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Some Aspects of the Interregnum in Malaya (14 August–3 September 1945)*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Cheah Boon Kheng
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Following Japan's announcement of unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers on 14 August 1945, almost three crucial weeks elapsed in Malaya before the landing of the British Royal Marines at Penang on 3 September. A day before the Marines landed, Vice-Admiral Walker had arrived off Penang aboard H.M.S. Nelson, and received the surrender of the local Japanese commanders. What happened in Malaya during the Interregnum still awaits a comprehensive study. The Interregnum is an important period in Malaya's social and political history which saw, on the one hand, the dramatic and cataclysmic collapse of the Japanese order and, on the other, the eruption of local political and social forces which were involved in a relentless and deadly struggle for power. True, there was no social revolution, as in Indonesia. What took place were conflicts along mainly communal rather than class lines. No class conflicts took place among the Malays, as in Sumatra between the traditional and religious groups, or among the Chinese and Indians. The social structures of the various communities in Malaya emerged relatively intact throughout the Interregnum and in the period thereafter. But there were bloody racial clashes, between Malays and Chinese. There were also bloody political feuds amongst the Chinese themselves. But, on the whole, the Malay-Chinese conflicts had far more serious repercussions on Malaya's post-war society and political development.

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Articles
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Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , March 1977 , pp. 48 - 74
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Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1977

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References

1 There are at least two uses of the term “Interregnum” as applied to Malaya and Southeast Asia. It is used generally as the “Japanese Interregnum” to refer to the period of the Japanese Military Administration as a break in the continuity of European colonial rule in these territories. Cf. Bastin, John and Benda, H. J., A History of Modern Southeast Asia (New Jersey, 1968), p. 123Google Scholar. It is also used as just “the Interregnum” to refer to that short interval when no formal government existed in any of these territories following the collapse of the Japanese Military Administration until the return of the troops of the previous European colonial power. For such use in respect to Malaya, see Gullick, J.M., Malaysia (London, 1969), p. 100Google Scholar and Tregonning, K.G., A History of Modern Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore, 1972), p. 218Google Scholar. It is the second meaning that is used here.

2 The 20 days of the Interregnum in Malaya could have been shortened considerably had it not been for an order of General Douglas MacArthur of the U.S. Armed Forces. MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, was authorised to make overall arrangements for the surrender of the Japanese, but he gave orders that the actual documents of surrender in theatres other than his own might only be signed after his own had been signed; and that no landing or re-occupation by military forces might be made until after his formal signature of the surrender document in Tokyo. The ceremony in Tokyo was originally fixed for 31 August 1945, but owing to a typhoon hitting the coast of Japan, it was postponed until 2 September, when the landings in Southeast Asia began. After Penang, British troops landed on 5 September at Singapore and on 9 September in the Port Swettenham-Port Dickson area, as planned for “Operation Zipper”. On 12 September Mountbatten accepted the surrender of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces of the Southern Regions in the Singapore City Council chamber. It was to be three weeks or more, however, before the presence of British troops was felt elsewhere in Malaya. Cf. Mountbatten of Burma, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia, 1943–1945 (London, 1951), pp. 183–186Google Scholar.

3 There is no study on the Interregnum in Malaya comparable to the superb studies which have been done on the Japanese Occupation and the Indonesian Revolution. See Smait, John R. W., Bandung in the Early Revolution 1945–1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca, New York, 1964)Google Scholar; Anderson, Benedict R.O.G., Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca, New York, 1972)Google Scholar; and Reid, Anthony, The Indonesian National Revolution (Australia, 1974)Google Scholar.

4 See Hanrahan, Gene Z., The Communist Struggle in Malaya (New York, 1954Google Scholar; reprint, Kuala Lumpur, 1971), reprint, pp. 87–88.

5 O'Ballance, Edgar, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948–60, (Connecticut, 1966), pp. 62–63Google Scholar.

