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Quintilian on the Emotions (Institutio Oratoria 6 preface and 1–2)*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2012

Matthew Leigh
Matthew Leigh*
Affiliation:
St Anne's College, Oxford
*
[email protected]
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Extract

Antiquity records few more cruel twists of fate than that which met the two-time former consul and conqueror of Macedon, L. Aemilius Paullus, on his return to Rome in 167 B.C. The great victory at Pydna the year before had finally removed the major rival to Roman power on the Greek mainland, and the riches generated in the campaign were such as to permit the abolition of direct taxation at Rome. The grant of a triumph should therefore have marked the acme of an already distinguished public career. Amidst this pomp, however, there intervened the worst of private disasters. For, a few days before the triumph, Paullus lost one of the two young sons born to him from his second marriage, and, only a few days after, the second died as well. The general responded with a notably dignified speech in which he recalled his prayer prior to the campaign, that the gods should reserve any intended catastrophe for his house alone and not for the state, and gave thanks for their having granted him his wish.

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Articles
Information
The Journal of Roman Studies , Volume 94 , November 2004 , pp. 122 - 140
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Copyright ©Matthew Leigh 2004. Exclusive Licence to Publish: The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

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Footnotes

*

This paper was composed for a seminar series on Quintilian organized by Michael Winterbottom in his final term as Corpus Professor of Latin in the University of Oxford. It is dedicated to him with affection and thanks. A later version was delivered in the Istituto di Filologia Latina of the University of Padova and it was here that a full revision of the original version was conducted. My thanks to Professor Emilio Pianezzola and his colleagues for their hospitality and to the Leverhulme Foundation for the award of a Philip Leverhulme Prize for the years 2001–3 which allowed me the space and time to think these issues through.

References

1 Liv. 45.40.6–42.1; Plut., Aem. 34.7–37.1; Val. Max. 5.10.2; Vell. 1.10.4–5.

2 Quint., inst. 1 pref. 1.

3 Quint., inst. 4 pref. 2.

4 For this problem, see Barwick, K., ‘Die Gliederung der rhetorischen TEXNH und die Horazische Epistula ad Pisones’, Hermes 57 (1922), 1–62,Google Scholar esp. 1–13.

5 Barwick, op. cit. (n. 4), 1 points to Quint., inst. 3.3.1: ‘omnis autem orandi ratio, ut plurimi maximique auctores tradiderunt, quinque partibus constat: inventione, dispositione, elocutione, memoria, pronuntiatione sive actione’, and sees Books 3–6 as dealing with as dealing with inventio, Book 7 dispositio, Books 8–11.1 elocutio, Book 11.2 memoria, Book 11.3 pronuntiatio. The analysis of the speech by its parts is thus uneasily subsumed into the category of inventio.

6 Barwick, op. cit. (n. 4), 1–2, identifies Cic., de orat. 2.104–306 as the account of inventio. This is muddied somewhat by M. Antonius' reference to tractatio as something distinct from inventio, but is essentially valid.

7 These titles are not reported consistently in all editions. Winterbottom reports no title for 6.2.1 and Radermacher attributes it only to P; Cousin, by contrast, finds it in A, G, and H and declines to report readings in P on account of the manuscript's late date.

8 Quint., inst. 6.1.9: ‘adfectibus quoque isdem fere utuntur’.

9 Quint., inst. 6.1.37, 6.1.40, 6.1.42, 6.1.46, 6.1.47, 6.1.50, 6.1.51, 6.1.52, 6.1.54, 6.1.55 bis, 6.2.12, 6.2.20 etc.

10 Solmsen, F., ‘Aristotle and Cicero on the orator's playing upon the feelings’, CPh 33 (1938), 390–404Google Scholar points to Cic., de orat. 2.152 and 160 and their implicit identification of Aristotle's Rhetoric as a source. He therefore argues that Aristotle's analysis of the emotions independent of any considerations of the different parts of the oration is reflected in their handling at de orat. 2.185–214 and 2.310–12. Yet the confession in the latter passage that proem and peroration remain the classic locations for such effects reveals the limitations to any alternative system Cicero may here wish to establish, and it is significant that the emotional effects employed in the defence of M'. Aquilius described at de orat. 2.194–5 have already been identified at 2.124 as stemming from the peroration. For other passages linking the peroration with emotional effect, see de orat. 2.278, 2.332, 3.107.

