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Limited state and strong social forces: Fishing lot management in Cambodia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2014

Say Sok
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Abstract

All observers and stakeholders agree that the Cambodian state's capacity for development has been rather limited, although there are signs of expansion. The management of its important fisheries is no exception. Drawing upon existing literature, primary documents, and field interviews in two provinces and in Phnom Penh with various state and non-state actors, this study provides a background to the reasons for Cambodia's failure to manage its fisheries, enforce compliance within fishing lots, and curtail corruption in the fishing industry. It shows how fishing concessionaires' power has grown vis-à-vis that of the state and other actors. This study concludes that the considerable power held by concessionaires to make and enforce their own rules, together with their ability to accommodate or co-opt relevant state agents, has impeded Cambodia's capacity to fully benefit from, conserve, and manage its fisheries.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 174 - 193
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 2014 

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References

1 Frank van Acker, ‘Don't trust fish when they are in water: Cambodia's inland fisheries in transition’ (n.d.), p. 11.

2 The two provinces the researcher visited are identified as Provinces A and B, respectively. This anonymity is needed to ensure informants' security and safety. A semi-structured interview and discussion guide, with frequent probing questions, was used to collect the data. NVivo software was used to aid content analyses of the interview scripts and the primary and secondary documents.

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18 For a discussion of ‘research lots’, see Say Sok, ‘State building in Cambodia’ (Ph.D. diss., Deakin University, Melbourne, 2012).

19 See ibid. for a discussion of CFis and the organisational and managerial capacities of CFCs.

20 DoF was transformed to the Fisheries Administration, equivalent in status to a general department, in 2006 though it is still affiliated with MAFF.

21 Cited in Ly, Vuthy, Yin, Dara and Degen, Peter, ‘Management aspects of Cambodia's freshwater capture fisheries’, in Management aspects of Cambodia's freshwater capture fisheries: Eleven presentations given at the Annual Meeting of the Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 27–28 January 2000, ed. Van Zalinge, Nicolaas, Nao, Thuok and Lieng, Sopha (Phnom Penh: MRC and DoF, 2000)Google Scholar, p. 97. Pumping is an illegal activity, when it involves pumping a water body up to a point that the existing water level is below the level the Fisheries Law permits. This is sometimes followed by sweeping, in which concessionaires/operators use mobile net gear to trawl the river bed, usually moved by multiple engine boats, to catch fish. Electro-fishing involves the use of an electrical pole connected to a mobile battery for fishing. Brush parks involve putting tree branches and leaves in a river, lake or stream in a pile to create an artificial inundated forest to attract fish. After some time, the area is cordoned off by fishing nets, and the fish inside are caught.

22 Degen and Nao, ‘Inland fishery management in Cambodia’, p. 11; Sithirith Mak, Piseth Vann and Sokkhoeun Te, ‘Communication strategies for fisheries conflict management: A case study in Cambodia’, Final Technical Report of DFID project R8294, Annex 7:7 (Phnom Penh: DFID, 2004), pp. 9, 25; NGO Forum on Cambodia, ‘Public forum on lot boundary disputes in Battambang’, 25 Feb. 2000 (n.p.), pp. 10–34; Sverdrup-Jensen, Sten, Poul, Degnbol and Ahmed, Mahfuzuddin, Guide to fisheries policy research in Cambodia: The institutional and legal context (Penang: WorldFish Centre, 2006)Google Scholar, p. 18.

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24 Informants 45, 46, 57; Carl Middleton, Sodary Chap, and Sarom Leng, ‘Resettlement of Peam Psot village, Ta Pon commune, Sangke district, Battambang Province’ (Phnom Penh: FACT, 2005), p. 3; see also Van Acker, Cambodia's commons, pp. 13–14.

25 Informants 45, 46, 49–56, 57, 61–63. See also Allebone-Webb, Sophie et al. , ‘The value of commercial fisheries’, in Integration of commercial and conservation objectives in Prek Toal, Tonle Sap and Battambang Fishing Lot #2 (Phase 1: Understanding current management systems and recommendations for reforms), ed. Clements, Tom and Allebone-Webb, Sophie (Phnom Penh: Wildlife Conservation Society and FiA, 2010)Google Scholar; Swift, Developing a research framework.

