Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 September 2012
Normally, little attention is paid to the authors of military manuals in the imperial period. ‘Entertaining though trifling’ is a comment that can generally be heard. Frontinus is more familiar than most because of his distinguished career and other writings, but even his Strategemata is considered more as a source of historical anecdote than as an object of serious study in its own right. Yet the military textbooks fit into the tradition of didactic literature in antiquity and as such raise questions about their scope and purpose, and about what use could be or was made of them. This has special significance in relation to generalship and the evolution of tactics in the Roman empire.
1 Rose, H. J., A Handbook of Greek Literature (1951), 394Google Scholar, commenting on Polyaenus.
2 I am not here concerned with handbooks on the construction and design of artillery. See Marsden, E. W., Greek and Roman Artillery, Historical Development (1969), 2–4Google Scholar, Technical Treatises (1971).
3 1. 1, ‘The general should show integrity and self-restraint; be sober, frugal, hardworking, alert, free from greed; be neither too young nor too old, in fact a father of children if possible; he should also be a good speaker and have a distinguished reputation’.
4 See Campbell, B., The Emperor and the Roman Army (1984), 134–6; 147Google Scholar.
5 Suet., Caes. 67. 2.
6 The most accessible text is that of the Loeb ed. (1923), translated by the Illinois Greek Club. See introduction, pp. 351–2.
7 Sections 4 and 7; cf. 8, ‘This treatise has not been written in an off-hand manner by a young mind with no experience of war; rather, everything in it has been taken from genuine deeds and exploits, especially those involving Romans’.
8 PJR 2 1. 322; Birley, A. R., The Fasti of Roman Britain (1981), 69–72Google Scholar.
9 Cf. Vegetius 1. 8; 11. 3. It is not true to say that the Strategemata are merely an appendix to this work (Webster, G., The Roman Imperial Army 2 (1981), 221Google Scholar). Cf. Frontinus, Strat. 1. prooem.
10 It has been suggested, largely on subjective grounds of style, that Book IV was not written by Frontinus, but added much later. A marginal preference now prevails in favour of authenticity; see Wight Duff, J., A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age 2 (1960), 339–42Google Scholar, and C. E. Bennet, Loeb edition (1925), vii–xxiv, for a judicious summary.
11 In books 1–111 examples from Roman history make up about 49 per cent of the total; in book iv they comprise over 70 per cent of the total. The figures, excluding all suspected interpolations and identical examples, are: book 1–61 Roman examples out of 129; book 2–101 out of 189; book 3–43 out of 99; book 4–101 out of 140.
12 Domitius Corbulo, that paragon of senatorial commanders, appears four times—iv. i. 21, 28; ii. 3; vii. 2. Frontinus also produces a personal reminiscence of how the Lingones were persuaded to desert Civilis when Frontinus refrained from sacking their city contrary to all expectation—iv. iii. 14. Moreover, there are several references to Vespasian and Domitian—ii. i. 17; IV. vi. 4; 1. i. 8; 1. iii. 10; 11. iii. 23; 11. xi. 7.
13 1. prooem.
14 Most of these examples are taken from Appian and Suetonius.
16. The following examples are representative of the material in Polyaenus: giving a false impression and using surprise and ambush—1. 14–15; 20. 2; 23; 27. 2; 28. 1–2; 29. 1–2; 30. 5; 32. 3; 33; 34, 1; 35.1; 37; 38.4; 39. 2; 40. 4; 41. 2; 42. 2; 45. 1–2; 46. 1; 47. 1; 49. 2; 11. 1. 10, 12, 16–17, 23–5, 27; 2. 6–7; 3. 7, 14; 4. 1; 5. 2; 10. 1; 23; 38. 2; 111. 1. 2; 9. 5–6, 18–20, 50, 53; 11. 6; 13. 3; iv. 2. 14; 3. 9; 6. 8, 19; 8. 1, 4; 9. 2, 4–5; 11. 4; 12. 1; 13; 15; 18. 1; 19; v. 2. 5, 7, 9; 7; 10. 3, 5; 16. 2, 4; 44. 4; vi. 4. 2; vii. 6. 10; 18. 2; 21. 6; 27. 1, 2; 28. 2; 36; 39; 43; viii. 10. 2; 16. 1; 17; 20; 23. 7, 10, 12;the use of natural resources and choice of the right moment to attack—1. 40. 7;111. 9. 13; viii, 10. 3; 23. 4; transport across a river—11. 2. 1; 4. 2; iv. 7. 12; vii. 21. 3; conduct of a retreat—111. 9. 50; 11. 15; iv. 18. 2; vii. 8. 2; 33. 3; conduct of sieges—vi. 3; vii. 6. 8; 11. 5; vii. 23. 11; maintenance of morale—11. 1. 3, 6–8; 3. 4, 8, 11–12, 15; 111. 9. 34; iv. 3. 3; 9. 6; 14; 20; v. 12. 3; 24; 25; vii. 21. 7; methods of stopping cavalry—11. 2. 9; 111. 10. 7; vii. 14. 3; moderate conduct by the general—iv. 11. 1; viii. 16. 6.