11 Quint., inst. 4.1.28, 6.1.51–2, 6.2.20; decl. 338.1–3. For the proem and peroration linked and differentiated, see also Longinus 1.2.183.1–7, 1.2.186.1–13 Spengel-Hammer; Anon. Rhet. I.2.209.27–210.5, 1.2.352.14–17, I.2.394.16–22 Spengel-Hammer; Hermogenes Spengel.

12 For ἀνακεϕαλαίωσις as a part of the peroration, see Anon. Rhet. 1.2.388.15–18 Spengel-Hammer; I.2.390.15–392.13 Spengel-Hammer; 1.2.407.12–15 Spengel-Hammer; Hermogenes II.436.9–26 Spengel.

13 For enumeratio as a part of the peroration, see Cic., inv. 1.98; part. 52, 59–60, 122; Rhet. Her. 2.47.

14 For conclusio, see Cic., inv. 1.98; de orat. 2.80; Rhet. Her. 1.4, 2.47; Q. Fabii Laurentii Victorini, Explanationes in Rhetoricam M. Tulli Ciceronis 1.52–5 = pp. 256–7 Halm; Cassiodorus, De Rhetorica 20 = p. 503 Halm. For concludere in the context of the peroration, see Cic., de orat. 2.80, 307, 332; orat. 122; part. 46, 47.

15 For cumulus as a rhetorical term, see TLL iv. 1386.84–1387.14. Of the examples cited, only Cassiod., in psalm. 68.8 seems properly to parallel Quintilian's use of cumulus at this point and Cassiodorus is noted for his dependence on the Institutio Oratorio. For the anomalous use of cumulus, see also L. Calboli Montefusco, Exordium Narratio Epilogus. Studi sulla teoria retorica greca e romana delle parti del discorso (1988), 79 n. 1.

16 For ἐπίλογος as a rhetorical term, see Arist., Rhet. 1419b10; D.H., Lys. 19; Isoc. 9; Dem. 19, 45, 48, 52; Anon. Rhet. 1.2.356.15, 1.2.395.27, 1.2.398.1 Spengel-Hammer; Rufus 1.2.407.12 Spengel-Hammer; Hermog. II. 149.7 Spengel.

17 For epilogus as a rhetorical term, see Cic., Brut. 127; de orat. 1.86 with Leeman-Pinkster ad loc., 2.278; orat. 57; Tusc. 1.47; Quint., inst. 2.17.6, 4.1.28 bis, 4.2.111, 4.2.114, 6.1.7, 6.1.10, 6.1.37, 6.1.40, 6.1.42, 6.1.46, 6.1.47, 6.1.50, 6.1.51, 6.1.52, 6.1.54, 6.1.55 bis, 6.2.12, 6.2.20 etc.

18 See OLD pp. 470–1 s.v. cumulus 4, cf. B. Brohm in G. Ueding (ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik II (1994), 396–7 s.v. cumulatio. I am, however, baffled by Brohm's attempt specifically to link cumulatio with Greek ἀνακεϕαλαίωσις.

19 Cic., top. 99: ‘ad id autem quod te velle senseram, cumulate satis factum esse debet voluntati tuae’.

20 Arist., Rhet. 1419b19–13 : .

21 Anon. Rhet. 1.2.388.15–18 Spengel-Hammer; Rufus 1.2.407.12–15 Spengel-Hammer; Cic., part. 52–60.

22 Apsine s 1.2.296.14–16 Spengel-Hammer; Rhet. Her. 2.47; Cic., inv. 1.98; C. Chirius Fortunatianus p. 119.31–3 Halm; Martianus Capella p. 491.18–20 Halm. For four-, three-, and two-part perorations, see also Calboli Montefusco, op. cit. (n. 15), 88–9.

23 Longinus 1.2.186.1 –13 Spengel-Hammer; Anon. Rhet. 1.2.208.10–12 Spengel-Hammer; Apsines 1.2.296.14–16 Spengel-Hammer; Anon. Rhet. 1.2.393.7–11, 1.2.398.19 Spengel-Hammer; Rufus 1.2.407.12–15 Spengel-Hammer.

24 Quint., inst. 6.1.52: ‘cum sit maxima pars epilogi amplificatio’; cf. Cic., de orat. 1.143, 3.104; orat. 127; part. 52, 128; top. 98: ‘peroratio autem et alia quaedam habet et maxime amplificationem, cuius effectus hic debet esse, ut aut perturbentur animi aut tranquillentur et, si ita adfecti iam ante sint, ut aut augeat eorum motus aut sedet oratio.’