26 See Allebone-Webb et al., ‘The value of commercial fisheries’; Degen and Nao, ‘Inland fishery management in Cambodia’; Touch and Todd, The inland and marine fisheries, p. 128; Nicolaas van Zalinge and Rath Troeung, ‘Organization of fishing operations in Lot 2 Battambang and proposed sampling plan to assess its fish catch’ (n.p., 2008).

27 Informants 1, 10, 11–13, 29, 45, 46, 49–56, 57, 58, 61–63. See also Bin, ‘Report on the result’; Gum, Inland aquatic resources, p. 28; Wildlife Conservation Society and FiA, ‘Comparison between outcomes under the proposed Prek Toal Sanctuary and alternative management regime’, in Integration of commercial and conservation objectives, pp. 105–6.

28 Informants 4, 9, 11–13, 14–28, 30–44, 45, 49–56, 58, 59–60, 61–3; NGO Forum on Cambodia, ‘Fishing conflict in Kompong Chhnang’ (n.p., 2004), p. 25. See also Allebone-Webb et al., ‘The value of commercial fisheries’, p. 48; Bin, ‘Report on the result’; Degen et al., ‘Taken for granted conflicts’, pp. 18–9; Degen, Peter et al. , ‘People, power, and fisheries policy: Fisheries management reform addressing community fisheries in Cambodia’, Fourth technical symposium on Mekong fisheries (Phnom Penh: MRC, 2001)Google Scholar, p. 16; DoF, Impacts of the fisheries policy reforms in Kampong Cham, Pursat and Takeo provinces: First round assessment report (Phnom Penh: DoF, 2004)Google Scholar, p. 2; Gum, Inland aquatic resources, pp. iii–iv, 22–8.

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30 It is worth noting that the official national poverty line was US$0.50 then, and the Tonle Sap area was and still is one of the poorest regions in Cambodia.

31 Sithirith Mak, ‘Fishing for lives: Conflicts and struggles between communities and fishing lots in Kompong Chhnang Province’ (Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2000), pp. 14–15; NGO Forum on Cambodia, ‘Fishing conflict in Kampong Chhnang’, pp. 13–15.

32 NGO Forum on Cambodia, ‘Fishing conflicts in Battambang’ (Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2004), p. 12. See also Yin Dara, Ly Vuthy, Prak Leang Huor, Thomas Olesen and Peter Degen, ‘Time allocation of fisher–farmer households in Phlong Village, in Fishing Lot 14, Kampong Chhnang’ (Phnom Penh: IFReDI Cambodia Fisheries Technical Paper Series, 2001), p. 41.

33 Cecilia Aipira, ‘Against all odds: Construction of livelihoods in the absence of rights to nature in Cambodia’ (M.Sc. thesis, Lund University, 2009), pp. 35–7; Van Zalinge and Troeung, ‘Organization of fishing operations’.

34 Informants 7–8.

35 See also Allebone-Webb et al., ‘The value of commercial fisheries’, p. 47; Chheng, Vibolrith, ‘Case study of Fishing Lot No. 3 in Siem Reap Province’, in Present status of Cambodia's freshwater fisheries and management implications: Nine presentations given at the Annual Meeting at the Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 19–21 January, 1999, ed. van Zalinge, Nicolaas, Nao, Thuok and Deap, Leoung (Phnom Penh: MRC and DoF, 1999)Google Scholar, p. 112; FACT and EJF, Feast or famine?, p. 25; Swift, Developing a research framework, pp. 62–7.

36 See Bin, ‘Report on the result’; Swift, Developing a research framework; TSA, ‘Report on results from implementing RGC's Order 01BB on Measures to Protect Fisheries Resources and Protection of Areas around Tonle Sap Lake’ (Phnom Penh: TSA, 31 Aug. 2010); Frank van Acker, ‘Don't trust fish’, pp. 1–40.

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39 Frank van Acker, Cambodia's commons: Changing governance, shifting entitlements? (Discussion Paper No. 42, Centre for ASEAN Studies, Antwerp, 2003), p. 23.