16 V prooem. Cf. vi prooem.,‘Most glorious emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, I present to you the sixth book of my Strategemata with the prayer that you are victorious in war and that I may therefore describe many excellent stratagems associated with your valour … I shall be eager to write up these exploits as being worthy of note in the present crisis. But now I shall publish in addition to my previous efforts some stratagems which have not the benefit of your personal experience, but are supported by the truth of having been carried out in the past’.
17 For Vegetius' date see Barnes, T. D., ‘The Date of Vegetius’, Phoenix 33 (1979), 254CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In general, military handbooks use earlier authors and the precedents and examples of past commanders. In contrast to this is the De Rebus Bellicis (see B. A. R. International Series 63 (1979), Part 1, Aspects of the De Rebus Bellicis, papers edited by M. W. C. Hassall; Part 2, the text, edited by R. Ireland) written in the second half of the fourth century, which contains suggestions for radical changes in the Roman army's equipment. The proposed innovations seem eccentric, and it has been recently argued that the author's real intentions were to highlight the financial pressures on the empire's taxpayers (Astin, A. E., ‘Observations on the De Rebus Bellicis’, Collection Latomus 180 (1983), 388)Google Scholar. In view of this, it has been excluded from this study.
18 11. Pref., 111. 10. Note also Vegetius' comments on Cato's writings: ‘Cato the Elder often commanded an army as consul and was invariably victorious; but he believed that he could help his country more effectively by writing on military matters. For the results of courageous actions do not last long, while works written for the public good are of constant benefit’(11. 3). For a brief summary of Vegetius' comments on tactics (perhaps partly based on Frontinus' lost work), see Webster (n. 9), 221–5.
19 See Lenoir, M., Pseudo-Hygin, des Fortifications du Camp (Budé, 1979), 111–33Google Scholar. The work may have been addressed to an emperor or a superior officer; see pp. 124–6.
20 Sect. 45.
21 See Dain, A., Histoire du Texte d'Élien le tacticien (1946), 26 ff.Google Scholar
22 Pref. 3.
23 ibid. 7.
24 See Kiechle, F., ‘Die “Taktik” des Flavius Arrianus’, 45 Bericht der römischen-germanischen Komission 1964 (1965), 87Google Scholar; Bosworth, A. B., ‘Arrian and the Alani’, HSCPh 81 (1977), 217Google Scholar (hereafter = Bosworth); A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander, vol. 1 (1980), 1–34Google Scholar; Stadter, P. A., Arrian of Nicomedia (1980), 41–9, 162–3Google Scholar; Brunt, P. A., Arrian: History of Alexander and Indica (Loeb, two vols., 1976 and 1983)Google Scholar.
25 Kochly, H. and Rüstow, W., Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller, 11, 1, 240 ffGoogle Scholar; A. Dain (n. 21), 26–40; Stadter, P. A., ‘The Ars Tactica of Arrian: Tradition and Originality’, CP 73 (1978), 117; Arrian of Nicomedia, 41–5.Google Scholar
26 11. 3–6. Arrian apparently refers to the testudo used in open battle conditions.
27 See Kiechle, op. cit. (n. 24); Davies, R. W., ‘Fronto, Hadrian and the Roman Army’, Latomus 27 (1968), 75Google Scholar; P. Stadter (n. 24), 43–5.
28 See below, pp. 22–3.
29 Aeneas Tacticus was the most important of the earlier writers on tactics. He wrote perhaps c. the midfourth century B.C. about the specialized warfare of the Greek city states, and was probably the model for several other military authors (he is mentioned by Aelian 1. 2) whose work is now lost, e.g. Polybius, Cineas, Pyrrhus of Epirus, Alexander of Epirus, Clearchus, Posidonius. For Asclepiodotus, see K. K. Müller, RE 11. 2, cols. 1637–41.
30 Tac, Dial. 34. 1.
31 See White, K. D., Roman Farming (1970), 14–37Google Scholar; ANRW 1. 4 (1973), ‘Roman Agricultural Writers I: Varro and his Predecessors’, 439; Astin, A. E., Cato the Censor (1978), 182–210Google Scholar. For the prefaces to agricultural works see Janson, T., Latin Prose Prefaces (1964), 83–95Google Scholar.