25 See especially Cic., orat. 125, cf. de orat. 1.143, 2.332, 3.104; part. 52.

26 Cic., de orat. 3.104.

27 Cic., deorat. 3.104, cf. top. 98.

28 Atherton, C. A., ‘Hand over fist: the failure of Stoic rhetoric’, CQ 38 (1988), 392–427,CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 404–5 translates ‘Atticorum’ and ‘Atticos’ as ‘Atticisers’ on the not unreasonable grounds that the disavowal of emotional appeal is far more generally true of the Roman Atticists (at least as presented by Cicero at e.g. Brut. 276, 290–1, orat. 20, opt. gen. 15–16) than it is of the orators of ancient Athens. However, Quintilian's explanatory reference to Athenian legislation and the intervention of the herald coheres much better with an admittedly inaccurate account of the Athenian orators than it does with the apparent aesthetic criteria of the Atticists. For this reason I translate ‘Athenians’.

29 Quint., inst. 2.16.4, 10.1.107, 12.10.26.

30 Xen., Mem. 4.4.4. For the prevalence of emotional appeal to the jury and the brandishing of children, see Ar., Vesp. 568–74, cf. 976–8; Pl., Apol. 34B–35B; cf. Isoc., Antid. 321; Lys. 20.34; And. 1–148; Dem. 21.99, 186–8.

31 Arist., Rhet. 1354a22–3: ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος.

32 Lys. 3.46 : ἐπειδὴ παρ' ὑμῖν οῦ νόμιμόν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν.

33 Lycurg., In Leocrat. 11 –13. The phrase ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος features in both 11 and 13.

34 For very similar treatment of the evidence, see D. M. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (1963), 43–4.

35 Arist., Rhet. 1354a11–18, cf. 1354a24–6.

36 Lycurg., In Leocrat. 11: .

37 Luc., Anach. 19; Anon. Rhet. I.359.19–21 Spengel-Hammer. Note especially Lucian's statement that the Areopagos tolerates those who speak περὶ τοῦ πράγματος but that the herald will intervene if one delivers a proem or if one οἶκτον ἢ δείνωσιν ἐπάγηι τῶι πράγματι. See also Quint., inst. 10.1.107.

38 The suggestion of Ath. 590E that a ban on emotional manipulation was introduced in response to the tactics adopted by Hyperides in order to secure the acquittal of Phryne is picturesque but implausible and need not detain us.

39 Quint., inst. 5 pref. 1–2: ‘fuerunt et clari quidem auctores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere (namque et adfectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia gratia ira similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium petere, cum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum, sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur), plures vero qui nec ab illis sine dubio partibus rationem orandi summoverent, hoc tamen proprium atque praecipuum crederent opus, sua confirmare et quae <ex> adverso proponerentur refutare.’

40 See e.g. the notes ad loc. of J. Cousin in the Budé (1975–80), S. Corsi in the BUR (1997), and D. Russell in the Loeb (2001) editions of Quintilian.

41 Arist., Rhet. 1354a11–18, 1354b16–22, 1356a14–19.

42 Arist., Rhet. 1354a18–26.

43 Arist., Rhet. 1356a1–4, 14–19.

44 Arist., Rhet. 1378a19– 1389b30, esp. 1378a22–6.

45 Arist, ., Rhet. 1419b10–13Google Scholar. For the case against contradiction, see Marx, F., ‘Aristoteles' Rhetorik’, in Stark, R. (ed.), Rhetorika. Schriften zur aristotelischen und hellenistischen Rhetorik (1968), 36–123Google Scholar, esp. 52–3; Schütrumpf, E., ‘Some observstions on the introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric’, in Furley, D. J. and Nehamas, A. (eds), Aristotle's Rhetoric. Philosophical Essays (1994), 99–116Google Scholar, esp. 113–15. The objections of Rapp, C., Aristoteles Rhetorik. Übersetzt und Erläutert (2002), ii, 46Google Scholar are not convincing.

46 Anon. Rhet. 1.2.392.14–393.6 Spengel-Hammer.

47 ἐπὶ τελευτῆς Kayser.

