movement has apparently failed. See Gampanat, op. cit., p. 220.

36 This terminological tactic of the Government is ostensibly to show that Thai citizenship is for all natives of the Kingdom whatever their religion. But the Malays suspected it of being a means to undermine Malay culture by denying its existence.

37 Khaek is a collective term of imprecise meaning that has been used to refer to Malays, Indians, Pakistanis, Arabs, Negroes, and all Muslims in general. The term is the same word as the term “visitor”. This second connotation is considered insulting to Malays because of its derogatory overtones, and the Malays resent its use. The Malays, in turn, usually call themselves “Malay”. There are a few exceptions in the educated urban Malays who sometimes refer to themselves as “Thai-Muslims”, adding the Muslim suffix since the term “Thai” alone to them connotes Thai-Buddhist.

This statement stems from personal observation, and discussion between the author and various Muslims in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, during March 1974.

38 This statement is based on opinions expressed to the author by some government officials of high rank in the Local Administration Department, Ministry of the Interior.

39 By a Royal proclamation, the infamous Dress and Custom Decree was formulated whereby all citizens were to wear Western style of dress with shoes and hats when appearing in public places or on public vehicles, to eat with forks and spoons and at tables, to stop chewing betel-nut etc. Those who did not conform were fined or punished by not being given access to public buildings. Some of these edicts created bitter feelings about regimentation even among the ethnic Thai. The period was characterized scornfully as Samai Mala Num. Thai haipen maha amnat (the period when hat-wearing enables Thailand to be accepted as one of the powerful nations).

40 He was the chief apostle of the “Greater Thai” movement, which aimed at a cultural union between all members of the Thai-speaking family of peoples whether resident in Thailand or in British, French or Chinese territory. See F.O. 371/23597, Sir J. Crosby to Viscount Halifax, No. 116, Confidential, 1 March 1939.

41 Tengku Pattaraw, Tengku Abdul Jalal's elder brother, particularly resented this adoption of a Westernized version of dress. He even refused to go out of his house because in so doing he would be obliged to conform to the Decree. He had once been arrested and fined for not wearing a particular kind of hat. Even today, the Pattaraw case is still alive in the memory of some Pattani Malays and has embittered their feelings towards the Government.

42 With respect to religion, the Decree concerning the Patronage of Islam was passed in 1945. A Central Islamic Committee headed by Chularachamontri, and provincial Islamic subcommittees, were established in order to advise the Government on matters peculiar to the Muslims. In the judicial system, the Civil Code is substituted by Islamic laws in cases dealing with marriage, divorce, and property settlement. The Mosque Act of 1947 provides for the orderly functioning of mosque committees especially in the handling of properties of the mosques. See “The 1945 Decree concerning the Patronage of Islam,” Rachakitchanubeksa (Official Gazette), Vol. 62, Pt. 26 (8 November 1945)Google Scholar; “The 1974 Act concerning Mosques,” Rachakitchanubeksa, Vol. 64, Pt. 41 (2 September 1947)Google Scholar.

43 The Thai language is the official language used by government officials of every level, by the courts of law in every type of dispute, and in the schools.

44 The local dialect of Malay spoken in South Thailand differs from standard Malay (Bahasa Melayu) of Malaysia only in its use of more Thai words; but the people on both sides of the border can readily communicate.

45 While Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat form a block of Malay.-speaking provinces on the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula, Setul, on the western coast, is separated from the other three by the province of Songkhla.

46 Muslim grievances, concerning Compulsory Education Law, were expressed as early as 1923. In February that year, there was an outbreak in Pattani because of the application of the Primary Education Act B.E. 2464 (1921). This Law required all children to spend 4–5 years studying in a national programme of education or until they attained a certain standard. The local authorities were accused of closing the Malay vernacular and Koran teaching schools, and compelling Muslim children to attend Thai schools. The Law was thus regarded by the Pattani Malays as the gradual “Siamifying” of Pattani, and the stamping out of the Malay language and the Muslim faith. See “Here and There”, Penang Gazette, 14 March 1923. In practice, the Law was not strictly enforced until after the revolution of 1932.

47 Withan, Khun Janya, “Kham prarop nai ruang kan suksa khong chon Thai Islam” (Comments on Education of Thai-Islam), Pattanisan (Pattani, 1937), pp. 74–75Google Scholar.

48 See Part One, section III.

49 The Straits Times, 16 July 1948.

50 The Malays identify secular education with the importation of religious values differing from their Islamic beliefs and practices. In part this is due to the value system of Thai-Muslims which stresses Islamic religious education, and a pilgrimage to Mecca as the means of gaining merit and attaining prestige.

