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The OSS in Laos: The 1945 Raven Mission and American Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

Arthur J. Dommen  and
George W. Dalley
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Extract

In September 1945, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) headquarters in Kunming dispatched a mission to Laos. The purpose and composition of the mission were described on the first page of the mission's report as follows:

The Raven Mission was put on by OSS in cooperation with AGAS [Air Ground Aid Section], and parachuted near Vientiane, French Indo-China on 16 September 1945 for Prisoner of War relief work. This mission was activated following a request by G-5 SOS. The mission was composed of the following personnel: Major [Aaron] Bank, Mission Leader; Major [Charles] Holland, Executive Officer; Lt. [Alger] Ellis, Asst. Executive Officer; Lt. Phelan, AGAS Representative; Lt. [B. Hugh] Tovar, Reports Officer; Lt. Reese, Reports Officer; T/5 McKowan, Radio Operator; T/5 Blandin, Medic; Lao Trug [Luu], Interpreter.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , September 1991 , pp. 327 - 346
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1991

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References

1 “Mission to Vientiane, French Indo-China.” Report from Major Aaron Bank to Intelligence Division, Headquarters, Strategic Services Unit, China Theatre, APO 627, dated 8 October 1945, in National Archives of the United States, Washington, D.C., Records Group 226, Entry 154, Box 174, Folder 3019. Hereafter cited as Raven. The report consists of 32 typewritten pages, plus various handwritten drafts, and attached documents (some of which are in other folders). Many of these documents bear the handwritten numbering scheme “YKB-”, apparently added by the OSS or the Strategic Services Unit, and signifying “Kunming Miscellaneous”. The Raven report is numbered YKB-1152. The authors express their thanks to John Taylor, archivist, National Archives, for assistance in locating these records. As the spelling of proper names in the documents varies in places, the authors have taken the liberty of standardizing, correctly wherever possible, the spelling of proper names.

2 The basic sources are: Sananikone, Oun, Lao Issara: The Memoirs of Oun Sananikone (ed. Wyatt, David K., trans. John B. Murdoch) (Cornell Data Paper, 1975)Google Scholar; Caply, Michel, Guérilla au Laos (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1966)Google Scholar; Kemp, Peter, Alms for Oblivion (London: Cassell, 1961)Google Scholar; Masanori, Sako, Laosu Dokuritsu no Shinso (The Truth About the Independence of Laos) (Tokyo, 1960)Google Scholar.

3 Handwritten report from Tovar to Bank, YKB-974–1, pp. 5–6, in National Archives of the United States, Washington, D.C., Records Group 226, Entry 140, Box 45, Folder 359.

4 Caply, Michel, “Le Japon et l'lndépendance du Laos (1945)”, Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1971), pp. 67–81Google Scholar.

5 Ibid., p. 79.

6 US. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), “Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Approved by the Heads of Government of the United States and the United Kingdom”, p. 1465Google Scholar.

7 The text of the king's proclamation to this effect, now in the French archives, is cited in Gunn, Geoffrey C., Political Struggles in Laos (1930–1954) (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1988), p. 140Google Scholar. The telegram from Luang Prabang of 7 September informing Phetsarath of the king's decision is published in “3349”, Iron Man of Laos: Prince Phetsarath Ratanavongsa (originally published in Bangkok in 1956, English translation of 1978 reprinted by Dalley Book Service in 1988), p. 37.

8 Raven, p. 24.

9 As Bank explained to one of the authors: “All the briefing I received from SI [Special Intelligence] at OSS headquarters in Kunming, China, is described in my book. It was short, primarily to hunt for Jap hidden POW camps, and to report and observe conditions in Laos and on important personalities there. There was no mention of governmental control, except as I've explained in my book, that it was under China Command north of the 16th parallel. In other words, for most of the time and circumstances I'd ‘play it by ear’.” (Personal communication from Bank to Dommen, 29 June 1990.) The reference is to Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets (Novato, California: Presidio, 1986)Google Scholar.

10 Raven, p. 1.

11 Interview with B. Hugh Tovar by Dommen, Washington, D.C., 26 June 1990. Prince Somsanith became Prime Minister of Laos from 3 June to 14 August 1960.

