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External actors and the relative autonomy of the ruling elite in post-UNTAC Cambodia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2010

Andrew Robert Cock
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Abstract

Cambodia has been governed by the same, relatively fixed, elite since the Vietnamese removal of the Khmer Rouge from power in early 1979. This article provides an analysis of the dynamic interplay of external and internal factors that have contributed to the perpetuation of this elite's rule in the context of a nominal political and economic transition that might have been expected to undermine the bases of their power. It is argued that the patrimonialism of the Cambodian state and the provision of material aid and political legitimacy by external actors have been central to the endurance of this ruling elite.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 41 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 241 - 265
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 2010

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References

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8 Three interrelated concepts are deployed in the analysis that follows: ruling elite, ruling class and political elite. The ruling elite are a subcomponent of the political elite which is in turn made up of those with an influence over how Cambodia is governed through their political engagement at a domestic and international level. The ruling elite are those holding power in some formal or informal sense and thus in a position to exercise the bulk of the influence over how Cambodia is governed. The ruling class is the well-spring and key constituency of the ruling elite. The ruling class are intertwined with state structures and are invariably key beneficiaries of the exploitation and manipulation of state assets.

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17 The capitalist state ‘takes charge, as it were, of the bourgeoisie's political interests and realises the function of political hegemony which the bourgeoisie is unable to achieve. But in order to do this, the capitalist state assumes a relative autonomy with regard to the bourgeoisie.’ Refer to Poulantzas, Political power and social classes, pp. 284–5. Emphasis in original.

18 Suggestive of this logic is the World Bank's June 2006 approval of a ‘Public Financial Management and Accountability Project’ designed ‘to set the stage for improved service delivery and reduced corruption’. The grant was approved in the same month three bank projects had been suspended due to ‘fraud and corruption problems’. See ‘World Bank suspends three key Cambodian projects over fraud’, Agence France Presse, 7 June 2006. For details of the June 2006 grant, see World Bank, ‘Project appraisal document on a proposed grant in the amount of SDR9.8 million (USD 14 million equivalent) to the Kingdom of Cambodia for a Public Financial Management and Accountability Project’ (Washington, DC: Report No: 35966-KH, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, 31 May 2006), p. 6.

19 On labour standards, see Ker Munthit, ‘Hun Sen turns down manufacturers’ request to amend labor law', Associated Press Newswires, 6 Aug. 2001. On human rights and democracy, see ‘Cambodia: TV carries footage of new cabinet meeting, highlights PM's address’, Television Kampuchea, in Khmer, 26 Sept. 2008, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (bbcapp0020080927e49r0008d), 27 Sept. 2008. On terrorism, see Xinhua, ‘Hun Sen declares Cambodia as terrorism-free’, Xinhua News Agency, 14 Feb. 2008.

20 Telling are the regime's manoeuvrings on anti-corruption legislation promised periodically from 1995 onwards. For an early post-UNTAC statement on corruption by Hun Sen, see National Voice of Cambodia, ‘Hun Sen outlines Four-Point Plan to fight graft’, National Voice of Cambodia, in Khmer, 11 Mar. 1995. Translated by BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific (bbcfe00020011102dr3f00da8), 15 Mar. 1995. For more recent observations on the actions of the ruling elite, see ‘Promises, promises: Hun Sen runs rings round his donors’, The Economist, 23–29 June 2007.

21 For an analysis of the regime's attempts to neutralise the influence of trade unions, see Hughes, Caroline, ‘Transnational networks, international organizations and political participation in Cambodia: Human rights, labour rights and common rights’, Democratization, 14, 5 (2007): 834–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 As an indication of this, state officials have long been preoccupied with the threat posed by ‘middle-men’. Not only do they tend to be proficient at developing trading arrangements with small-holders, they also tend to be adept at evading, contesting and negotiating the predations of state actors. For pre-civil war and PRK era debates over the role of middle-men, see Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the politics of nation building, pp. 193–4, Samphan, Khieu, Cambodia's economy and industrial development, trans. Summers, Laura (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Dept. of Asian Studies Cornell University, 1979)Google Scholar.