48 Anon. Rhet. 1.2.389.6–18 Spengel-Hammer.

49 Pl., Phdr. 267D. For Thrasymachus and pathos, see Pl., Phdr. 267 C–D; cf. Arist., Rhet. 1404a14, who refers to his work, the Ἔλεοι. Schütrumpf, op. cit. (n. 45), 102–3 points to Pl., Phdr. 269 B and D and suggests that what Socrates objects to in Thrasymachus and his peers is the failure to integrate emotional appeal into a broader rhetorical system.

50 SVF II.296.

51 For Chrysippus and the unipartite peroration, see also Atherton, op. cit. (n. 28), 404–5; G. Moretti, Acutum dicendi genus. Brevità, oscurità, sottigliezze e paradossi nelle tradizioni retoriche degli stoici (2nd edn, 1995), 42–3 andn. 19.

52 For this distinction between Zeno and Chrysippus, see SVF III.461 = Galen, de H. et Plat. decr. IV. 1 = p. 334 M and V. 1 = p. 405 M.

53 See SVF III.459 = Plut., Mor. 446 F: . For other definitions of the passions as false judgements, see SVF III.38 2 = Them., paraphr. in Arist. de anima III. 5 p. 197 Sp.; SVF III.386 = Aspasius in Arist. NE p. 44.12 Heylb.; SVF III.389 = Stob. 2.89.4; SVF 3.391 = Andron., περὶ παθῶν 1 (p. 11 Kreuttner); SVF III.394 = Stob. 2.90.7.

54 Atherton, op. cit. (n. 28), 409–10, 414 points to the statement attributed to Arcesilaus at Sextus M. 7.154, that Stoics overlook the fact that assent is granted to propositions and not, as they assume, to impressions. On this basis she argues subtly and impressively that Stoic rhetoric, though it excludes attempts to rouse the passions per se, may nevertheless presuppose a very limited range of ‘acceptably emotive’ modes of speaking. These will be expressions of the three Stoic εὐπαθείαι, evidence for which is collected at SVF III.431–42. The famous plainness of Stoic rhetoric will, however, indicate quite how limited these were and, as Atherton herself notes at 405, cf. 414, the distinction is much too subtle for Quintilian to grasp.

55 SVF III.39 5 = Stob. 2.91.10; SVF III.39 6 = DL 7.113; SVF III.397 = Andron., περὶ παθῶν 4 (p. 16 Kreuttner); SVF III.398 = Cic., Tusc. 4.21. See also Anon. Rhet. 1.2.392.14–393.6 Spengel-Hammer, esp. ὀργὴ δέ ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας.

56 SVF 111.414 = Andron., περὶ παθῶν 2 (p. 12 Kreuttner) includes both ἔλεος, and οἶκτος as subsets of λύπη. See also Cic., Tusc. 3.20; Sen., clem. 2.6–7.

57 Quint., inst. 6.2.4–6.

58 B. Riposati, Studi sui topica di Cicerone (1947), 282 and Calboli Montefusco, op. cit. (n. 15), 84–5 are unsatisfactory on this point. Even if a tradition can be traced back to Corax which attributes to the peroration nothing more than the recapitulation of points already made, it surely is not grounded in the same broader theory as the position which Chrysippus represents.

59 Anon, proleg. in Hermog. status, Rh. Gr. vol. VII. I, p. 8.20 Walz: SVF II.293 cites the first half of this definition but not the crucial identification of speaking well with speaking the truth. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa (1949), ii, 31 puts this right. For the first half of the definition, see also Quint., inst. 2.15.34 = SVF II.292; Sextus, adv. math. II.6 = SVF II.294. For both parts, cf. Mnesarchus at Cic., de orat. 1.83. It is perhaps indicative of the scant difference between Stoic rhetoric and Stoic dialectic that Alexander, in top. p. 1.8–14 Wallie should open his survey of definitions of the latter category as follows: .

60 Cic., de orat. 1.227–8. For Galba as the first Roman to study emotional effect, see Cic., Brut. 82.

61 For the Stoicism of Rufus and his relationship with Panaetius, see Cic., Brut. 114, 116; off. 3.10 with Dyck ad loc; Atherton, op. cit. (n. 28), 409, 426–7; Moretti, op. cit. (n. 51), 92–6; Lévy, C., ‘Cicéron critique de l'éloquence stoïcienne’, in Montefusco, L. Calboli (ed.), Papers on Rhetoric III (2000), 127–44,Google Scholar esp. 131–4.