12 According to a reliable French contemporary witness, the Lao Pen Lao agents Bong and others exploited their contacts with Americans of the OSS to spread the word in Vientiane that the latter promised Phetsarath American aid to prevent the French from returning to Laos and to support, internationally, Laotian independence. According to this account, these agents tried to give the impression that they were the intermediaries authorized by the Americans to discuss problems of independence, and used the Americans' presence to further their own influence. (Personal communication to one of the authors (Dommen) from Jean Deuve, 23 May 1990. Cf. Caply, , Guérilla, p. 256.Google Scholar) If indeed Phetsarath was led by these contacts to expect a continuing American intervention in the affairs of Laos, including possibly the provision of arms against the French, it would go a long way to explaining his actions at the time. Phetsarath's “memoir” is silent on his interviews with OSS personnel. This fact, among others, casts considerable doubt on the authenticity of this “memoir”. See “3349”, op. cit., introduction by Dommen.

13 Raven, p. 11.

14 Ibid., p. 2.

15 Oun Sananikone, op. cit., p. 29. The statement betrays a callousness toward the French, including civilians, that alas was not an isolated instance.

16 Raven, p. 13.

17 Ibid., p. 2.

18 Ibid.

19 “The only Japanese activity in Thakhek is against French guerrillas who are actively sabotaging communications, chiefly telegraphic.” (Intelligence report, OSS, Washington, D.C., 18 June 1945, in National Archives, Records Group 226, Entry 154, Box 174, Folder 3019.)

20 Caply, , Guérilla, p. 306Google Scholar.

21 Kemp, op. cit., p. 48.

22 Raven, unnumbered page of typescript. The final version of this passage, in the third person, is on p. 12.

23 Raven, p. 7.

24 Handwritten report from Tovar to Bank, p. 7. This information is attributed by Tovar to the secretary to the chao khoueng of Vientiane, Khamphoui.

25 Handwritten report from Tovar to Bank, p. 6.

26 Raven, pp. 2–3. Tovar, who participated in the interview, says the team had considerable difficulty in translating from English to French. He says that when he later discovered that Klotz, who had remained silent throughout, was fluent in English he was furious. (Dommen interview.)

27 All these developments were reported in an official telegram sent to Bank and Holland by Xieng Mao on 24 September. (In National Archives, Records Group 226, Entry 140, Box 45, Folder 359.) Xieng Mao, who became the Prime Minister of the Lao Issara provisional government, is described in the Raven mission's report as “an intelligent, sincere person, a painstaking worker and honest” (p. 24). The Raven mission's operational log records receipt of this telegram on 27 September (p. 4).

28 Raven, p. 3.

29 The Raven mission report (p. 22) gives a figure of 5,000.

30 Personal communication to one of the authors (Dommen) from Jean Deuve, 2 September 1990.

31 Tape-recorded interview with Roger Warner, Vientiane, February 1990. Cited by permission.

32 Oun Sananikone, op. cit., p. 25.

33 Bank, op. cit., p. 29.

34 Oun Sananikone, op. cit., p. 25.

35 Raven, p. 22. Tovar affirms that there was no Japanese policy to turn over arms to the Vietnamese (Dommen interview). The Vietnamese ranks included a number of deserters from the Garde Indochinoise, a French-officered police force, who had looted the armories of the latter organization after the Japanese takeover.

36 Raven, p. 22.

37 Deuve letter, 23 May 1990.

38 Tovar noted that Vu Huu Binh “constantly referred to it [his faction] as the Annamite, and never as Viet Minh”. (Handwritten report from Tovar to Bank, p. 2.) The Viet Minh is the abbreviated name of the nationalist front behind which the ICP operated.

39 Raven, p. 24.

40 Dommen interview with Tovar. Tovar said that at first Bank had not been planning to take Holland, but to leave him in command of the team. Tovar found the departure from Laos of the mission's two senior officers “extraordinary”.

41 Bank, op. cit., p. 110.

42 As Bank explained his chain of command to one of the authors: “I was under direct command of Special Intelligence Branch, OSS. I was not under China Command but operating within its area of combat responsibility.” (Personal communication to Dommen, 29 June 1990.) Both Bank and Holland had been in Hanoi before. In early August Bank had been given the mission of investigating Japanese war crimes, and while in Hanoi had met Holland, who had been captured by the Japanese while training Viet Minh guerrillas. Holland had also met Ho Chi Minh at this time. (Bank, op. cit., pp. 104–105.)