23 On the distinction between ‘empirical’ and ‘juridical’ sovereignty, see Jackson, Robert H., Quasi-states: Sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

24 As one 2004 political analysis of the Cambodian state noted: ‘For the time being … it appears services are at a sufficiently high level to meet the modest demands of ordinary Cambodians. At least two factors work in the government's favor: 1) Citizens older than 30 years can remember a period when these services were not offered at all, and furthermore have seen significant service improvements in the past 15 years; 2) Leaders have succeeded in claiming credit for facilities and services financed or provided by donors.’ See Michael M. Calavan, Sergio Diaz Briquets and Jerald O'Brien, ‘Cambodian corruption assessment’ (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2004), p. 11.

25 According to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, Yash Ghai, ‘One does not need expertise in human rights to recognize that many policies of the Government have subverted the essential principles of democracy and due process, deprived people of their economic resources and means of livelihood, and denied them their dignity.’ See Yash Ghai, ‘Statement to the Human Rights Council’ (Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 26 Sept. 2006).

26 As an example of the quelling of dissent, in March 2005, five villagers were shot dead by military and police officials while protesting over their forced eviction from a disputed plot of land in Poipet. Details are contained in Phann Ana and William Shaw, ‘Phnom Penh's land grab angers villagers’, South China Morning Post, 16 May 2005. The regularised pursuit of predatory ambitions in the Cardamom Mountains is detailed in Global Witness, ‘Taking a cut: Institutionalised corruption and illegal logging in Cambodia's Aural wildlife sanctuary’ (London: Global Witness, 2004).

27 For an analysis, see Osborne, Milton E., ‘Cambodia: The endgame of politics?’, Southeast Asian Affairs (2007): 117–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Kimsong, Kay, ‘Hun Sen donates money for hilltribe theater’, Cambodia Daily (Weekly Review), 11–17 Aug. 2007Google Scholar; Sisovann, Pin, ‘Bun Rany helps Cham families get land back’, The Cambodia Daily (Weekly Review), 28 May–1 June 2007Google Scholar; Thul, Prak Chan, ‘PM's wife Bun Rany depicted on 1 million stamps’, Cambodia Daily (Weekly Review), 12–16 Feb. 2007Google Scholar.

29 On the Cambodian National Petroleum Authority, see Caroline, Hughes, ‘Cambodia in 2007: Development and dispossession’, Asian Survey, 48, 1 (2008): 72–3Google Scholar. The recentralisation of the Forest Administration was formalised in Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, ‘Prakas on the organization and functioning of Forestry Administration’ (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Kingdom of Cambodia, No. 509 PK/MAFF/B, 2003).

30 See, inter alia, Coren, Michael, ‘Landgrabs loom for Mondolkiri minorities’, Phnom Penh Post, 15–28 Aug. 2003Google Scholar; Samean, Yun and Gillison, Douglas, ‘Hun Sen defends record on rural development’, Cambodia Daily (Weekly Review), 12–16 Feb. 2007Google Scholar.

31 On the clergy, see Samean, Yun, ‘Tep Vong accused of favoritism, going against Buddha’, Cambodia Daily (Weekly Review), 8–12 Jan. 2007Google Scholar.

32 As an example, see Kimsong, Kay and Kinetz, Erika, ‘Hun Sen accuses foreign consultants of stealing ideas’, Cambodia Daily (Weekly Review), 4–8 June 2007Google Scholar.

33 One case is the Koh Kong Sugar plantation scheme. Details of the business venture are contained in Jaiimsin, Aranee, ‘Commodities / sugar industry expansion; KSL joins partners in Cambodia venture’, Bangkok Post, 7 Aug. 2006Google Scholar.

