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Bureaucrats and Budgeting Benefits: How do British Central Government Departments Measure Up?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Christopher Hood
Affiliation:
Department of PoliticsUniversity of Glasgow
Meg Huby
Affiliation:
Department of PoliticsUniversity of York
Andrew Dunsire
Affiliation:
Department of PoliticsUniversity of York

Abstract

Many economics-based theories of bureaucracy build on the assumption that public bureaucrats reap utility from a large budget. This article examines what evidence may be marshalled for bureaucratic appropriation of budgetary funds, by reference to measurable changes in British central government departments from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, both at the civil-service-wide level and at the level of departments taken separately and severally. This evidence indicates that, while the budget/utility approach cannot be dismissed entirely, the link between budgetary increases and bureaucratic utility is neither clearly demonstrable nor universally applicable. At the least, a more refined type of budget/utility theory seems to be called for.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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