43 Bank, op. cit., p. 115.

44 Dommen interview with Tovar. It is perhaps not surprising that in the Raven mission's report Oun is described as “a slippery politician, intelligent and self-seeking” (Raven, p. 24).

45 Colonel Legrand had parachuted into Laos during the Japanese occupation and was the French Government's representative for all of southern Laos at the time of the meeting.

46 Recalling his suggestion of a plebiscite at the Savannakhet meeting, Tovar told one of the authors: “It was the only thing I could think of saying to try to mediate between two very ugly groups.” (Dommen interview with Tovar.)

47 Raven, pp. 8–9.

48 Oun gave himself the title Governor of Central and Southern Laos. See his letter from Thakhek to the governor of Nakhon Phanom of 4 October 1945 in National Archives, Records Group 226, Entry 140, Box 45, Folder 359.

49 For a discussion of the reasons for this opposition, see Toye, Hugh, Laos: Buffer State or Battleground (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 71Google Scholar.

50 Raven, p. 7.

51 Deuve, telephone interview with Dommen, 13 July 1990.

52 Bulletin de Renseignement No. 1633 dated 12 July 1945 in National Archives, Records Group 226, Entry 154, Box 174, Folder 3019.

53 Raven, p. 14.

54 Years later, Tovar and Kemp met again in Laos. Tovar was serving as station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) between May 1970 and September 1973 when Kemp visited Vientiane. (Dommen interview of Tovar.)

55 Kemp, op. cit., p. 18.

56 One of the other passengers in the bus was Phoumi Nosavan, who told Kemp he had been in charge of the Free Lao resistance against the Japanese in the Savannakhet area; Kemp says he did not find out until later that Phoumi was on his way back to Savannakhet to organize resistance against the French (Kemp, op. cit., p. 23).

57 Quoted in Kemp, op. cit., p. 44.

58 The Raven mission's brief reference to this evacuation makes no mention of Klotz's role, and the Americans may have been unaware of it (p. 12).

59 Kemp, op. cit., pp. 27–28. Deuve supplies the following biographical information about Klotz: born in Paris, 12 June 1920, son of Léeon Klotz and Anna Gutenberg, residents of Strasbourg; entered the French Army in Morocco in 1942; sent to India, 14 September 1944; commando training at Eastern Warfare School, Poona; paratroop training at Chaklala (Rawalpindi); joined Force 136, 1 February 1945; awarded the Croix de Guerre posthumously, 14 December 1945. (Personal communication.)

60 Kemp, op. cit., p. 49.

61 Raven, p. 28.

62 Ibid., pp. 30–31.

63 Ibid., pp. 27–28.

64 Kemp, op. cit., pp. 49–52. Cf. Caply, , Guérilla, pp. 306–307Google Scholar.

65 Raven, p. 28. Klotz's handwritten note in French is also in the National Archives, Records Group 226, Entry 140, Box 45, Folder 359.

66 The Vietnamese had their spies everywhere, including in Nakhon Phanom which was home to a large Vietnamese community. Kemp says that even the captain and motorman of the Siamese governor's launch were Vietnamese, and complains of the difficulty of sifting true information from false because he was at the mercy of his agents, “who turned out as often as not to be double agents” (Kemp, op. cit., p. 24). If the Vietnamese had intercepted the first message, they were perfectly capable of intercepting the second, which gave the anticipated arrival time.

67 Raven, p. 29.

68 Ibid., p. 4.

69 Ibid., p. 5.

70 Raven, p. 31. Bank's account of the incident in his book published in 1986 can only be described as pure fantasy. He writes: “A Laotian patrol happened to be near the ferry landing in front of our quarters. When the launch was tied to the pier, the two officers started to walk along the dock toward shore. The patrol opened fire, killing the Frenchman. The British officer, with the help of some of our team, carried the body back to the launch.” Bank claims he asked Pheng why the patrol had not warned Klotz to turn back. “I couldn't deny that the French were waging war against the Laotians and dropped the subject. The Frenchman had asked for it” (Bank, op. cit., p. 123). In his omission to describe the patrol as Vietnamese and not Laotian, to describe the ambush as having been deliberately prepared, and to say that Klotz was shot in the back, Bank contradicts his own report of 1945.