62 Cic., de orat. 1.229.

63 Cic., de orat. 1.230: ‘nemo ingemuit, nemo inclamavit patronorum, nihil cuiquam doluit, nemo est questus, nemo rem publicam imploravit, nemo supplicavit; quid multa? pedem nemo in illo iudicio supplosit, credo, ne Stoicis renuntiaretur.’

64 Cic., Brut. 113–16, cf. de orat. 1.227–30. For Rufus' disavowal of pathetic pleas, see Val. Max. 6.4.4, cf. D.C. 28 fr. 97.2.

65 Cic., de orat. 1.45, 75.

66 J. Glucker, ‘Probabile, veri simile and related terms’, in J. G. Powell (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher (1995), 115–43, examines the overlap between these terms in Ciceronian Academic scepticism and rhetorical writing. See esp. 124–5 for Tisias ap. Pl. Phdr. 273B–C and Corax ap. Arist. Rhet. 1402a17–24 for rhetoricians using arguments from εἰκός in order to evade the truth and 130–1 citing Cic., Tusc. 1.17,4.7, off. 2.7–8, 3.20, 3.33, Luc. 121, 124, 126, 134, 135, 138, 139, 146 for probabilis as a technical term in Academic scepticism. Glucker concludes at 136 that the ‘rhetorical provenance’ of such terms has little bearing o n philosophical understanding because th e types of issues and problems in which philosophers and rhetoricians appeal to the ‘probable’ are so different. A more idealistic account of rhetorical practice might, however, be derived from Cic., de orat. 1. 239–40. Here, the jurisconsult P. Crassus is consulted by a client and gives a discouraging response; his companion, the orator Ser. Galba, offers an alternative answer in which he says much ‘pro aequitate’. Crassus is sufficiently discomforted by this line of argument that he must check his books in order to confirm that it is wrong, but confesses all the same that ‘Galbae disputationem sibi probabilem et prope veram videri’. What matters here is that the appeal to aequitas against dogmatic adherence to the terms of the law itself involves an implicit enthymeme. For Cic., top. 9 states that ‘ius civile est aequitas constituta eis qui eiusdem civitatis sunt ad res suas obtinendas’; to state that the jurisconsult's response violates aequitas is to argue ‘If x, then y; if not x, then not y’. The process of exchange between rhetoric and philosophy may be more fluid than Glucker implies.

67 Cic., de orat. 1.44. Leeman-Pinkster ad loc. point to Panaetius fr. 95 van Straaten = Cic., off. 2. 51: ‘atque etiam hoc praeceptum officii diligenter tenendum est, ne quern umquam innocentem iudicio capitis arcessaris; id enim sine scelere fieri nullo pacto potest. nam quid est tam inhumanum quam eloquentiam a natura ad salutem hominum et ad conservationem datam ad bonorum pestem perniciemque convertere? nee tamen, ut hoc fugiendum est, item est habendum religioni nocentem aliquando, modo ne nefarium impiumque, defendere. vult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas. iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi, patroni nonnumquam veri simile, etiam si minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere, praesertim cum de philosophia scriberem, non auderem nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio.’ This, however, must be a grotesque misrepresentation of the Stoic, taking his unflattering description of what orators actually do and representing it as a prescription for what they should do. The interpretation offered by B. N. Tatakis, Panétius de Rhodes (1931), 50 gets the matter precisely the wrong way round.

68 Cic., de orat. 1.83. See also Crassus at Cic., de orat. 3.65.

69 Cic., de orat. 1.220.

70 Cic., de orat. 1.221.

71 Cic., de orat. 1.44, cf. 2.115. The translations of 2.115 offered in the Budé of E. Courbaud (1927), ‘prouver la vérité de ce qu'on affirme'; the Loeb of E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham (1959), ‘the proof of our allegations’; and the BUR of M. Martina, M. Ogrin, I. Torzi, and G. Cettuzzi (1994), ‘dimostrare la veridicità della propria tesi’ all misrepresent the force of ‘probemus’ here. Piderit-Harnecker ad loc. astutely point to Arist., Rhet. 1356a4: διὰ τοῦ . See also Rhet. Her. 1.3: ‘inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium, quae causam probabilem reddant.’

