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The Poetry of Ethics: Horace, Epistles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 September 2012

C. W. Macleod
C. W. Macleod
Affiliation:
Christ Church, Oxford
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Extract

In 23 B.C. the first three books of Horace's Odes appeared. In the years which followed, up to the completion of Epistles 1, his work took a new direction, and the ethical themes which had had a marked place in his lyric verse became his entire concern: in his own words (Ep. 1.1.10–11),

nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono;

quid verum atque decens euro et rogo, et omnis in hoc sum.

What Horace describes in this context, at the very beginning of the book, is a kind of conversion to philosophy; and so the reader is at once drawn to ask what philosophy means to the poet. Before considering this question by scrutiny of the poems, two more general ones should be raised: first, what are the dominant features of ancient ethics as a whole and how far does it differ from modern ethical systems or moral thinking? Second, what part did moral philosophy play in the life of Romans in Horace's time? The answers I shall give to these very large questions are pragmatic and limited: they are meant simply as preparation for considering Horace's Epistles.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Roman Studies , Volume 69 , November 1979 , pp. 16 - 27
Copyright
Copyright ©C. W. Macleod 1979. Exclusive Licence to Publish: The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

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References

1 On this phenomenon in antiquity see Nock, A. D., Conversion (1933), ch. 11Google Scholar. Horace's account of his conversion is an unusual one in not conforming to the dogmatic pattern that Nock traces; it need be no less genuine for that, though it is clearly meant to signal a new departure in his poetry. For a sensitive account of Horace's mobility of belief and mood in Ep. 1, see J. Perret, Horace (1959), 149–53.

2 A very helpful general treatment of ancient ethics, to which I am indebted in many respects, is A. Dihle s.v. ‘Ethik’ in RAC 6 (1966), 646–796; the article includes a select bibliography.

3 The most striking exception to this generalization is existentialism. It is no surprise to find that its progenitor, Kierkegaard, is a profound and subtle connoisseur of Greek ethics. Another exception is ‘attualismo’: see Calogero, G. (also a fine connoisseur of Greek philosophy and a pupil of Socrates), e.g. La conclusione della filosofia del conoscere (1960)Google Scholar; Filosofia del dialogo (1962).

4 I do not count as ordinary usage the sense in which I have used ‘ethical’ in this context, i.e. ‘pertaining to moral philosophy’.

5 Besides Plato, passim, cf. Plut, Mor. 613B and the Loeb editors' note ad loc.

6 e.g. Scipio and Panaetius (RE 18. 2. 422–3); Tiberius Gracchus and Blossius (RE 3. 571); Piso and Philodemus (RE 19. 2445); Cicero and Diodotus (RE 5. 715); Octavian, and Athenodorus and Arius (RE Supp. 5. 49–51).

7 For another one, see Ed. Fraenkel, , Horace (1957), 361Google Scholar.

8 Shackleton Bailey ad loc. compares Tusc. 3. 37 and 5. 36. See further SVF 3. 49–67.

9 On going to meet (ἀπάντησις or ὑπάντησις) as a conventional honour, see T. E. V. Pearce, CQ 20 (1970), 313–16.

10 On urbanitas and εὐγένεια as philosophical topics, see Shackleton Bailey's notes. Chrysippus labelled as virtues εὐαπαντησία, εὐτραπελία and ἐπιδεξιότης (SVF 3. 255); but it looks rather as if Cicero is alluding to the Stoic use of ἀστεῖος as equivalent to σοφός or σπουδαῖος (see SVF Index), though of course they did not mean by it the same as Latin urbanus, as he was no doubt aware. It is clear in any case that in his mention of the Stoics, as of Athenodorus, he is dragging in philosophical doctrine—which brings out its value to him as an arbiter of proper conduct and right thinking.