71 Oun Sananikone, op. cit., p. 39.

72 We are in possession of a French translation of Kemp's report, sent the afternoon of 27 September.

73 US. Department of State, Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, “Control and Command in the War Against Japan No. 603”Google Scholar, memo by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (G. M. Elsey) submitted to Leahy 1 July and subsequently forwarded to Truman, “Indo-China”, op. cit., p. 920.

74 Handwritten report from Tovar to Bank, p. 1. The use of surnames was not customary in Laos in 1945, except in the case of a few distinguished families.

75 Kemp, op. cit., p. 46.

76 Ibid., p. 48.

77 Raven, p. 25.

78 Message dated 7 October 1945 in National Archives, Records Group 226, Entry 154, Box 174, Folder 3019. This message bears the notations 070831Z, 071150Z, 072000. The matter also figured in a diplomatic communication from Paris to Washington; see The New York Times, 5 10 1945Google Scholar.

79 Intelligence report, OSS, Washington, D.C., 30 September 1945, in National Archives, Records Group 226, Entry 154, Box 174, Folder 3019.

80 Raven, p. 6.

81 Memorandum of conversation by Assistant Secretary of State James Clement Dunn, 29 August 1945, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Far East, China, 1945, Vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 540–41Google Scholar. From the French side, Jean Lacouture, in his biography of De Gaulle, writes about this meeting that De Gaulle found a good understanding on Truman's part on the subject of France's overseas territories: “De Gaulle having spoken of leading the French colonies toward independence, Truman indicated on the subject of Indochina that his government was not opposed to the return of French authority and the French army in this territory” [Lacouture, Jean, De Gaulle, Vol. 2, Le Politique 1944–1959 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985), p. 110Google Scholar].

82 Isoart, Paul, “Aux Origines d'une Guerre: L'Indochine Française (1940–45)”, in L'lndochine Française 1940–1945, ed. Isoart, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982), pp. 1–74Google Scholar.

83 The texts of the two aide-mémoires are in the National Archives. The French démarche produced no result, and Ambassador Hurley in Chungking informed the State Department in a telegram on 6 September that plans and troop dispositions were so far advanced that it would not be practicable to accede to the French request. (National Archives, Records Group 59, “General Records of the Department of State”, 1945–49 Central Decimal File, from 740.00119 PW/8–2145 to 740.00119 PW/9–3045, Box 3925.)

84 Telegram drafted by Kenneth P. Landon to American Mission New Delhi, 30 August 1945, in National Archives, Record Group 59, “General Records of the Department of State”, 1945–49 Central Decimal File, from 740.00119 PW/8–2145 to 740.00119 PW/9–3045, Box 3925.

85 Raven, p. 24. Words in brackets are found in handwritten draft, not in typewritten report.

86 In Laos, at least, the constitutional question was not so complicated as in Vietnam, where the emperor Bao Dai, head of state, had abdicated.

87 Wording adopted in the OSS report dated 29 September sent to Washington by the Raven mission, in National Archives, Records Group 226, Entry 154, Box 174, Folder 3019.

88 As Ho told an OSS officer on 23 September. See Patti, Archimedes L. A., Why Viet Nam? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 348Google Scholar.

89 For Ho's shifting relations with the French and Chinese during this whole period, see Devillers, Philippe, Paris-Saigon-Hanoi; Les Archives de la Guerre 1944–1947 (Paris: Gallimard/Julliard, 1988)Google Scholar, which is based on an examination of the French archives and the personal papers of key figures involved. Devillers points out, among other things, that a Soviet mission arrived in Hanoi on 20 December and this was followed by a noticeable change in Ho's line toward the French (pp. 114–15). The modus vivendi was signed on 6 March 1946.

90 In deference to nationalist sensibilities, the Central Committee of the ICP decided on 11 November 1945 to voluntarily dissolve itself. The formation of a “separate” Communist party for Laos had to wait until March 1955.