72 Note especially Cic., de orat. 2.116: ‘ad probandum autem duplex est oratori subiecta materies.’

73 For witnesses, wills, and statutes, see Cic., de orat. 2.118–19; for the logical analysis of the case and the invention of argumenta, see 2.120–76.

74 Cic., de orat. 2.177–8, esp. 178: ‘ut aliquando ad ilia maiora veniamus.’

75 Cic., de orat. 2.178. For the sense of veritate in this passage, see Leeman-Pinkster ad loc.

76 Cic., de orat. 3.65.

77 SVF II.288 = Cic., fin. 4.7. See also Cic., de orat. 1.50 for the claim that Chrysippus is no stylist, hence no orator.

78 Cic., Tusc. 4.51–2. Note that Cic., Tusc. 4.11 –14 = SVF III.438 has defined the four Stoic πάθη and contrasted them with the three εὐπαθείαι. Under these terms, vehement action is a part of βούλησις, which in turn is the virtuous opposite of ἐπιθυμία.

79 For the need to study philosophy in order to appreciate the emotions and their arousal, see Pl., Phdr. 269E–272C; Cic., de orat. 1.53–4, 60, 87; cf. 1.219 for the scepticism of M. Antonius; orat. 14–15. See also Leeman-Pinkster i.62.

80 Cic.,part. 9.

81 For emotional effect as the essence of oratory, see Cic., de orat. 1.30, 1.53–4, 160: ‘quod unum in oratore dominatur’; 2.214–15: ‘in quo sunt omnia’; 3.104–5: ‘eaque una laus oratoris est [et] propria maxime’; Brut. 322: ‘quod unum est oratoris maxime proprium’; orat. 69: ‘in quo uno vis omnis oratoris est’; 128 ‘in quo uno regnat oratio’.

82 Atherton, op. cit. (n. 28), 405, 423–4; SVF II.994 = Plut., Mor. 1055F–1056A; SVF III.177 = Plut., Mor. 1057A–B.

83 Atherton, op. cit. (n. 28), 424.

84 Cato, ad fil. fr. 14 J = Sen., contr. 1 pref. 9; Quint., inst. 1 pref. 9, 2.15.1 and 34, 4.1.7, 12.1.1 and 24. See G. Calboli, Marci Porci Catonis Oratio Pro Rhodiensibus. Introduzione, edizione critica dei frammenti, traduzione e commento (1978), 14–22, for a survey of opinions; Moretti, op. cit. (n. 51), 82–6 and n. 26.

85 The orthodox Stoic view as represented at Cic., Tusc. 5.28, cf. Sen., const. 7.2, is that only the sapiens is the bonus vir, but the latter term has a considerably looser sense in the vast majority of Latin writers. Cato's contemporary Terence uses bonus vir in an ethically loaded sense throughout his work — see e.g. Ter., Ad. 463–4, 476, 961; Eun. 660, 918 — but primarily in order to express the behaviour which can be expected of a ‘gentleman’.

86 For the Stoic sage, see esp. Sen., const. 7.1; ira 2.10.6; tranq. 7.4. For good men in the society evoked in Cic., de orat., see 2.25, 144, 208, 260.

87 Cic., de orat. 2.198.

88 Cic., de orat. 2.184, 2.206, 2.211, 2.321, 2.349.

89 Cic., de orat. 2.85: ‘si intellegam posse ad summos pervenire, non solum hortabor, ut elaboret, sed etiam, si vir quoque bonus mihi videbitur esse, obsecrabo; tantum ego in excellenti oratore et eodem bono viro pon o esse ornamenti universae civitati.’

90 Quint., inst. 12 pref. 4: ‘at nostra temeritas etiam mores ei conabitur dare et adsignabit officia’, represents the concern for the moral excellence of the orator as a novelty with respect to previous rhetorical works; but the basic category of the bonus vir is scarcely his invention.

91 Quint., inst. 12.1.1. Winterbottom, M., ‘Quintilian and the vir bonus’, JRS 54 (1964), 90–7,Google Scholar is a devastating catalogue of bad men and delatores among the orators of Quintilian's age.

92 Quint., inst. 1 pref. 9, 2.15.34, 12.1.4. In both these passages th e good man stands in for the sage of SVF III.594 = Alexander in Arist. top. II p. 134.13 Wallie: ; SVF III.612 = D L 7.122: ; SVF III.654 = Stob. 2.67.13: SVF III.655 = Plut., Mor. 472A: . See also Leeman-Pinkster at Cic., de orat. 2.85: ‘Quint, verbindet die Definition mit der stoischen Auffassung der Redekunst’.