51 Many could read Thai printing fluently, but without any understanding of the text. In fact they learned little and retained less. This slight knowledge of Thai language reflects the opposition among the Islamic people to learning what they consider to be the language of Buddhism.

52 The period of compulsory education was initially 4 years; but it has been extended to 7 years since 1960, but this is still to be implemented in many rural areas. Most Muslim children drop out after 3 or 4 years and Malay girls tend to get married even before completing primary education. See Saihoo, Patya, “Letter from the South: Language and Administration”, Songkhomsatparithat, (The Social Science Review), Vol. 3, No. 4 (March-May 1966), 54Google Scholar.

53 Khurusamanakhan, , Seminar on the Improvement of Pawno (Yala: Khurusamanakhan, 1961), pp. 3, 45–48Google Scholar.

54 Rusamilae, , “From Common Pawno to Private Pawno Islamic School”, Rusamilae, II (May-June 1974), 17Google Scholar.

55 Summary Research Report on the Establishment of Pawno education in the Southern Border Provinces, (Yala: General Education Development, Centre Region 2, 1968), p. 10Google Scholar.

56 To encourage Malay education and speed up the educational process, there has been an official effort to familiarize the Malay children with the Thai orthography by using Thai characters for the Malay language. Translation from the Thai textbooks into Malay is thus being done at the Regional General Education Development Centre in Yala. This project is designed to lay a solid foundation in Thai language which is not easily obtained through 4 years of primary schooling.

57 The Islamic College (Islam Vidhayalai) was established in Bangkok for the pre-university education of Muslim youth.

58 Other faculties will be sited in appropriate locales in different southern provinces, according to a national master plan.

59 50 seats in universities, and in the Police Officer Cadet Academy, have been reserved, since 1971, for Thai-Muslim students; and 16 scholarships have also been granted each year. See Coordination Division, Department of Local Administration, Annual Report, 1974.

60 Given the fact that vertical mobility in Thai society is conditioned first and foremost by the degree of educational attainment, lack of high education has eventually disqualified most of the Malays from entry or promotion in the national civil service.

61 Suhrke, Astri, “Thai Muslims: Some Aspects of Minority Integration” Pacific Affairs, (Winter 1970–1971), 545Google Scholar.

62 There is at present a minuscule percentage of Thai-Muslim officials in the four provinces, including a handful of Thai-Buddhist officials who have some knowledge of Islamic law, customs, and religion, particularly low-level government officials (e.g., a deputy district officer, a commune chief, a village headman). There were also a few high-level provincial and district officials who were familiar with Malay culture and language like Phraya Ratanaphakdi (Chaeng Suvannachinda), Chat Bunyarataphun, the former governors of Pattani and Setul respectively. However, the number of officials in the South possessing such knowledge is still inadequate.

63 This programme started in 1964. Department of Local Administration, Annual Report of the Year 1967 (Bangkok: Interior Ministry, 1968), p. 113Google Scholar.

64 Ibid, p. 118. This programme was begun in 1966.

65 The training Centre also trains village leaders under the National Village Security Programme, and coordinates regular briefing sessions among high-ranking local officials.

66 Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, Report on Malay language training, 1966–1968. (Bangkok: Khurusapha, 1968)Google Scholar; and Department of Local Administration, Annual Report of the Year 1967.

67 For Regulations for the Administration of the Seven Provinces, 1902 (amended in 1904), see Chantavimol, Aphai, Problems concerning the Four Southern Provinces (Lopburi: Narai Military Center, 1964), pp. 45–50Google Scholar.

68 F.O. 69/204, Scott to Greville, Inclosure in No. 3, 5 August 1899.

69 Phraya Sukhumnaivinit was a man of quite exceptional ability. He gained the entire confidence of the local population—Malays, Thais, and Chinese—and was not only respected, but beloved by all. He spent 10 years as Superintendent Commissioner of the Circle of Nakornsrithammarat; and became Chao Phraya Yommarat in 1909. See Prince Damrongrachanuphap, Biography of Chao Phraya Yommarat, pp. 87–89.

70 Interior Ministry, No. 23/47, Prince Damrongrachanuphap to King Chulalongkorn, private, 262/43047, 4 March 1896, cited in Tej Bunnag, Vanvaithayakorn, p. 21.

71 Coordination Division, Department of Local Administration, Interior Ministry, 3/78, King Rama VI's Administration Policies for governing monthon Pattani, 6 July 1923.