34 John Marston notes: ‘The political economy of Cambodia as it … exists today is a direct result of the ability of power brokers like Hun Sen to use the new political-economic climate to negotiate a favourable position in relation to international aid, international investors, and domestic and international partners in land concessions. This in turn put the power brokers in a position to consolidate their position in relation to those who held civilian or military power at local levels.’ Marston, ‘Post-Pol Pot Cambodia’, p. 507.

35 A key source of information on how this ruling class evolved is Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the politics of nation building, especially pp. 205–22.

36 A sampling of individuals forming part of this group is listed in a February 2009 Global Witness report on extractive industries in Cambodia. The report notes that of the mine sites investigated by Global Witness, ‘every single one was owned or controlled by members of Cambodia's political or military elite’. Global Witness, ‘Country for sale: How Cambodia's elite has captured the country's extractive industries’ (London: Global Witness, Feb. 2009), p. 6.

37 One example is Major-General Keo Samuan who, according to Global Witness, ‘sits at the apex of the Military Region 3 revenue collection system’. Global Witness note that the Major-General ‘does not often get directly involved in logging deals himself, however he oversees the patronage system which drives them. Keo Samuan's demands for payments take the form of requests for money for “parties” and “meetings”. These are passed to the MR3 deputy commanders through his secretary, Major In Sokhear.’ An examination of the predatory activities of middle level officials in Kompong Speu, Kompong Chhnang, and Pursat provinces is contained in Global Witness, ‘Taking a cut: Institutionalised corruption and illegal logging in Cambodia's Aural wildlife sanctuary’. Details of Keo Samuan are contained on p. 25.

38 As Evans puts it: ‘Personalism and plundering at the top destroys any possibility of rule governed behavior in the lower levels of the bureaucracy…’ See Evans, Peter B., Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 46Google Scholar.

39 A common spectacle for the Phnom Penh commuter is witnessing the traffic police attempting to shake down some miscreant bicycle or motorbike rider while an un-plated Mercedes speeds past with impunity. For comment on the disparities of wealth and status in Phnom Penh, see Cochrane, Joe, ‘Costly wedding brings home divorce of elite from masses’, South China Morning Post, 24 Mar. 1999Google Scholar.

40 ‘World Bank gives Cambodia proof of corruption in canceled development projects’, Associated Press Newswires, 18 June 2006; ‘World Bank suspends three key Cambodian projects over fraud’, Agence France Presse, 7 June 2006.

41 For background, see Becker, Elizabeth, When the war was over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge revolution (New York: Public Affairs, 1998)Google Scholar; Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the politics of nation building; Vickery, Michael, Kampuchea: Politics, economics, and society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986Google Scholar.

42 The contribution of the UN agreement to political normalisation is pointed out in Stephen Heder's review of Shawcross, William, Cambodia's new deal: A report (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994)Google Scholar. Heder notes:

What UNTAC allowed was not so much a social revolution as a social restoration. Finally, after years of suppression and involution in neo-traditional forms under the CPP, old patterns of patron client neo-patrimonialism have reemerged in more readily recognizable forms under the FUNCINPEC-CPP coalition and Sihanouk's kingship. This is not the fault of the current political leadership, nor of UNTAC, but has deeper historical roots.

See Heder, Stephen R., ‘Shawcross book highlights post-UNTAC blues’, Phnom Penh Post, 24 Feb.–9 Mar. 1995Google Scholar. On earlier schisms in the Cambodian polity, see Chandler, David P., The tragedy of Cambodian history: Politics, war, and revolution since 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Reddi, V.M., A history of the Cambodian independence movement, 1863–1955 (Tirupati: Sri Venkateswara University, 1970)Google Scholar.