6 O'Ballance, p. 63.

7 An interesting account of the meeting conducted in “cloak and dagger” style has been given by Chapman, F. Spencer in his book, The Jungle Is Neutral (London, 1949), pp. 16–17Google Scholar. The British officials were Innes Tremlett, a Chinese-speaking officer of the Malayan Police, Special Branch, and Chapman, head of 101 Special Training School. One of the two MCP Chinese representatives was Lai Tek, the party's secretary-general. “This conference,” recalled Chapman, “took place in a small upstairs room in a back street of Singapore, and, to complete the air of conspiracy, both Chinese wore dark glasses.”

8 For details on the last-minute preparations to defend Singapore, see Donnison, F. S. V., British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943–1946 (United Kingdom military series of the History of the Second World War) (London, 1956), pp. 378–379Google Scholar; Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia (New York, 1950), p. 130Google Scholar; Seng, Png Poh, “The Kuomintang in Malaya,” Journal of Southeast Asian History, II, I (March 1961), 39Google Scholar.

9 Besides the MCP's “stay-behind” parties in Singapore, attempts were also made to organise and install other Chinese “stay-behind” parties on the Malayan mainland. Chapman went up to Perak where he held several meetings (organised by Dalley) with Chinese leaders and organisations. He found that in Perak as in Singapore, all the anti-Japanese societies were united under MCP leadership. It was decided to establish fifteen small Chinese “stay-behind” parties in the portion of Perak that was still held by the British. In order to train these men, a training centre was established at the Chung Ching High School in Ipoh, which was called 102 STS. The centre was inaugurated on 3 January 1942 with instructors and several truckloads of weapons and explosives from 101 STS in Singapore. Owing to the deteriorating war situation, the school had to be abandoned before the first course was completed. The Perak Chinese recruits joined the MCP's first party which was installed at Serendah (Selangor) on 5 January. Chapman, pp. 40–41, 51.

10 The MPAJA was not formally known by that title until March 1942. The first class of graduates in Selangor became known as the 1st Regiment; the second class, sent to Negri Sembilan, the 2nd Regiment; the final classes in north and south Johore, the 3rd and 4th Regiments respectively. All four regiments of the MPAJA carried out acts of sabotage and raids on Japanese positions. Other units were created subsequently. The 5th Regiment was formed in Perak in mid-1942 and became known as the “Traitor-killing” Unit. Although other units had their own traitor-killing squads, this unit specialised in killing victims selected by the MCP. The 6th Regiment was formed in Pahang, and the 7th Regiment in Trengganu. See O'Ballance, pp. 41,44–45.

11 These initial European “stay-behind” parties should not be confused with the subsequent groups of Force 136 parties which were landed into Malaya either by submarine or parachute after June 1943. Chapman who was in the initial “stay-behind” parties was not recruited into Force 136 mainly because South East Asia Command had lost all contact with him since the fall of Singapore and he was presumed dead.

12 They were at least 20, if not 30 in all, and included separately or together Spencer Chapman (101 STS), J.L.H. Davis (police), John Barry and Richard Broome (civil service), Pat Noone (Director of Aborigines) and others. Davis and Broome together escaped to Sumatra and from there made their way to Colombo. They were subsequently recruited into Force 136. The story is told in Chapman's book. For other accounts, see Cross, John, Red Jungle (London, 1957)Google Scholar; Thatcher, Dorothy and Cross, Robert, Pai Naa (London, 1959)Google Scholar; and Holman, Dennis, Noone of the Ulu (London, 1958)Google Scholar.

13 The MPAJU was the forerunner of the Min Yuen, or the People's Movement, by which it became known during the Emergency. See Miller, Harry, Menace in Malaya London, 1954), p. 42Google Scholar.