11 cf. CQ 27 (1977), 361. Further SVF 1. 229; 3. 643–4, 712. Plut., Mor. 613B–C is illuminating in general on the ethics of symposia, a theme treated by Horace himself in the Odes (esp. 1. 18 and 3. 21) and the Satires (2. 6. 65–76). Some Peripatetics wrote περὶ μέθης: see Wehrli on Chamaileon frag. 9–13; later, note Philo, Ebr. 91; Sen., Ep. 83. 8–27; Dio Chrys. 27. 1–4.

12 See further McGann, M. J., Studies in Horace's First Book of Epistles (1969), 29Google Scholar on Ep. 1. 18. 50–64, and Kiessling-Heinze9 (1957), ad loc. (henceforth, K.-H.).

13 In general on Roman amicitia and its ethics, see P. A. Brunt, PCPS 191 (1965), 1–8. For an attractive account of Horace on friendship see Maguinness, W. S., Hermathena 51 (1938), 29–48Google Scholar. Note also White, P., ‘Amicitia and the Profession of Poetry in Early Imperial Rome’, JRS 68 (1978), 74–92Google Scholar.

14 More relevant to this section than Aristotle ap. Stob., Ecl. Eth. 2. 7. 25, mentioned by K.-H. on line 9, is EN 1126b 11–16.

15 On this section, see further ZPE 23 (1976), 41–3.

16 cf. Maguinness, op. cit., 33–4. For thoughtful remarks on Ep. 18 as a whole, see H. Rohdich, RM 115 (1972), 261–88, though he rather underrates the humorous and satirical element in the poem.

17 On the meaning of this line see Wistrand, E., Horace's Ninth Epode (1958), 38–9Google Scholar = Opera Selecta (1972), 326–7.

18 See frags. 555–7 Usener (cf. K.-H. ad loc). Cf. Cic., Off. 1. 110 (Panaetius); Sen., De tranqu. 7.2.

19 Contrast Lucr. 2. 1–13 and the passages quoted in Bailey's Addenda, p. 1751.

20 McGann, op. cit. (n. 12), ch. 2 tactfully indicates a wealth of connections in Ep. 1.

21 For a thoughtful and comprehensive treatment see Fraisse, J.-C., Philia (1974)Google Scholar; he helpfully explains why friendship is a ‘lost problem’ of philosophy and why it need no longer be.

22 On the philosophical background to these lines see Fraenkel, op. cit. (n. 7), 330–2; Hiltbrunner, O., Gymnasium 67 (1960), 298Google Scholar n. 12; McGann, op. cit. (n. 12), 13. On the whole I find the most satisfactory account of the poem and their place in it is Büchner, K., Hermes 75 (1940), 64–80Google Scholar = Studien zur römischen Literatur III (1962), 139–57.

23 On line 38, see CQ 27 (1977), 372–3; cf. further Epic., frag. 589 Usener; Ter., Ad. 73.

24 cf. Becker, C., Das Spätwerk des Horaz (1963), 23, on Ep. 14Google Scholar: ‘Was an der ‘Situation’ … des Briefes real und was erdichtet ist … lässt sich nicht entscheiden; für das Verständnis des Briefes hängt davon auch nichts ab. Die Alternative: real oder fiktiv, wird dem literarischen Charakter eines solchen Briefes nicht gerecht’. Similarly McGann, op. cit. (n. 12), 89–100.

25 On the force of these lines, see McGann, op. cit. (n. 12), 44.

26 See K.-H. ad loc.

27 The stilted word-order may be meant to recall Hesiod, frag. 211. 7 M.-W.: τρὶς μάκαρ Αἰακίδη καὶ τετράκις ὄλβιε Πηλεῦ (a makarismos, as Ep. 8. 1–2 are a salutation). If so, this emphasizes still further the mock-solemnity of the opening. For puns on names, see Horsfall, N., Mnemosyne Ser. 4. 28 (1976), 422;CrossRefGoogle ScholarNisbet, R. G. M., JRS 68 (1978), 8Google Scholar.

28 Also tactful is delivering the whole message through the Muse, a device which at the same time, since it unnaturally elevates the tone of the letter, gently mocks Celsus’ pride in his success.