43 Frieson explains it this way: ‘UNTAC, in effect, attempted to pry the state from the society long enough that institutions such as the national media association, human rights organizations, and the twenty registered political parties could take life and exist separately from the state. ’ Refer to Frieson, Kate G., ‘The Cambodian elections of 1993: A case of power to the people?’, in The politics of elections in Southeast Asia, ed. Taylor, R. H. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 233Google Scholar.

44 As an outcome of the election and post-election machinations, Sihanouk's son, Ranariddh, became ‘First Prime Minister’ and Hun Sen became ‘Second Prime Minister’ in a three-party coalition government that divided the less financially lucrative or more politically marginal ministries and created co-ministerial positions in key ministries such as defence and interior.

45 Cited in Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the politics of nation building, p. 338.

46 For instance, Shawcross noted of the ‘First Prime Minister’: ‘Prince Ranariddh sometimes appears unable to concentrate on issues for any length of time. His critics believe he is happy with the trappings of power and unwilling to fight for the substance.’ Shawcross, Cambodia's new deal: A report, p. 93.

47 Joel Migdal explains: ‘[a] prime motivation for state leaders to attempt to stretch the state's rule-making domain within its formal boundaries, even with all the risks that has entailed, has been to build sufficient clout to survive the dangers posed by those outside its boundaries, from the world of states.’ See Migdal, Joel S., Strong societies and weak states: State-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 21Google Scholar. For an assessment of the PRK regime emphasising the relative competence with which Cambodia was governed during the 1980s in the face of extreme pressures from the ‘world of states’, see Slocomb, Margaret, The People's Republic of Kampuchea 1979–1989: The revolution after Pol Pot (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2003)Google Scholar.

48 Those able to extract more can afford to pay more to purchase their state positions. For a suggestive analysis, see Wade, Robert H., ‘The market for public office: Why the Indian state is not better at development’, World Development, 13, 4 (1985): 467–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

49 On cigarette smuggling across the border with Vietnam, see ‘Smugglers move with the times’, Vietnam Investment Review, 9 May 2005.

50 A USAID report on corruption highlighted what its authors considered to be the pervasiveness of the state's patrimonial features, noting: ‘The RGC collects very limited legal revenues, as large sums are lost to smuggling, bribes and other illegal practices … Grand corruption involving illegal grants of logging concessions coexists with the nearly universal practice of small facilitation payments to speed or simply secure service delivery.’ Calavan, Briquets and O'Brien, ‘Cambodian corruption assessment’, p. 1.

51 For an inkling into the internal machinations of the ruling class, see Hayes, Michael, Carmichael, Robert and Sokheng, Vong, ‘PM Hun Sen hints at more “removals”’, Phnom Penh Post, 14–27 Feb. 2003Google Scholar.

52 According to a January 2009 World Bank report, ‘growth has been narrowly based. The four leading sectors have been garments, tourism, construction, and agriculture. Very little diversification has occurred beyond them: garment products account for 88 percent of all exports.’ World Bank, ‘Sustaining rapid growth in a challenging environment: Cambodia country economic memorandum’ (Washington, DC: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, 14 Jan. 2009), p. ii (emphasis in original). For comments on the skewing of entrepreneurship towards ‘further use of natural resources, as opposed to investment in manufacturing or innovation’, see p. 19.

53 AFP, ‘Race to build grips Cambodian capital as real estate prices soar’, Agence France Presse, 10 July 2005; Munthit, Ker, ‘Cambodia's thriving real estate market enriches the elite and sidelines the poor’, Associated Press Newswires, 9 Mar. 2008Google Scholar.

54 Cited in Kammerer, Peter, ‘Dark days return’, South China Morning Post, 20 Jan. 2006Google Scholar.

55 As examples, see Cheng, Derek, ‘Sokimex negotiating ticket rights to six more temples’, Phnom Penh Post, 11–24 Mar. 2005Google Scholar; Lesley, Elena and Rith, Sam, ‘Public land deals flaunt intentions of law’, Phnom Penh Post, 28 Jan.–10 Feb. 2005Google Scholar.