14 When Headquarters, South East Asia Command (SEAC) under Vice-Admiral Louis Mount batten opened in New Delhi on 16 November 1943, Force 136 became one of its components. Headquarters, SEAC moved to Kandy in April 1944. Davis initially held the rank of Major in Force 136, but was later promoted to Colonel and appointed Mountbatten's repsentative in Malaya. Broome first held the rank of Captain and later Colonel. Of Force 136, Davis in an interview at his home in Kent, on 14 April 1976 recalled, “Force 136 was only the final name for the Far Eastern branch of Special Operations Executive (SOE) which had a continuous existence from well before the outbreak of war with Japan. When Broome and I arrived in India at the end of 1942 from Sumatra we rejoined SOE and reported that at the time of our last contact with the MCP (at Sepang about 15 February 1942) their plans for raising a Malayan resistance movement appeared to be taking effect. From then till June 1943 no information of consequence about their position inside Malaya was obtained at all.” See also Donnison, p. 380; Chapman, pp. 232–242.

15 Davis, interview. He disagreed with the writer's original contention that it was probably to offset the MCP's growing influence in the resistance movement that Force 136 had turned to the KMT and secured the assistance of the well-known Malayan Kuomintang official.

16 Lim was given the rank of Major by the Nationalist Government which was later posthumously raised to Major-General. Lim was a former businessman in Singapore who escaped from the city in a small motor sampan before the British surrender on 15 February 1942 and sailed to Ceylon via Sumatra. After his Chungking trip he helped to train many Chinese for resistance work in Malaya. He himself entered the country by submarine in November 1943. Posing as a trader in Ipoh he organised a countryside intelligence system, but due to betrayal by the MCP leader, Lai Tek, he was captured and tortured in Batu Gajah jail where he died in 1944. Cf. Chapman, pp. 232–242; Low, N.I. and Cheng, H.M., This Singapore (Singapore, 1947), pp. 50–70Google Scholar; Shinozaki, Mamoru, My War-time Experiences in Singapore (Singapore, 1973), pp. 109–113Google Scholar.

17 Chapman, pp. 235–242.

18 Chang Hong was none other than Lai Tek, the Secretary-General of the MCP. Davis, interview. Neither Davis, Broome nor Chapman knew the true identity of Chang Hong until long afterwards. Davis says that he only found out after the war that it had been Lai Tek whom they had met. See also Miller, Menace in Malaya, p. 47.

19 Lim Bo Seng used an alias “Tan Choon Lim” at this meeting. Davis, interview. Like Lai Tek, he had thought it necessary to conceal his true identity. Donnison, however, mentions “Tan Choon Lim” in addition to Lim Bo Seng as among the four SEAC representatives. See Donnison, p. 380. The confusion was apparently due to Donnison being unaware that the two names belonged to the same man. N. I. Low in his revised book When Singapore Was Syonan-to (Singapore, 1973), p. 104Google Scholar, explains how Lim Bo Seng joined Davis at the MPAJA camp. Lim had earlier met the MCP representative Chin Peng aboard a SEAC submarine. Lim's instructions were to receive the reports of the guerrillas, give them advice and return to Colombo in the submarine. Instead, he joined them.

20 Information regarding the terms of agreement is taken largely from the BMA historian Donnison, pp. 380–381, and Chapman, pp. 248–249.

21 Chapman, p. 375. The vagueness with which Chapman couched this statement adds a certain poignancy to the position of the MCP.

22 Hanrahan, p. 81.

23 Donnison, pp. 382–383.

24 The key sources for evidence of these rumours are Purcell's, VictorThe Chinese in Malaya (London, 1948), p. 258Google Scholar, and Malaya: Communist or Free? (London, 1954), p. 47Google Scholar, and also O'Ballance, p. 63. Purcell's accounts are certainly authoritative as he was the Chief Chinese Affairs Adviser to the British Military Administration in Malaya from September 1945 to March 1946. That these rumours were current in Malaya has been confirmed in several interviews with older generation Malayans of different racial groups. The Chinese, in general, appeared quite excited by these rumours; the Malays, on the other hand, dreaded the prospect of their country being turned into the “Nineteenth Province of China”. Chinese government representation in the personnel of Force 136, especially in the person of Lim Bo Seng, had driven this fear further home to the MCP. This KMT presence may perhaps account for Chapman's observation that several MPAJA units had adopted an attitude of non-cooperation, indifference and hostility towards the Force 136 officers at the closing stages of the war. Hanrahan's conclusion that it was the KMT men's presence which caused this hostility seems a reasonable explanation. Cf. Hanrahan, p. 83.