29 The words gaudere et bene rem gerere in line 1 already suggest that there is a kind of happiness or success better than Celsus'; the greeting which conventionally begins a letter is given an ethical form and meaning, as in [Plato], Ep. 3. 315A–B; Epic, frag. 95 Usener.

29a On self-examination as a daily practice, see H. Chadwick, s.v. ‘Gewissen’ in RAC 10 (1978), 1056; also Horace himself, Sat. 1. 4. 133–8.

30 cf. also 2. 17. 14–18, 2. 26. 4, 3. 23. 34 with Hor., Ep. 1. 1. 97–100 (a sense of conflict within the self as the beginning of philosophy). Socratic philosophy likewise starts by revealing contradiction in the interlocutor: e.g. Plato, Gorg. 457E, 460E–461A, 487B. Contradiction among men in general is also a beginning of philosophy: cf. Hor., Ep. 1. 1. 70–80 and Arr, Epict. 2. 11. 13, 2. 17. 10–13, 2. 24. 15.

31 See Nisbet, and Hubbard, , A commentary on Horace: Odes 1 (1970)Google Scholar (henceforth N.-H.) on Od. 1. 6 (pp. 81–3).

32 cf. CQ 27 (1977), 359–76 (esp. 362–3).

33 A point drawn to my attention by Mr. Stephen Instone. Compono is further stressed by the wordplay with pono (10) which it echoes antithetically; on this type of pun see G&R 26 (1979), on Od. 1. 20.

34 cf. Sen., Ep 1. 1–3. For other similar passages, see A. La Penna, SIFC 27/28 (1956), 192–3.

35 Epistle 6 is also a kind of protreptic: see K.-H. on its line 29. But it is unusual as such in having a strong sceptical streak: cf. Sex. Emp., Adv. Eth. 110–40 who like Horace argues that to ‘pursue intensely’ (συντόνως διώκειν) any end at all is damaging, and applies this principle to different choices of goal, pleasure, fame or wealth. Thus here Horace is aware that even virtus can become a delusion if pursued to excess (15–16; the Stoics too saw this: see K.-H. ad loc). So in his protreptics Horace does not, like Aristotle or Isocrates, impress and inspire the reader, but soberly points out, together with our need for right living, the difficulties that attend the search for it.

In general on the typical features of protreptics, see Düring, I., Aristotle's Protrepticus (1961), 19–24Google Scholar; Hartlich, P., De exhortationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia et indole (1889)Google Scholar. For a lucid account of the argument of Ep. 6, see Courbaud, E., Horace: sa vie et sa pensée à l'époque des Épîtres (1914), 105–16Google Scholar.

36 The end of the book, like the beginning, is a natural place for a programmatic poem: cf. CQ 23 (1973), 308. And to address or describe the physical book is a common way of saying something about the poetic character of its contents as a whole; besides Catullus 1, cf. Meleager, AP 4. 1; Cinna, frag. 11 Morel; Ovid, Tr. 1. 1. For the poet as the delinquent slave, cf. Ep. 2. 2. 1 ff.

37 On these see Fraenkel, op. cit. (n. 7), 356–9. Note further on lines 17–19, S. F. Bonner, AJP 93 (1972), 509–28.

38 cf. McGann, op. cit. (n. 12), 85.

39 On the function of this preface, and for parallels to the notion of the escaping book, see the excellent remarks of Th. Wirth, MH 24 (1967), 149–61; note also Dover's commentary on Aristophanes, Clouds, p. 270 (Addendum to p. xcviii).

40 For humorous or sarcastic characterizations of poetry or style as sexually attractive see Ar., Thes. 130–3; Cat. 16; Lucr. 1. 642–4; Pers. 1. 19–21; Juv. 7. 82–7, where the poet is the pander: this last passage is admirably discussed by Tandoi, V., Maia 21 (1969), 103–22Google Scholar.