56 A partial exception is owner of the Royal Group, Kith Meng, who has extended his business activities into mobile phones, television, banking, and insurance, and thus beyond the type of rent seeking activities in the agricultural and logging sectors that have tended to pre-occupy other dominant indigenous business entities. For profiles, see Gluckman, Ron, ‘Bringing commerce to Cambodia; brash, some say ruthless, Kith Meng is building an empire in the newest tiger economy’, Forbes Asia, 4, 3 (2008)Google Scholar; Minder, Raphael, ‘Cambodia's transforming tycoon’, Financial Times, 17 Aug. 2008Google Scholar.

57 As the Cambodian Corruption Report noted: ‘From outside, the regime appears monolithic, an efficient mechanism for absorbing resources and maintaining power. Inside, there are factional struggles and constant efforts to build and maintain, or undercut and shift, alliances. Hun Sen must balance the interests and concerns of hard liners and moderates. In any case, members of both factions are involved in corruption, and are dedicated to maintaining CPP power. When under serious threat, the system mobilizes innumerable resources to oppose and neutralize opponents, and for all practical purposes, reacts as a monolith.’ Calavan, Briquets and O'Brien, ‘Cambodian corruption assessment’, p. 5.

58 Van Roeun, , ‘Marriages abound among the political elite’, Cambodia Daily, 6 Jan. 2004Google Scholar; Xinhua; ‘Cambodian PM's nephew-in-law becomes police chief’, Xinhua News Agency, 21 Nov. 2008.

59 A more recent pattern has been to launch defamation writs against the outspoken, the critical, or simply the prominent.

60 Hughes makes this point, noting: ‘The use of power by Cambodian power-holders has informed representations of violence in the discourses of the state. The distinction between the violence of human rights abuse and the violence of anarchic, terrorist, or criminal elements offers escape routes to elites wishing to avoid international accountability.’ Refer to Hughes, Caroline, ‘Dare to say, dare to do: The strongman in business in 1990s Cambodia’, Asian Perspective, 24, 2 (2000): 132 and 134Google Scholar.

61 Weber pointed out that the patrimonial office can ‘develop bureaucratic features with increasing functional division and rationalization’ and yet not have its basic patrimonial character undermined. Refer to Weber, Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology, vol. 2, p. 1028. Hutchcroft makes this point with reference to Marcos' bureaucratic reforms. See Hutchcroft, Paul D., ‘Oligarchs and cronies in the Philippine state: The politics of patrimonial plunder’, World Politics, 43, 3 (1991): 416CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 ‘Cambodia's great asset swap angers many, leaves government on the fringe’, Agence France Presse, 9 July 2005.

63 Callaghy, ‘External actors and the relative autonomy of the political aristocracy in Zaire’, p. 72. Emphasis in original.

64 As Hun Sen reportedly responded following an IMF threat to suspend its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1995, ‘I told the IMF “If you want to cut assistance because of some problems, that is your right, but if aid is cut chaos will come, inflation will rise”.’ Quoted in Nate Thayer, ‘Say when: The IMF grows exasperated with Cambodia’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 Mar. 1995.

65 The ratio of tax revenue to GDP remains low, growing from 7.6% in 2005 to an estimated 8.0% in 2006. See World Bank, ‘International Development Association program document for a proposed grant in the amount of SDR9.8 million US$15 million equivalent to Cambodia for a poverty reduction and growth operation’ (Washington, DC: Report No. 36553-KH, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Southeast Asia Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, 18 June 2007), p. 6.

66 For a critical review of debates concerning China's rise as a development actor, see Woods, Ngaire, ‘Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance’, International Affairs, 84, 6 (2008): 1205–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 Cited in Chanda, Nayan, ‘China and Cambodia: In the mirror of history’, Asia-Pacific Review, 9, 2 (2002): 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

68 Ibid.

69 Kay Kimsong, ‘China to continue investment to Cambodia’, Cambodia Daily, 6 July 2005. This trend has continued with China pledging $600 million in 2006: equivalent to the combined total of what other international donors pledged to provide over the following 12 months. See Amy Kazmin, ‘China boosts Cambodian relations with $600m pledge’, Financial Times, 9 Apr. 2006.