25 Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, p. 258, and Blythe, W. L., The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya (London, 1968), p. 328Google Scholar. It is said that the closest support between Force 136 and Malayan resistance groups was established with the Askar Melayu Setia. Cf. Short, Anthony, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1945–1960 (London, 1975), p. 24 fnGoogle Scholar.

26 Mountbatten to Chiefs of Staff, 12 May 1945 War Office (W.O.) 203/2967. See also Donnison, op. cit., pp. 381–384.

27 Ibid.

28 This, as it turns out, was a correct assessment because such a claim was eventually made by the MCP and Chinese organisations in Malaya after the war.

29 Donnison, p. 381.

30 Ibid.

31 In contrast to the Force 136 officers, it should be noted that there was no wireless communications between the MPAJA regiments. Communications was only through a courier system. Besides, direct contact between the regiments was forbidden. All communications was through MPAJA Central Headquarters. While this ensured security, it prevented easy communications. Davis comments: “The MPAJA were controlled by directives issued by Central and distributed incredibly slowly by jungle couriers from unit to unit. This often took months. When it did arrive at a unit it still had to be interpreted in the light of local conditions. This situation could not be changed at a drop of the hat when the Japanese surrendered. The only fast communications available to MPAJA were Force 136 wireless sets. Communications are everything in war.” Interview.

32 Chinese membership in the MCP units constituted about 95 per cent. Chapman said he saw only one Indian in the MPAJA camps, while Davis says he never saw any Malays. A former MPAJA leader, R. Balan, asserts that the MPAJA units had a fairly substantial number of Indians and Malays.

33 See the report, “The Chinese Resistance Forces,” in Secret Weekly Intelligence Review No. 11, 25 Indian Division, H.Q. Malaya Command Papers, Kuala Lumpur, 28 November 1945, pp. 4–5Google Scholar.

34 See his Malaya Upside Down (Singapore, January 1946), p. 109Google Scholar.

35 See N. I. Low and H. M. Cheng, p. 67.

36 Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, pp. 258–262.

37 Short, p. 24f.

38 Purcell, pp. 258–262.

39 Blythe, p. 332. OCAJA = Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army.

40 The first British Force 136 party to contact the Malays was dropped by parachute into North Perak in December 1944 and was led by Lt. Col. (then Major) Dobree. He found the Malays in that area only too enthusiastic to take up arms against the Japanese and had to discourage many from joining him. He started arming and training small sections and gave them the name Askhar Melayu Setia (AMS) or the Loyal Malay Army. In Pahang, Major J. D. Richardson was able to contact a Malay District officer Yeop Mahidin and with his help put up a scheme for raising and training Malays with their own officers with the borrowed authority of Sir Abu Bakar, Sultan of Pahang. For an interesting Malay account of the Askhar Melayu Setia, see Zakaria, Abdul Aziz bin, Lt. Nor. Pahlawan Gerila (Kuala Lumpur, 1963)Google Scholar.

41 Aziz, and Silcock, , “Nationalism in Malaya” in Holland, William (ed.) Asian Nationalism and the West (New York, 1953), p. 292Google Scholar.

42 Chapman, p. 412. The truth was that the British were generally suspicious of the Malays whom they believed to be favourably disposed towards the Japanese. About 150 Malays were rounded up and imprisoned by the British just before the fall of Singapore on charges of working with the Japanese. These Malays were mostly officials and members of the radical Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) led by Ibrahim Yaacob, who were freed by the Japanese and emerged in prominence during the Japanese Administration. Moreover, it should be remembered that none of the Sultans followed the British in their retreat from Malaya to India or Austrlia

43 O'Ballance, p. 62; see also Abdul Aziz bin Zakaria, op. cit.

44 Mountbatten of Burma, Post Surrender Tasks: Section E of the Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia 1943–45 (London 1969 p. 301Google Scholar.

