Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dsjbd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T20:35:33.279Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

“Anti-Communism” in Japanese-Philippine Relations during the 1930s

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Grant K. Goodman
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

This paper derives from a larger study of the nature of Japan's relations with colonial South and Southeast Asia in the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War. By means of a detailed examination of a single facet of Japanese-Philippine relations, it is hoped that a greater insight may be gained into the often convolute processes of the interactions between, on the one hand, the dominant Asian power of the inter-war period, and on the other hand, colonial entities and personalities still beholden to Western European or North American rulers. However, two caveats need to be put forward about this essay: (1) the case of the Philippines was unique in colonial Asia since the United States had fully committed itself to a policy of withdrawal, thus facilitating contacts between the local ruling elite and Japanese diplomats; (2) despite pre-war and wartime propaganda to the contrary, the principal concern of Japan in all its dealings with colonial South and Southeast Asia before the Pacific War was economic. In the prior instance, therefore, the paragraphs that follow will demonstrate an apparently remarkable degree of freedom of action on the part of the Filipinos in authority under the Commonwealth Administration (1935–46) in spite of the continuing legal responsibility of the United States for Philippine foreign affairs under the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie (Independence) Act of 1934. The second caveat will be evidenced by the unstinting and continuous attention of Japanese diplomats to the development of ever closer economic ties between the Philippines and Japan.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 9 , Special Issue 2: Japan and the Western Powers in Southeast Asia , September 1978 , pp. 219 - 233
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Goodman, G.K., Four Aspects of Philippine-Japanese Relations, 1930–1940 (New Haven, 1967)Google Scholar and Goodman, G.K., Davao: A Case Study in Japanese-Philippine Relations (Lawrence, 1967)Google Scholar.

2 Porter, Catherine, Crisis in the Philippines (New York, 1942), p. 84Google Scholar.

3 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter this series of documents will be cited as “JMFA” followed by fife number, date, and classification, if given) A.6.0.0.1.–33, 13 Oct. 1937. Very Secret.

4 The Communist Party of the Philippines had been officially founded on 7 Nov. 1930 but had been outlawed in a judgement of the Court of First Instance on 18 Sept. 1931, a decision reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on 26 Oct. 1932. However, in a somewhat typical example of his exercise of a power which he did not have (but which no one questioned!) President Quezon on 15 Oct. 1937 “legalized” the Communist Party of the Philippines. (For details see Hoeksema, Renze L., “Communism in the Philippines: A Historical and Analytical Study of Communism and the Communist Party in the Philippines and Its Relations to Communist Movements Abroad” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1956)Google Scholar.

5 JMFA, A.6.0.0.1–33.13 Oct. 1937. Very Secret.

6 JMFA, 1.4.5.1.3, vol. 1, 27 Aug. 1938.

7 JMFA, S10.1.1.0–19, reel 459,22 May 1939.

8 Ibid.

9 Sixto V. Jimenez was both Chairman of the Anti-Communism League of the Philippines and editor of the Far Eastern Bulletin. By Feb. 1938 the Anti Communism League of the Philippines was listed as a member organization of the pro-Japanese anti-Communist Association of East Asian Anti-Communist Leagues (Tōa Hankyō Dōmeikai). (JMFA, 1.4.5.1.3, 21 Apr. 1938.)

10 JMFA, A. 6.0.0.1.–33, 7 Feb. 1938. During the wartime Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Baluyot was appointed Chief of the Labor Institute of the Makapili (Katipunang Makabayan ng.mga Pilipino or Patriotic League of Filipinos), a pro-Japanese group which fought alongside the Japanese army in opposition to the American reconquest of the Islands.

11 The full text can be found in Messages of the President, vol. I. pt. 1 (Manila, 1939), 764Google Scholar.

12 JMFA, A.6.0.0.1–33,8 Jan. 1938.

13 Ibid.

14 JMFA, A.6.0.0.1–33, 7 Feb. 1938.

15 Ibid.

16 JMFA, 1.4.5.1.3, vol. 1,27 Aug. 1938.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 A detailed account of their discussion is found in JMFA, 1.4.5.1.3, vol. 1, 29 Aug. 1938.

23 Ibid.

24 A copy of the full verbatim English text of the handbill is attached to JMFA, 1.4.5.1.3, vol. I, 5 Sept. 1938.

25 JMFA, 1.4.5.1.3, vol. 1,29 Aug. 1938.

26 The Philippines Free Press described the participants as the anti-radical elements of Philippine labour, 3 Sept. 1938.