40 Sverdrup-Jensen, Poul and Ahmed, Guide to fisheries policy research in Cambodia, pp. 26–7. See also Neou, Bonheur et al. , ‘Towards a holistic approach to wetland governance: The legal and institutional framework and economic evaluation of wetland resources in Cambodia’, in Wetland governance in the Mekong region: Country reports on the legal–institutional framework and economic evaluation of aquatic resources, ed. Oh, Edmund J.V. et al. (Penang: WorldFish Centre, 2005), pp. 70–1.Google Scholar

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43 Van Acker, Cambodia's commons, p. 31.

44 Evans, Embedded autonomy, pp. 36–7.

45 DoF, ‘Report on fishing lot leasing’ (Phnom Penh: DoF, 1999).

46 See also Hortle, Lieng, and Valbo-Jorgensen, An introduction to Cambodia's inland fisheries, p. 28; Wildlife Conservation Society and FiA, ‘Comparison between outcomes’, pp. 105–6.

47 Bin, ‘Report on the result’; Informant 2.

48 See Baran, Eric, Jantunen, Teemu and Chong, Chiew Kieok, Values of inland fisheries in the Mekong River Basin (Phnom Penh: WorldFish Center, 2007)Google Scholar, p. 51; Van Zalinge and Troeung, ‘Organization of fishing operations’.

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50 Conflict managers refer to local authorities from village to provincial levels, CFC members and fisheries officials. Sithirith Mak and Sokkhoeun Te, ‘Enabling fisheries conflict management: A case study in Cambodia’ (Phnom Penh: FACT, 2005), pp. 19–20.

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53 Informants 9, 11–13, 57.

54 Swift, Developing a research framework, p. 20.

55 Informant 57; Sithirith Mak, ‘The Tonle Sap and its fisheries management: A case in Cambodia’ (Phnom Penh: FACT), pp. 16–7; NGO Forum on Cambodia, ‘Fishing conflict in Kompong Chhnang’, pp. 10–20.

56 Wildlife Conservation Society and FiA, ‘Comparison between outcomes’, p. 106. See also Mak, ‘Fishing for lives’, p. 10; NGO Forum on Cambodia, ‘Fishing conflict in Kompong Chhnang’, pp. 19–20.

57 Informants 1, 46, 64; Bin, ‘Report on the result’.

58 Informants 3, 46, 47.

59 Informant 47.

60 Informant 64.

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65 Grzymala-Busse and Luong, ‘Reconceptualizing the state’, pp. 531–7.

66 Degen and Nao, ‘Inland fishery management in Cambodia’, p. 8; Degen et al., ‘Taken for granted conflicts’, pp. 2–3; Van Acker, ‘Don't trust fish’, pp. 12–15.

67 Mahfuzuddin Ahmed, Seang Tana Touch, and Thuok Nao, ‘Sustaining the gifts of the Mekong: The future of freshwater capture fisheries in Cambodia’, Watershed, Mar.–June 1996, p. 3; Nao, Ahmed, and Sam, ‘Cambodia's Great Lake’, p. 4.

68 Cited in NGO Forum on Cambodia, ‘Public forum on lot boundary’, n.p.

69 Informant 65.

70 DoF, ‘Report on fishing lot leasing’, Informant 46.

71 DoF, ‘Letter No. 153, 158 and 161 RS.Kh 199 dating 6 and 7 May, 1999 of the Commission on Human Rights and Litigation of the National Assembly’; Touch and Todd, The inland and marine fisheries, pp. 128–31.

72 See, for example, Sophakchakrya Khouth, ‘PM order for ACU oversight’, Phnom Penh Post, 28 Nov. 2011.

73 Informants 45, 46.

74 Touch and Todd, The inland and marine fisheries, pp. 129–30.

75 Van Acker, ‘Don't trust fish’, pp. 12–13. See also Degen et al., ‘Taken for granted conflicts’, p. 18.

76 Fukuyama, Francis, State-building: Governance and world order in the 21st century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

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78 Grzymala-Busse and Luong, ‘Reconceptualizing the state’, pp. 533–4.

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82 Evans, Embedded autonomy, p. 59.

83 Van Zalinge and Troeung, ‘Organization of fishing operations’; Informant 45.

84 However, the instantaneous reforms in 2001 and 2011 without any consultation with any social stakeholders attest to the ‘strength’ (but not necessary capacity) of the state relative to society.

85 Informant 4.