45 Purcell, p. 262.

46 Information on the Ho Pi Tui is given by Balan, R., a former MPAJA leader. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 2 April 1973Google Scholar. Chinese-speaking Balan joined the MPAJA in the jungle in 1942 and while there, worked in the propaganda section of the MCP, editing its Tamil news-sheets. The MCP leadership displayed a great deal of trust and confidence in him and before long had accepted him into the party as a member. After the war, Balan became the party's key activist in the estate labour unions. He was elected into the MCP's central committee in 1947, after he had attended the Empire Conference of Communist Parties in London with two other MCP representatives (Wu Tien Wang and Rashid Maidin). While involved in an estate labour strike in June 1948, Balan was arrested and detained. He remained in detention throughout the period of the Emergency until his release in 1961 (13 years). In 1955 while still in detention, Balan was elected vice-president of the MCP's central committee. He is now aged 60 and in poor health. Anthony Short describes Balan as one of the most skilful and successful communist union organisers who, when he was arrested, was within six hours of taking to the jungle. Short, pp. 60, 66, 92.

47 Secret Intelligence Summary No 5 based on information received up to 1 December 1945, H.Q. Malaya Command, Kuala Lumpur, p. 6.

48 Blythe, pp. 230–232. For an account of the terrifying retribution which the MPAJA meted out to traitors and collaborators, see Chapman, pp. 316–330.

49 See Mountbatten, Post-Surrender Tasks, Appendix H, p. 313. However, it was some time before this order became publicly known in Malaya.

50 Blythe, p. 330.

51 Allied Land Forces, South East Asia, Weekly Intelligence Review No 49, for week ending 7 September 1945, pp. 3–4.

52 Davis, interview; Donnison, p. 304.

53 It has been noted that everywhere they appeared, the guerrilla units were greeted more by the Chinese population than by the other races. At the surrender parades, it was not the entry of British troops but the MPAJA which received the roars of acclamation from the crowds. While in the main cities and towns some greetings were extended to the “Allied Armies”, up country the slogans hailed only the war effort of the Chinese guerrillas, especially the MPAJA, and the triumphal arches were mostly in their honour. Cf. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, pp. 263–264; and Blythe, Wilfred, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya (London, 1969), pp. 330–331Google Scholar.

54 Weekly Intelligence Review, 25 Indian Division, (H.Q. Malaya Command), Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 1945, pp. 5–6.

55 Ibid.

56 Balan, interview.

57 Peritz, Rene, “The Evolving Politics of Singapore: A Study of Trends and Issues,” Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Pennsylvania, 1964), 52Google Scholar.

58 Blythe, pp. 332–333. Blythe was Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the post-war civil administration of Malaya, and his account must therefore be regarded as authoritative.

59 PETA stood for the Japanese-sponsored Malay Army called Pembela Tanah Ayer (Defenders of the Fatherland) in which Ibrahim Yaacob held the rank of Lieutenant-General.

60 See Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka (Djakarta, 1957), p. 35. Recently Ibrahim has come in for some criticism from his former KMM colleagues such as Ishak Haji Mohamed (Pak Sako) and Mustafa Hussein for his accounts of the KMM's activities. Their complaint that he is often if not always his own best propagandist should be noted. See “Kenangan Pak Sako (Memories of Pak Sako) No. 28,” in the weekly Mingguan Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), 11 July 1976.

61 Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, pp. 32–33. The above is my translation from the Malay text. Regarding union with Indonesia, Ibrahim claims he won the support of several Sultans to the idea.

62 Ibid., p. 29.

63 Ibid., p. 35.

64 R. Balan, interview.

65 Cf. Mantrak, Musak, “Sejarah Masyarakat Majemuk di Mukim VII, Batu Pahat, Johore 1940–1945,” B. A. academic exercise (University of Malaya, 1974)Google Scholar. For an interesting account of the exploits of Penghulu Kiai Salleh and his cult of invulnerability in the racial clashes in Batu Pahat, see Abdullah, Anwar, Dato Onn (Petaling Jaya, 1974), pp. 94–109Google Scholar. For an earlier account of the racial clashes in Johore and other states, see Goh, Nellie, “Sino-Malay Relations in Malaya, 1945–1955”, B. A. academic exercise (University of Malaya in Singapore, 1960)Google Scholar.