27 Their conversation is reported in JMFA, 1.4.5.1.3, vol. I, 3 Sept. 1938.

28 Kihara sent the Foreign Office a copy of this issue of the Workingman (vol. I, no. 5, 31 Aug. 1938) as an example of the success of his activities. (JMFA, 1.4.5.1.3, vol. I, 7 Sept. 1938.)

29 Kihara had been privately discussing for some time with President Quezon the anti-Japanese boycott and possible methods of combating it. (JMFA, A.6.0.0.14, 25 Oct. 1938.)

30 Under Comintern direction to form a “United Front from above”, in December 1936 a Popular Front had been founded in the Philippines under the aegis of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Originally the Philippine Popular Front had directed its attacks against “the Fascist tendencies of the Quezon administration”. However, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the formation of the United Front in China, the Communist Party was urging support for Quezon who was “most definitely following an anti-Japanese policy”. (See letter of James S. Allen to Pedro Abad Santos dated 26 Sept. 1937 and published in the Philippine Herald, 1 Nov. 1937. James S. Allen was an alias of Sol Auerbach, principal representative of the Communist Party of the United States in the Philippines.)

31 From 1938 the Communist Party of the Philippines concentrated its efforts on the development of various anti-fascist and anti-Japanese organizations. For example, the Communists took credit for forming the “Philippine League for the Defense of Democracy”, the “Friends of China Youth Congress”, the “Civil Liberties Union”, and the “Congress for Democracy and Collective Security”. (Hoeksema, op. cit., pp. 168, 201–2.)

32 Union, 1 Apr. 1939.

33 Philippine Herald, 5 July 1939.

34 Nava was later sentenced to life imprisonment for communist activities and died before the Philippine Supreme Court could rule on his appeal.

35 Philippine Herald, 5 July 1939. Non-communist Chinese support for communistsponsored anti-Japanese agitation in the Philippines had become standard practice. Both Manuel Cabo Chan of the Kuomintang and Santiago F. Chan of the Chinese Filipino Association had addressed the Third National Congress of the Communist Party of the Philippines held on 29–31 Oct. 1938 in Manila. The theme of the Congress was “For a national democratic front against reaction and Japanese aggression, for security, democracy, peace and freedom.” (Hoeksema, op. cit., pp. 188–90.)

36 Far Eastern Bulletin, 8 July 1939.

37 Philippine Herald, 6 July 1939.

38 The full text of the letter to Bautista is in the Philippine Herald, 7 July 1939.

39 Union, 15 July 1939.

40 Far Eastern Bulletin, 8 July 1939.

41 See n. 31 above.

42 Philippine Herald, 10 July 1939.

43 Ibid.

44 JMFA, J.1.1.0.Xl–Ul, 2 June 1939.

45 The contents of Quezon's remarks can be found in JMFA, A.6.0.0.1–33, 24 July 1939.

46 For a detailed and penetrating analysis of the lack of an organized opposition in the prewar Philippines, see J. Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York, 1955), c. 15, “The Unrepresented Minority”, pp. 376–400. Without necessarily questioning the sincerity of the anti-Japanese sentiments of Bautista and his supporters, it should nevertheless be noted that a frustrated and ambitious minority will very often seize upon any issue which seems to have some chance of arousing popular enthusiasm and which might then be used as a vehicle to promote other views held by that minority. Clearly the Congress for Democracy and Collective Security was a communist front. (See n. 31 above.)

47 See, for example, “Embargo Against Japan is Urged”, Philippine Herald, 26 Jan. 1940.

48 Niiro received his appointment to the Philippines directly from his post as Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of Commerce in the Foreign Office where he was known as an expert on trade and industry.

49 In reality the war situation created an artificial set of circumstances which made it possible for the Philippines to secure some momentary advantages which had never been possible before.

50 Under these regulations the export of coconut oil, Manila hemp, chrome, manganese, copper, and scrap metal was banned, and the export of iron ore and timber were placed under an allotment system.

51 The three Filipinos were Sixto Jimenez, Chairman of the Anti-Communism League of the Philippines; Aurelio Alvero, Chief of the Kalturop (A Brotherhood for the Purpose of Helping Preserve the Nation); and Vincente Correa, Vice-Chairman, Philippine Youth Party (JMFA, 1.4.5.1.3, vol. 1, 11 Oct. 1939, Very Secret.)

52 JMFA, H.2.6.0.1–23, 18 June 1941. Subsidies from the Foreign Office in Tokyo to the Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Manila had begun with 1,000 yen for the year 1937. Such funds gave the Consul-General a direct voice in the operation of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Manila since specific expenditures ordered by him were to be carried out in accordance with his instructions or else the subsidy was to be refunded to the government. (JMFA, H.2.6.0.1, 19 Oct. 1937. Secret.)