93 See above n. 92.

94 Cic., de orat. 2.8; Brut. 163.

95 Cic., de orat. 1.94, 1.206, 3189.

96 The account of M. Caelius Rufus at Cic., Brut. 273 is, however, ample evidence of how easy it is to get these judgements wrong.

97 Cic., de orat. 2.8.

98 dominetur A, Winterbottom; dominatur Campanus, Russell.

99 Quint., inst. 6.2.4–6.

100 see also Quint., inst. 4.5.6, especially ‘non enim solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet, cui rei contraria est maxime tenuis ilia et scrupulose in partis secta divisionis diligentia eo tempore quo cognoscenti iudicium conamur auferre’.

101 For a sympathetic discussion of this problem in Quintilian, see M. Winterbottom, ‘Quintilian the moralist’, in T. Albaladejo, E. del Rio, and J. A. Caballero (eds), Quintiliano: historia y actualidad (1998), I, 317–34, esp. 323–6.

102 Quint., inst. 6 pref. 2: ‘at me fortuna id agentem diebus ac noctibus festinantemque metu meae mortalitatis ita subito prostravit ut laboris mei fructus ad neminem minus quam ad me pertineret’; cf. 6 pref. 15 ‘imperitanti fortunae’.

103 For intriguing parallels in declamatory practice, see T. Zinsmaier, ‘Quintilian als Deklamator. Die Topik des parens superstes im Proömium zu Buch VI der Institutio Oratoria’, in B.-J. and J.-P. Schröder (eds), Studium Declamatorium (2003), 153–68, esp. 162 n. 47.

104 Quint., inst. 6 pref. 11.

105 For the rhetorical consolatio, see Cic., de orat. 2.50, 2.64, 3.118, 3.211; Sen., ep. 94.21, 94.39, 94.49, 95.34. 95.65; dial. 6, 11, 12; Quint., inst. 10.1.47, 11.3.153; Mar. Victorin. rhet. p. 174.30 Halm; Plut., Mor. 101E–122A; Menander Rhetor III.413.5–414.30 Spengel with Russell and Wilson ad loc.

106 Zinsmaier, op. cit. (n. 103), 165, is however right to resist any implication that language is necessarily the less heartfelt for being formalized or overtly rhetorical.

107 G. A. Kennedy, Quintilian (1969), 29–30; G. O. Hutchinson, Latin Literature from Seneca to Juvenal (1992), 271–3; Zinsmaier, op. cit. (n. 103), 153 n. 1 with refs.

108 For previous treatments of this issue, see H. Rahn, Quintilianus. Ausbildung des Redners (1972–5), I, 672 n. 3; Winterbottom, M., ‘Quintilian and rhetoric’, in Dorey, T. A. (ed.), Empire and Aftermath. Silver Latin II (1975), 75–97,Google Scholar esp. 90–1; F. Ahlheid, Quintilian. The Preface to Book VIII and Comparable Passages in the Institutio Oratorio (1983), 55; Zinsmaier, op. cit. (n. 103), 154 and nn. 3–4.

109 On this point cf. Celentano, M. S., ‘Il sesto libro dell'Institutio Oratoria di Quintiliano: la trasmissione del sapere, l'attualità storica, l'esperienza autobiografica’, in Montefusco, L. Calboli (ed.), Papers in Rhetoric III (2000), 69Google Scholar.

110 cf. Rhet. Her. 3. 24: ‘amplificatio dividitur in cohortationem et conquestionem.’ See also C. Chirius Fortunatianus, Ars Rhetorica II.31 = pp. 119–20, esp. p. 120.10 Halm: ‘conquestio, id est miseratio’; C. Julius Victor, Ars Rhetorica 18 = pp. 429–30 Halm, where the peroration is divided into enumeratio, indignatio, and conquestio. See also Martianus Capella p. 491.18–28 Halm, esp. 21–2: ‘conquestio, id est miseratio’. For miseratio and commiseratio as parts of the peroration, see also Cic., de orat. 2.125; orat. 130; part. 56–7, 122.

111 Cic., inv. 1.107: ‘tertius, per quern unum quodque deploratur incommodum, ut in morte fili pueritiae delectatio, amor, spes, solatium, educatio et, si qua simili in genere quolibet de incommodo per conquestionem dici poterunt.’