70 The size of these debts is not clear, particularly in relation to debts incurred during the period 1975–79. For information on China's growing ties to Cambodia during the 1960s, see Jones, P.H.M., ‘Cambodia's new factories’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 May 1963Google Scholar; Marsot, Alain-Gerard, ‘China's aid to Cambodia’, Pacific Affairs, 42, 2 (1969): 189–98Google Scholar.

71 Loans between 1999 and 2002 reportedly totalled more than US$210 million. Refer to Osborne, Milton E., ‘Cambodia: Hun Sen firmly in control’, Southeast Asian Affairs (2003): 90Google Scholar.

72 Wu and Chen note that because most Chinese companies investing overseas are state owned or are entities over which the government maintains at least some control, ‘political and diplomatic motivations are still important factors’. See Wu, Hsiu-Ling and Chen, Chien-Hsun, ‘An assessment of outward foreign direct investment from China's transitional economy’, Europe-Asia Studies, 53, 8 (2001): 1236–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 As Chanda has noted: ‘A devastated Cambodia, ruled by an authoritarian Cambodian People's Party (CPP), not only welcomed all assistance but also shared some of China's concerns about Western calls for democratic reform. The CPP was eager to welcome China back as Chinese political support meant undercutting the regime's greatest challenger – the Khmer Rouge – as well as assistance for its empty coffers.’ See Chanda, ‘China and Cambodia: In the mirror of history’, p. 5.

74 Ibid., p. 8.

75 Cambodia was the second largest (after Thailand) destination of Chinese investment in Southeast Asia receiving 2.7% of the global total in the period 1979–2001. Of directions of overseas investment, Wong and Chan noted: ‘The pattern and sectoral distribution of China's outward FDI to a large degree reflects the Chinese government's considerations.’ Refer to Wong, John and Chan, Sarah, ‘China's outward direct investment: Expanding worldwide’, China: An International Journal, 1, 2 (2003): 279Google Scholar, note 10.

76 As Nayan Chanda writes: ‘Gifts, once sent by the Chinese emperors to the smaller “barbarian” tributary states, have been replaced by economic and military aid that is being reinforced by private investment, the dispatch of labor and influence-building through support for the local ethnic Chinese community.’ See Chanda, ‘China and Cambodia: In the mirror of history’, p. 2.

77 Paul Marks, ‘China's Cambodia strategy’, Parameters, 30, 3 (2000): 100. Cited in Frost, Stephen, Pandita, Sanjiv and Hewison, Kevin, ‘The implications for labor of China's direct investment in Cambodia’, Asian Perspective, 26, 4 (2002): 207Google Scholar.

78 See, for instance, Dave Bloss, ‘Chinese firm to plant eucalyptus for paper’, Cambodia Daily, 4 Jan. 2001; ‘Cambodia's logging giant joins Chinese company in local bamboo forest venture’, Reaksmei Kampuchea, 6 June 2001.

79 Cambodia's former monarch, Norodom Sihanouk, awarded both Hun Sen and Chea Sim with the honorific title, Samdech. This designation has two principal meanings: (1) powerful person; powerful, glorious; (2) title given to very high officials of a kingdom; the highest title in the Khmer mandarinate. See Headley, Robert K., Cambodian-English dictionary (Washington, DC: Catholic University of American Press, 1977)Google Scholar. According to Shawcross, some FUNCINPEC officials characterised Chea Sim's 1994 assignation as making him ‘plus royalist que le roi’. Refer to Shawcross, Cambodia's new deal: A report, p. 42.