41 On the Epistles as sermones see 2. 1. 250 (probably also 1. 4. 1); A. La Penna, ASNP 18 (1949), 14. A plain style is also proper for letters: see Dem., Eloc. 223; Quintil. 9. 4. 19.

42 cf. N.-H. on Od. 2. 20. 14; and possibly the bird-image in line 21 ironically echoes Od. 2. 20. 9–12. Line 20 corresponds to ‘pauperum sanguis parentum’ in Od. 2. 20. 5–6, and line 23 to ‘ego quem vocas, dilecte Maecenas’ in Od. 2. 20. 6–7. In general on Horace's mockery of his own amour propre as a poet in the Epistles, see CQ 27 (1977), 373–5.

43 K.-H. compare Varro, RR 3. 7. 1–2.

44 cf. A. Stuiber s.v. ‘Beifall’ in RAC 2 (1954), 95–6.

45 cf. SVF 1. 216, 3. 617. Further on kingship as supreme freedom, see de Romilly, J., Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (1963), 79–82Google Scholar and Aesch., PV 49–50; and as supreme happiness, Solon, frag. 33W; Plat., Gorg. 470D–471D, 492B; Theag. 125E–126A; Lucian, Icarom. 25; Arist, Rhet. 1371b 26.

46 cf. K.-H. on lines 12 and 24; further Epic., Basic Doctrines 15 = Vatican Sayings 8; frags. 202–3, 468–9, 471, 477. Epicurus also commended country-life (frag. 570); cf. Lucr. 2.20–33, 5. 1390–6. If, as Williams, G., Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry (1968), 596–7Google Scholar, suggests, Horace is punning in line 24 on natura as both ‘great creating nature’ (cf. Lucr. 1. 629 etc.) and man's natural needs or desires, that has a background in Epicurus; and there is no merely comical sophistry here, any more than there is portentous dogmatism.

47 This kind of ‘persuasive definition’ is typically Stoic: see Od. 2. 2. 19–21 and N.-H. ad loc. Note also Epic. frag. 476–7; K.-H. on Hor., Sat. 2. 2. 15; Lucan 2. 384–7.

48 cf. esp. Virgil, Georg. 2. 465, and in general the use of fucus and cognates; also Hor., Ep. 2. 1. 207: ‘lana Tarentino violas imitata veneno’. Imitata in this context hints at Plato's condemnation of dramatic μίμησις; and violas evokes violare = μιαίνειν (note Virgil, Aen. 12. 67 with Homer., II. 4. 141, 146). The general sense of the line recalls Ion 535 D 2: κεκοσμημένος ἐσθῆτι ποικίλῃ, as 211–13 recall Ion 535c 1–3.

For the thought of Ep. 1. 10. 26–9 K.-H. compare Epic. frag. 548; for non-Epicurean parallels see A. La Penna, Ann. scuol. norm. Pisa 18 (1949), 26.

49 There is a tension between aeternum and parvo and between serviet and uti. The notion of freedom here has an Epicurean flavour (cf. K.H. on line 40).

50 cf. Epic, frag. 471–8.

51 cf. Od. 2. 2. 9–12 and N.-H. ad loc.

52 See lines 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 28, 34, 35, 39, 43, 45, 48.

53 On this phrase, appropriate to Fuscus' profession of grammaticus, see R. G. M. Nisbet, CQ N.S. 9 (1959), 74–5.

54 Either Horace, by a small poetic licence, renamed the goddess of the temple Vacuna, or Vespasian renamed her Victoria, presumably because that divinity is closely associated with the emperor (cf. ILS III. 1, p. 555).

55 See esp. frag. 174–5; BD 27–8; VS 13, 23, 52. Also Arist., EN 9. 9.

56 See esp. Cic., Or. 60–74. In general, M. Pohlenz, NGG 1933, 53–92 = Kleine Schriften 1 (1965), 100–39Google Scholar.

57 I have been greatly helped by criticisms from Mr. D. O. M. Charles and by previous conversation with him.