72 Provision had already been made in 1934 in the Civil Law that reserved some rights for the Muslims to use Islamic Law in matters concerning marriage, property, and so forth.

73 The officials whose duties bring them into regular contact with Malay villagers are the district officer (nai canphoe), deputy district officer (palat amphoe), commune chief (kamnan), village headman (phuyaiban), and district police. Officials working at the district level are normally the only government-appointed officers to come into contact with local Muslims. (The phuyaiban and the kamnan are local residents.)

74 The local people have the impression that police are, among Thai officials, the most oppressive, and that wherever they go the people have to feed them or they will simply help themselves to whatever they like.

75 All mosques are registered with the Interior Ministry. In 1974 there were over 1,400 registered mosques all over Thailand, and 335 private pawno Islamic schools in the provinces of Yala (83), Setul (16), Narathiwat (78), and Pattani (158). See Coordination Division, Local Administration Department, Pawno Schools in the Southern Border Provinces (Bangkok: Interior Ministry, 1974)Google Scholar.

76 All important ceremonial occasions, such as a marriage, death, etc. are traditionally observed by the local Malays with a feast. It is called kin niw in the southern Thai dialect since glutinous rice (khaw niw) forms an essential dish. Nearly all acquaintances in the village are invited to the feast, which may last 2 or 3 days, and each guest is expected to contribute a monetary gift to the host family. See Fraser, Thomas M., Fishermen of South Thailand (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1966) pp. 36–38Google Scholar.

77 The government officials at the provincial and district levels are all civil servants appointed by the central government. They are regularly transferred from one place to another and rarely appreciate the extent of the problems inherent in administering the local population. It seems to be a policy of the Interior Ministry to rotate provincial and district officials throughout the country every three or four years, so that, among other reasons, they do not develop too close personal and political associations with the people and institutions in one area.

78 A big group of Malays had migrated from Ra-ngae and Kuala Tabal, which had come under Thai control by the Anglo-Thai Treaty of 1909, in order to settle down in Kelantan. See F.O. 422/64, Wood to Beckett, 2 August 1909; and F.O. 371/984, J. S. Mason to the Federal Secretary, F.M.S., Confidential, 2 April 1910.

79 After 1845, the Pattani raja developed close family relations with the Sultan of Kelantan. As Tengku Mahyiddin put it, “My ancestor came from Kelantan…” A raja of Pattani, Tun Timong, spent much of his time in Kelantan since his wife came from the Kelantan dynasty. See Mahyiddin to Jones, B. W., 17 November 1948, Jones Papers; and Ministry of the Interior, Matters Concerning the Southern Border Provinces, p. 66Google Scholar.

80 Within the PMIP party, there was a movement in the postwar period which sought to rescue Malay minorities in neighbouring states. In its strongholds of Kelantan and Trengganu, the Party took up the cause of the Pattani Malays. It alleged that the Thai Government's education and language policies discriminated against Malays, that Thai officials were unsympathetic and uncooperative in cases that should have been governed by Muslim jurisprudence and practice, and that the area was neglected by Bangkok. On several occasions in the past, PMIP leaders have proposed the annexation to Malaysia of Pattani province—a demand which received sporadic verbal support from circles in opposition to the Malaysian government, and which previously complicated Malaysian-Thai relations. See Means, Gordon P., Malaysian Politics (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1970), p. 229Google Scholar; and Vasil, R. K., Politics in a Plural Society (Singapore: the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1971), pp. 168–172Google Scholar.

81 The Straits Times, 4 August 1960.

82 The Straits Times, 8 May 1961.

83 Norton, Bob, “Cramp in the Toe” FEER, LXXI, 1 (2 January 1971), 7Google Scholar.

84 Prachathipatai (and various other dailies) June 1974. (In 1973 the PMIP was renamed the Parti Islam Se Malaysia—Ed.).

85 Siam Rath, July 1974.

86 Phraya Samantarathburin (Tui bin Abdullah), a Muslim M.P. for Setul in 1933, was the Raja of Setul's son. He himself once held a governorship of that province. Phra Phiphitphakdi (Kumuda Abdulputra), another Malay M.P. from Pattani elected in 1937, 1938, and 1952, was the son of Phraya Phiphisenamatya, the governor of Yaring and Pattani. Phra Phiphitphakdi used to be district officer of Mayo district in Pattani province, and a governor of the province of Saiburi. But the most outstanding of them all is Inche Abdullah Wangputeh, an M.P. for Setul in 1946, 1948, 1952, and 1957. He is the only Muslim local leader ever to become a minister (Deputy Minister of Education, and Public Health). It is significant that representatives from the four southernmost provinces are 80 % Muslims. See Election Division, Local Administration Department, The Outcome of the Election in the Southern Border Provinces (Bangkok: Interior Ministry, 1975)Google Scholar.