66 This is stated authoritatively by McLane and Short who separately had access to Special Branch files. Short was assigned by the Malayan Government to write the ‘official’ history of the Malayan Emergency covering the period 1948–1960, while McLane obtained permission to look at the files with Short's help. See McLane, Charles B., Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia (Princeton, 1966), p. 241 and pp. 309–311CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Anthony Short, pp. 39–43. The main source which they used is the “Basic Paper on the Malayan Communist Party,” 4 vols., compiled by the Malayan Special Branch, Kuala Lumpur, in 1950. It is a detailed study of Malayan communist activities to the beginning of the Emergency, based on materials in government files which are not easily open to researchers. Short's own work on the Emergency was submitted to the Malaysian Government, but for some reason the Government was unhappy with it and refused to have it published. Undaunted, Short went ahead and had it published. Cf. Short, preface.

67 Believed to be Vietnamese, Lai Tek was acquired by a Special Branch officer in the course of a visit to Saigon and arrived in Singapore in the early 1930s. Before his assignment he had been a police informant with the French Securite, while assisting the Vietnamese Communist Party in its early struggles. His cover was eventually “blown” and it was probably because of this that he was passed on by the French to the Singapore Special Branch. According to the records that Short saw, Lai Tek had served as a representative of the Third International, had studied communism in Russia and France and had served on the Shanghai Town Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. See Short, p. 39. Short accepts Lai Tek's Comintern and CCP roles from the ‘Basic Paper’ unquestioningly. McLane, however, throws some doubt on it by citing the MCP's famous expose, “Statement of the Incident of Wright (alias Lai Tek),” dated 28 May 1948, which describes these as fraudulent claims made by Lai Tek. Another source claims that Lai Tek was involved in the Mao Tse-tung vs. Chen Tu-hsiu (Trotskyite) factional struggle in the Chinese Communist Party. The allegation is believed to have been made among the series of findings by the MCP on Lai Tek, which had been prepared by Chin Peng. See Rene Peritz, “The Evolving Politics of Singapore,” 52. Cf. Kum, Peter, “Master Mind the MCP Defied,” Singapore Standard, 31 August 1957, cited in PeritzGoogle Scholar.

68 The Batu Caves Incident of September 1942, according to the Special Branch sources McLane consulted, was engineered by Lai Tek himself to eliminate rivals in the party hierarchy. McLane, however, notes that the MCP's “Statement of the Incident of Wright” does not charge him with responsibility for this incident. See McLane, p. 309, fn. For a Japanese account of how the Kempeitai (military police) arrested Lai Tek and used him to disrupt the communist network, see Mamoru Shinozaki, My War-time Experiences in Singapore, p. 24 and pp. 109–113. Shinozaki, however, gives no account of the Batu Caves Incident, but discloses that Lai Tek was responsible for the capture of Major Lim Bo Seng of Force 136. No reason is advanced for Lim's betrayal, but it was probably because he was a Kuomintang agent. Significantly, Lai Tek did not once betray a British Force 136 officer to the Japanese.

69 See the MCP's eight-point statement attached to M.E. Dening's letter to the Foreign Office dated 3 September 1945. Dening was the Chief Political Adviser to Mountbatten. See F.O. 371/46340.

70 There was a suggestion from the MCP ranks in Johore to the CEC that all Force 136 officers attached to MPAJA units should be killed and that the forces of reoccupation should be presented with a takeover of power as a fait accompli. See Short, pp. 34–35.

71 See McLane, pp. 313–316.

72 Harry Miller, Menace in Malaya, pp. 45–49.

73 O'Ballance, pp. 62–63.