80 This is presumably part of the indispensability of the long-standing Minister of Economy and Finance Keat Chhon. A rare find among the elite, he possesses both the technical competence, discretion and credibility to be a main point of contact with external actors, and particularly counterparts from international financial institutions. Having defected from the Khmer Rouge at the rather late stage of 1984, he is perhaps too tainted by these ties and too old to be a leadership contender. Details of his background are found in Bekaert, Jacques, Cambodian diary: Tales of a divided nation, 1983–1986 (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1997), pp. 98–9 and 172Google Scholar.

81 In relation to the 2008 global financial crisis, see Thai News Service, ‘Cambodian govt rejects IMF's gloomy economic report’, Thai News Service, 11 Nov. 2008.

82 Logging concessions and agricultural concessions are examples, as perhaps are the recently awarded mining and petroleum concessions. See Global Witness, ‘Country for sale: How Cambodia's elite has captured the country's extractive industries’.

83 Weber, Economy and society: An outline of interpretive dociology, vol. 2, p. 1099.

84 Details concerning the alleviation of debts owed to the Russian Federation are outlined in Thai News Service, ‘Russia to consider writing off debt for Cambodia’, Thai News Service, 11 Nov. 2008. For a relatively upbeat assessment of the sustainability of Cambodia's borrowings, see ‘Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Marciel testifies on United States, Cambodia: Bilateral relations, bilateral debt before House panel’, US Fed News, 17 Feb. 2008.

85 Cited in Ker Munthit, ‘Cambodia asks foreign donors for more aid while critics call for corruption control’, Associated Press Newswires, 20 June 2007.

86 A 2007 report on judicial reform noted that in the period since 1992, ‘there has been no progress whatsoever in the single most important issue affecting the courts: their lack of independence from political and financial influence’. It suggested: ‘The donor community needs to wake up. It needs to recognize that while reform of the courts is undoubtedly in the best interests of the Cambodian people, it is not seen by the Cambodian government as being in its best interests.’ Licadho, ‘Human rights in Cambodia: The charade of justice’ (Phnom Penh: Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights, Dec. 2007), p. 1.

87 The delay in the passage of an anti-corruption law for multiple years is a prominent example.

88 Clapham, Christopher S., Africa and the international system: The politics of state survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 183CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

89 See also the discussion in Hutchcroft, Booty capitalism: The politics of banking in the Philippines, pp. 14–15.

90 Callaghy, ‘External actors and the relative autonomy of the political aristocracy in Zaire’, p. 61.

91 Licadho, ‘Reading between the lines: How politics, money & fear control Cambodia's media’ (Phnom Penh: Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights, May 2008), p. ii.

92 On the paradoxical outcomes of democracy assistance, see Hughes, ‘Transforming oppositions in Cambodia’.

93 Diamond, Larry, ‘Thinking about hybrid regimes’, Journal of Democracy, 13, 2 (2002): 22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

94 Provincial government responses to the Keat Kolney land dispute in Ratanakiri Province highlight these trends. See, inter alia, Kinetz, Erika and Sambath, Thet, ‘Police, soldiers block land forum in R'kiri’, Cambodia Daily (Weekly Review), 10–15 Sept. 2007Google Scholar; Thul, Prak Chan, ‘R'kiri police turn hoses on land protesters’, Cambodia Daily (Weekly Review), 17–21 Dec. 2007Google Scholar; Sambath, Thet, ‘Police block human rights forum in R'kiri’, Cambodia Daily (Weekly Review), 26–30 Nov. 2007Google Scholar.

95 As Larry Diamond notes of the 2002 election: ‘In Cambodia the hegemonic character of rule by Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) was not apparent in the bare majority of parliamentary seats it won in 1998, but it became more blatant in early 2002 when the CPP won control of about 99 percent of the 1,621 local communes with about 70 percent of the vote.’ Refer to Diamond, ‘Thinking about hybrid regimes’, p. 32.