87 A major problem is the frustration of the educated Malays over the region's failure to keep pace economically with the advance of its, neighbours across the border.

88 The small and scattered tin-mining operations in the area suffer from inefficient techniques of production.

89 Although coconuts are grown in almost every part of the country, the highest productivity is in the South, for this region possesses almost two-thirds of the nation's coconut palms.

90 Malays have not involved themselves in tin-mining, and even rubber cultivation exerts far less appeal for them than rice farming, although in some areas rubber is an important cash crop among small landholders. In general, mining and the marketing of rubber are mostly pursued by the Chinese.

91 It is estimated that more than 38 million baht have been spent for rural development of the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Setul, and Narathiwat during the 1964–74 period. See The Southern Region Development Committee, Budget for the Development of the Southern Region, 1964–1974 (Bangkok: Local Administration Department, 1974)Google Scholar.

92 Since 1962, the government has launched a replanting and new planting scheme modelled closely on that of Malaysia. Two rubber research units have been established, at Kor Hong near Haadyai, and at Thanto in Yala in the centre of the rubber-producing area. The units are seeking ways to upgrade the industry and educate the smallholders to more efficient and profitable growing techniques.

93 The Mobile Development Units move from area to area, constructing roads and schools, digging wells, providing health services, etc. The MDU also tried to create a sense of co-operation and responsibility on the part of the villager towards his community.

94 In addition to other economic problems, most of the Muslim population have suffered from occasional heavy floods.

95 Many of these innovations designed to bring the Malays closer to the rest of the nation, and to promote national development as a means of strengthening the country, occurred during the regime of the late Field-Marshal Sarit Thanarat, Prime Minister from 1957–1963.

96 One acre (0–40469 hectare) equals 2½ rai.

97 There are altogether 7 nikhom in the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Setul, and Pattani. See Division of Nikhom Project, Social Welfare Department, Self-Help Land Settlement Projects (Bangkok: Interior Ministry, 1974)Google Scholar.

98 In fact, one objective among others of the resettlement programme in the southern border provinces is to redress the population imbalance between the Thai-Buddhists and the Muslim-Malays, to enable the two to build up new, integrated communities that are much larger than their villages. The idea has not, so far, met with success, owing to maladministration of the project. There have been Muslim complaints about the methods for choosing the type of person recruited for the resettlement projects. For, rather than enlisting only the local people who are industrious and adaptable to new locations and agricultural problems, the Nikhom Project Authorities have drawn a large percentage of Thai-Buddhists from the barren North-East, especially chosen for their apparent loyalty and their pioneering spirit. The Muslims considered this as new steps in an effort to eliminate them.

99 A Muslim ecclesiastical mission (a Muslim thammacharik) had been set up to work in coordination with a mobile medical unit. The mission usually sends 6 rosters to work about 17 days in one area. But, attempts made to use Islamic religious persons in the promotion of national policy have not been a success, and have made only superficial impressions upon the Islamic people. See The Bangkok Post, 26 January 1973.

100 Every year the Muslims travel in ships provided by the government to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. The ships are always filled to capacity. See the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, Notes from the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand (Bangkok: Prasanmitkanphim, 1966), pp. 9–13Google Scholar.

101 The sending of a Thai-Muslim representative for the international Koran-reading competition held in Kuala Lumpur was begun in 1961. See The Southern Region Development Committee, The Outcome of the Southern Region Development 1961–1964 (Bangkok: Local Administration Department, 1965), pp. 12–13Google Scholar.

102 The most conspicuous one is a large and beautiful central Islamic Mosque in Pattani. But what is considered to be an anomaly is an enormous Buddha statue in the large Malay area of Narathiwat. This has come to be interpreted by the Muslims as a sign of official indifference to Islam sentiments.

103 Radio and T.V. Malaysia broadcasts in standard Malay were previously popular among the Muslims, for programming tended to be somewhat better than early programming in Thailand.

104 The King and Queen of Thailand have done much to benefit Muslims in the country and to promote Islamic religious and educational welfare. See Coordination Division, Local Administration Department, Annual Report of the Year 1966 (Bangkok: Ministry of the Interior, 1967)Google Scholar.

105 There is a special office as well within the Local Administration Department of the Interior Ministry called the Coordination Division which deals solely with the activities of the southernmost provinces