32 See for example, Brunt, P. A., JRS 62 (1972), 153–4Google Scholar; Finley, M. I., The Ancient Economy (1973), 110–11Google Scholar; White, ANRW (n. 31), 447; Purcell, N., ‘Wine and Wealth in Ancient Italy’, JRS 75 (1985), 5–6Google Scholar for some critical comments.
33 White, , Roman Farming, 18Google Scholar; ANRW, 457–8, 473–82, 489–92—defending the general value and relevance of the agricultural writers.
34 1. 1. 3–4.
35 See Bowie, E. L., ‘The Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic’, Past and Present 46 (1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar = Studies in Ancient Society (1974), ed. M. I. Finley, 166.
36 iv prooem. Polyaenus says that this book was especially pleasant to write because in it the emperors could learn of the exploits of his ancestors, the kings of Macedon. Note that in 1 prooem. 1, Polyaenus makes an anachronistic reference to the emperors' victory over the Persians and the Parthians, which serves to tie Roman affairs more closely with Greek achievement. At viii prooem., however, he does identify himself with Rome's wars.
37 Ep. viii. 14. 4–5. Cf. Seneca, Ep. 1. 6. 5; Tac, Dialog. 34. 1.
38 Sherwin-White, A. N., The Letters of Pliny (1966), 462Google Scholar.
39 xii. 2. 29–30; cf. Cicero, De Am. 10; De Off. 11. 46–7.
40 Ep. 11. 1. 130–1. See in general on the importance of exempla Yavetz, Z., ‘The Res Gestae and Augustus' Public Image’ in Millar, F. and Segal, E. (eds.), Caesar Augustus, Seven Aspects (1984), 19–20.Google Scholar
41 ‘For who can doubt that military skill is superior to all other accomplishments, since through it our freedom and authority are preserved, our territory enhanced, and our empire safeguarded’—Vegetius 111. 10.
42 W. V. Harris has argued that until the last years of the second century B.C., candidates for office had to fulfil many seasons of military service, probably ten campaigns, and so gained much practical experience in the military arts (War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327–70 B.C. (1979), 10–16; see too Hopkins, K., Conquerors and Slaves (1978), 27–8)Google Scholar. I am not certain how demanding the requirement to serve ten campaigns was in practice. The campaigning season might last only a few months and involve no fighting. Moreover, it is by no means clear in the early period how far senators had formal duties in the post of military tribune. It was presumably up to the individual to make what he wanted out of his military service.
43 Cato, in the second century B.C., had published a didactic work entitled De Re Militari, which was apparently intended as a practical guide to Roman military techniques, supported by reference to particular exploits (see Astin, A. E., Cato the Censor, 204–5, 209, 231–2)Google Scholar. Pliny (NH xxv. 4) could describe Cato as ‘omnium bonarum artium magister’. It has also been suggested that Polybius' account of how the Romans built a camp was derived from a manual for the guidance of military tribunes–Walbank, F. W., A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (1957), 711 on Polybius vi. 27 ff.Google Scholar
44 Pro M. Fonteio 42–3.
45 Pro Balbo 47; cf. Sallust, Bell. Iug. 85. 12–14.
46 De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 27–8. We may contrast Pompey's civilian career. His long military service had left him ignorant of senatorial procedure and ‘res urbanae’. So, to avoid embarrassment during his consulship of 70, he asked his friend Varro to prepare an introductory handbook—‘ex quo disceret quid facere dicereque deberet’ (Aul. Gell., Noct. Att. xiv. 7. 2).
47 xi. 8. 1–2.
48 Lucullus 1. 1–2. Cicero says that Lucullus arrived in Asia ‘having become a general, although on leaving he had been ignorant of military science’. He has chosen to ignore Lucullus' not inconsiderable experience as proquaestor and trusted lieutenant of Sulla during his campaigns in Asia (Plutarch, Luc. 3–4).
63 Appian, BC 11. 79; cf. Caesar, BC 111. 92–3. See too Keppie, L., The Making of the Roman Army, From Republic to Empire (1984), 108–9Google Scholar.
64 See Dio liii. 19. 3–5.
65 For example, in his famous description of the Roman army, Josephus admires its organization, trained skill, discipline, and technical expertise in siegewarfare. But on battle tactics his comments are general and straightforward: the Romans insisted on proper planning for battle; nothing was left to chance, and the agreed tactics were carried out; they learned from their mistakes—BJ 111. 70–107 (army in general); 98–101(tactics).
66 BJ 11. 634–7; cf. 111. 186–7.
67 BJ 11. 551.
68 Tac, H, 5. 23. We may recall that Pericles suspected that the Spartans would try a similar trick to discredit him—Thucydides 11. 13; cf. Polyaenus 1. 36. 2.
