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Appointee vacancies in US executive branch agencies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 September 2020

William G. Resh Open the ORCID record for William G. Resh [Opens in a new window] ,
Gary E. Hollibaugh Jr. Open the ORCID record for Gary E. Hollibaugh Jr. [Opens in a new window] ,
Patrick S. Roberts Open the ORCID record for Patrick S. Roberts [Opens in a new window]  and
Matthew M. Dull
William G. Resh*
Affiliation:
Sol Price School of Public Policy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Gary E. Hollibaugh Jr.
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Patrick S. Roberts
Affiliation:
School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, Arlington, VA, USA
Matthew M. Dull
Affiliation:
School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, Arlington, VA, USA
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We analyse United States presidential appointee positions subject to Senate confirmation without a confirmed appointee in office. These “vacant” positions are byproducts of American constitutional design, shaped by the interplay of institutional politics. Using a novel dataset, we analyse appointee vacancies across executive branch departments and single-headed agencies from 1989 to 2013. We develop a theoretical model that uncovers the dynamics of vacancy onset and length. We then specify an empirical model and report results highlighting both position and principal–agent relations as critical to the politics of appointee vacancies. Conditional on high status positions reducing the frequency and duration of vacancies, we find important principal–agent considerations from a separation of powers perspective. Appointee positions in agencies ideologically divergent from the relevant Senate committee chair are vacant for less time than in ideologically proximal agencies. Importantly, this relationship strengthens as agency ideology diverges away from the chair and towards the chair’s party extreme.

Keywords

appointeescommittee chairsconfirmationseparation of powersvacancies
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 41 , Issue 4 , December 2021 , pp. 653 - 676
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Resh et al. Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FYTCEW
Link
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