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The Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces: A Case Study in the Non-Legitimation of a Guerrilla Organization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

Elmer N. Lear
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Extract

When invasion forces occupy a land, elements of the local population may regroup and organize into a resistance movement. In so doing, the resisters are challenging the legitimacy of the conqueror-imposed regime. Through tactics ranging from non-cooperation to armed combat, the resisters hope to sap the strength of the conqueror, attract outside military intervention, and eventually expel the alien.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian History , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 1968 , pp. 69 - 94
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1968

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References

1. For an account of “collaborationism” in Leyte, see Lear, Elmer N., “Collaboration in Leyte. The Philippines Under Japanese Occupation,” Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 2, 02, 1952 pp. 183–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. See “Preface” to Elmer N. Lear's The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines; Leyte, 1941–1945 — which is Data Paper No. 42 (Ithaca: Cornell University, June/1961) for elaboration of why source materials not in possession of the author are probably irretrievably lost. Nonetheless, as a basis for hope that some increments of primary data may be forthcoming, see Hart, Donn V., “A Note on Sources: Central Philippines University's World War II Manuscript Collection,” Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. VI, No. 2, 09 1965 pp. 129–130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. See Lear, , “Collaboration in Leyte,” op. cit., pp. 183–5, 202.Google Scholar

4. Early in 1942, when it became clear that the Japanese drive across Luzon could not be blocked, many of the Leyte townspeople evacuated to the rugged interior of the Province.

5. Biographical references to Miranda and other personalities mentioned in this study are based upon personal interview, supported by guerrilla documents, and confirmed by other interviewers.

6. –“Miranda Group — These guerrillas originally controlled the area in northwestern Leyte from Palompon south to Baybay, and were under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Bias Miranda (alias Col. Briguez). He was formerly a Lieutenant in the USAFFE, PC. He disregarded the order of surrender and escaped to the mountains behind Ormoc where he proceeded to organize a guerrilla unit……” The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, GSC, Editor-in Chief, “The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Leyte Island.” Section 2, p. 2.

7. Sabelino, General Order No. 2. 1 March 1943. Par. 1–2.

8. Maj. Marcos Soliman. Letter to: Lt. Col. Marcano Peralta, C.O. Panay Forces July 5, 1943. p. 2, par. “i”.

9. Atty. Victorino C. Teleron. Special Statement prepared at his residence in Ormoc. February, 1946.

10. Miranda, Blas E.. “Report of the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces and Various Informations.”Google Scholar To: The Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Philippines. October 23, 1944. p. 5.

11. Saco [Sonrado Sabellino, then chief of staff]. General Order No. 5-a, 30 Nov. 1942.

12. Ibabo, J. [Adjutant General]. General Order No. 8.27, 01 1943.Google Scholar

13. – Lt. R. Advincula, Chief, Supply-Labor Administration. To: Lt. Reforzado, In Charge, Supply-Labor Administration, 6th Inf. Regt. 3 Aug. 1943.

14. – F. R. Refordazo, Prob. 3rd Lt., QMS, In Charge, Food Production, Albuera Sector. “Report for the last 16 days of March, 1943.” To: Lt. Ramon Advincula, Chief Food Production. April 1, 1943.

15. E. Barte, Mil. May., Albuera. “Report of Civil Affairs for March, 1943.

16. Jose T. Ibabo, Maj., AGS. By command of Brig. Gen. Brigues. Memo to: Commanding Officer, LFSO [Land Force Service Organization] July 7, 1943.

17. –B. Torres, Prov. Gov. To: Japanese Military Adm. for Dist. of Visayas. Dec. 21, 1942.

18. Lt. Saco [Sabelling]. By order of commanding officer, Briguez. Gen. Ord. No. 2 To: All sub-sector Comdrs. and Barrio Lts., Ormoc Sector. 12 Nov. 1942.

19. F. R. Reforzado, Prob. 3rd. Lt. (QMS) WLGWF, in charge Food Prod. & Labor, Albuera. “Monthly Report for Feb., 1943” To: The Adj. Gen., GHQ, WLGWF.