69 See Appendix.
70 His light cavalry attacked in the flank and used their short swords to knock aside the enemy's long spears; Lucullus then led part of the infantry against the heavy cavalry and ordered them to attack the thighs and legs of the riders, which were the only exposed part—Plutarch, Luc. 26. 6; 28. 2–5; see too Bosworth, 235–6.
71 Plutarch, Crass. 23–4; Dio xl. 23–4.
72 xl. 22. 2–4. Cf. Plutarch, Crass. 27.
73 Dio xlix. 20. 1–3; for the campaigns of 39, see xlviii. 39–41. 6. Frontinus, Strat. 1. i. 6; 11. ii. 5; v. 37.
74 Plutarch, Marc. Ant. 41–2; 45; Dio xlix. 26. 2.
75 Plutarch, Marc. Anat. 45; Dio xlix. 29. 3–30; Frontinus, Strat. 11. iii. 15. It is worth noting Strabo's statement (vii. 3. 17) that all barbarian light-armed troops were feeble in opposition to a well-organized and heavily armed phalanx. He may, however, have in mind the general and traditional superiority of Greek hoplites over oriental troops.
76 Corbulo's operations in A.D. 58–64 involved no pitched battle.
77 Syme, R., ‘The Argonautica of Valerius Flaccus’, CQ 23 (1929), 129–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bosworth, 220–32; Eadie, J. W., ‘The Development of Roman Mailed Cavalry’, JRS 57 (1967), 165–6Google Scholar; Florescu, F.B., Die Trajanssäule (1969), Taf. 23; 28Google Scholar; see also HA, Vit. Had. vi. 6–7—trouble from the Sarmatians in Hadrian's reign.
78 Wheeler, Cf. E. L., ‘The Legion as Phalanx’, Chiron 9 (1979), 313–14Google Scholar; Davies (n. 27), 75; Campbell (n. 4), 45–8; 77–80.
79 See above, p. 18.
80 Ectaxis, 15–17. See Bosworth, 237–42.
81 For discussion of the phalanx as a model for Roman infantry tactics and the relevance of Arrian's Tactica, see Kiechle (n. 24), 87 ff.; Bosworth, 217 ff.; Stadter(n. 25), especially 122–8; Wheeler, E. L., ‘The Occasion of Arrian's Tactica’, GRBS 19 (1978), 351Google Scholar. Wheeler argues that Arrian wrote the work to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of Hadrian's rule and to persuade the emperor to extend his active service. It seems to me that there is insufficient evidence for this idea. Note also Wheeler (n. 78), 310–14.
82 See Bosworth, 243.
83 Tactica 11; 12. 6. Cf. Wheeler (n. 78), 303, especially 307–14. However he goes too far in his attempts to find phalanx tactics in operation in the Republican and imperial periods.
84 Bosworth, 242–6. For the early Greek phalanx see Salmon, J. B., ‘Political Hoplites’, JHS 97 (1977), 90–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Adcock, F. E., The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (1962), 24–8Google Scholar. It is not significant that no Latin terms were devised to describe the component parts and manoeuvres of the phalanx. That would not be necessary if the formation was only infrequently used.
85 Bosworth, 244. Wheeler, GRBS (1978), 356 doubted the existence of this separate monograph, but his arguments seem unconvincing.
86 Ectaxis 20–1; 25–6; for improved methods of archery training see Bosworth, 245; and Marsden (n. 2, Historical Development), 178, 187–91 for the development of Roman artillery in tactical plans for open battle.
87 On Roman cavalry tactics in general, see Kiechle (n. 24), 87–129; Davies (n. 27), 88–9; Eadie (n. 77), 167–8. I cannot agree with Eadie's further contention (173; cf. 164) that mailed cavalry was generally ineffective and that to stand firm against it was to invite disaster. This takes no account of much of the available evidence. Note also Wheeler (n. 81), 357–61. I am not persuaded by his suggestion that the cavalry exercises described by Arrian were purely for entertainment and not for training. This is too fine a distinction. Wheeler's own description of the armatura (p. 360) shows how competitive it was.
88 The Ectaxis probably originated as a report to Hadrian on Arrian's military operations and tactical experiments, and was subsequently revised in a more elevated style for publication. This can explain Bosworth's objection (247–55)that the style of the work is intricate and was influenced by the historians of Alexander, and is therefore unsuitable for a manual or report. Once published, the Ectaxis was on the one hand a private memoir, and on the other could serve as a military handbook, showing how a battle line could be drawn up to deal with a certain type of opponent.
89 Cf. Tac, A. xi. 19—a comment on Corbulo in the reign of Claudius—‘formidolosum paci virum insignem et ignavo principi praegravem’.