112 Cic., inv. 1.109: ‘undecimus, per quern liberorum aut parentum aut sui corporis sepeliendi aut alicuius eiusmodi rei commendatio fit.’

113 Cic., inv. 1.109: ‘duodecimus, per quem disiunctio deploratur ab aliquo, cum diducaris ab eo quicum libentissime vixeris, ut a parente filio, a fratre familiari.’

114 Rhet. Her. 2.50: ‘si quid nostris parentibus, liberis, ceteris necessariis casurum sit propter nostras calamitates aperiemus’; cf. ‘si nostrum fatum aut fortunam conqueremur.’

115 Quint., inst. 6.1.24, 6.1.30, 6.1.33, cf. 6.1.46–7.

116 Quint., inst. 6 pref. 13–16.

117 Quint., inst. 6. 1.3: ‘licet et dubitare num quid nos fugerit, et quid responsurus sit adversarius his et his, aut quam spem accusator habeat omnibus ita defensis.’

118 cf. Cic., part. 60: ‘reo rarius utendum.’

119 Quint., inst. 6.1.3.

120 Anon. Rhet. 1.2.390.15–23 Spengel-Hammer.

121 Quint., inst. 6.1.1.

122 Quint., inst. 6.1.2: ‘in hac quae repetemus quam brevissime dicenda sunt, et quod Graeco verbo patet, decurrendum per capita.’

123 Quint., inst. 11.3.170, cf. Anon. Rhet. Rhet. 1.2.398.19–20 Spengel-Hammer, especially ; Anon. Rhet. 1.2.398.19–20 Spengel-Hammer, .

124 Quint., inst. 6.1.27: ‘nee sine causa dictum est nihil facilius quam lacrimas inarescere.’ For this dictum cf. Rhet. Her. 2.50 with Calboli ad loc; Cic., inv. 1.109; part. 57; Quint., decl. 338.3; Jul. Sever., praec. art. rhet. 24 = p. 370.4 Halm, cf. Curt. Ruf. 5.5.11.

125 This sets a further unsettling context for the preface. Quintilian acknowledges that the public ament for the son is no way out of loneliness: he can never fully communicate his distress; the tears of the reading public will dry and they will walk away.

126 Cic., de orat. 2.189–96; orat. 132; Hor., AP 101–3 with Brink ad loc.

127 Quint., inst. 6.2.29–32.

128 Quint., inst. 6.2.29, 32. For these concepts in ancient rhetorical theory, see Long., Subl. 15.1–2 with Russell ad loc; Webb, R., ‘Imagination and the arousal of the emotions in Greco-Roman rhetoric’, in Morton-Braund, S. and Gill, C. (eds), The Passions in Roman Literature and Thought (1997), 112–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cicero discusses what he dubs ‘inlustris… oratio’ at part. 20. See also orat. 139: ‘saepe etiam rem dicendo subiciet oculis’.

129 Arist., Rhet. 1354a11–18 on the joys of the enthymeme; Cic., de orat. 3.188, cf. 209 on prosametrics.

130 Cic., de orat. 2.195, 198, 201, cf. 204.

131 Cic., de orat. 2.72, 75–84.

132 Cic., de orat. 1.82, 2.364.

133 Cic., de orat. 1.219–20.

134 Cic., de orat. 2.55–61.

135 Cic., de orat. 1.5.

136 Cic., de orat. 2.1–7, esp. 4.

137 For Crassus pretending to have studied Greek philosophy only late in life, see Cic., de orat. 3.74–7. For his knowledge of Greek literary and artistic culture exposed, see Cic., de orat. 3.21, 26–8, 36, 56, 82, 132, 137–9, 228.

138 Cic., de orat. 2.151–3, 160–1.

139 Cic., de orat. 2.299–300, 351–4, 357, 360.

140 Cic., de orat. 2.341.

141 For the pleasure which this revelation gives his peers, see Cic., de orat. 2.350, 362–3, 365.

142 That Quintilian himself is alert to this is evident from inst. 2.17.5–6: ‘quidam naturalem esse rhetoricen volunt et tamen adiuvari exercitatione non diffitentur, ut in libris Ciceronis de oratore dicit Antonius observationem quandam esse, non artem. quod non ideo ut pro vero accipiamus est positum, sed ut Antoni persona servetur, qui dissimulator artis fuit.’