20. F. R. Reforzado, Prob. 3rd Lt. (QMS) WLGWF. “Report for first 15 days of Mar. 1943” To: The Chief, Food Prod. —Labor, GHQ, WLGWF.

21. Usualdo F. Laguitan, 2nd. Lt., AGS. By command of Brig. Gen. Briguez. Memorandum No. 32 To: All Regimental Commanders. Mar. 29, 1943.

22. Mun. Council of Albuera. Ord. No. 1, series 1943, Art. 1 April 15, 1943.

23. L. Taganas, Ormoc Military Mayor TO: Commander, Sub-Sector No. 5, WLGWF 13 Feb. 1943.

24. Reforzado, In Charge, Food Prod. — Labor, Albuera Sector. Report to: Lt. Ramon Advincula, Chief, Food. Prod. Labor, April 1, 194.3.

25. Sotto, Felix, “Brief History, 6th Infantry, WLGWF, Albuera,” 1945, p. 2.Google Scholar

26. Miranda, , op. cit., p. 3.Google Scholar

27. Compare this policy with Heilbrunn's generalizations: “The guerrillas must try to prevent their opponent from building up a superior force; by continuous attacks on enemy-held towns and villages, his lines of communication and stores, over as wide an aera as possible, they will try to make him disperse his forces on security duties and also gain time for their own build-up.” Heilbrunn, Otto, Partisan Warfare. (New York: Frederick A. Prueger, 1962), p. 51.Google Scholar

28. “The Japs in Ormoc are confined in the poblacion for they are surrounded by the men of Lieut. Bias Miranda who is leading the guerrilla in that sector.” F. E. Zara, Ex-Mayor of the Provisional Municipal Government. Maasin Affidavit, p. 10. 15 July 1943.

29. H. Roy Bell, Civil Affairs Officer of Negros, assisted Fertig in establishing radio contact with Australia. See Hart, Donn V., “A Bibliographical Essay: Guerrilla Warfare and the Filipino Resistance on Negros Island in the Bisayas, 1942–1945, “Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. V, No. 1, 03 1964, p. 119.Google Scholar

30. Kangleon's forces penetrated the WLGWF zone at Baybay, resulting in a large scale armed clash. After initial successes, the invaders were decisively repulsed.

31. An official American report unintentionally underscores this point: “The guerrilla resistance movement in Mindanao is unique in several respects. The movement was guided and directed mainly by Americans: it organized shortly after the surrender of USAFFE forces; it was quickly supplied with arms and ammunition from SWPA; it developed a civil administration parallel with its military organization, and in every respect justified the confidence of the U.S. in the loyalty of the Filipino people.” Guerrilla Resistance Philippines, op. cit., p. 83.Google Scholar

The same report says of Peralta: “People who have known him report that he is.… a strong nationalist.… He wants the Panay guerrilla organization to be a purely Filipino accomplishment. Americans who were left free on Panay after the USAFFE surrender were used by the Army to help build up the organization while those who could not contribute were cared for but tolerated as though they were not wanted.…” Ibid. p. 48.

32. Wolfert, , American Guerrilla in the Philippines. (New York: Bantam Books, 1950). p. 98.Google Scholar

33. Barnard, Chester I., “The Theory of Authority,” in Theories of Society, ed. by Parsons, Talcott et al. (New York: Th Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 1961) pp. 637–8.Google Scholar

34. An American guerrilla, a member of the United States Marine Corps, wrote: “There is a need for unification of all the independent guerrilla islands under one command with its headquarters on Mindanao. The commanding officer should be sent from here [GHO, SWPA] with the rank of General. This will prevent any mistrust or refusal to join on the part of any one of the independent guerrilla leaders. He will need definite written orders to display from this headquarters, as this will convince the guerrilla leaders that the United States is taking them under control.…” Major Michiel Dobervich, USMC. To: Brig. Gen. C. A. Willoughby, A.C. of S. 0-2, SWPA. Subject: “Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, Recommendations for.”

35. Wolfert, , op. cit., p. 113.Google Scholar