The Democratic Party faced a crisis of political legitimacy in the late 1960s as distrust and protest permeated its electoral base. In response, the Democratic National Committee established the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, tasked with restructuring the party’s presidential nomination process. Contrary to the conventional historical narrative of the McGovern-Fraser Commission that has focused on a supposed displacement of the party’s old guard by radical insurgents, this article instead argues that the main impetus for reform came from national party leaders seeking to build up the legitimacy and authority of the National Committee. Commission Chair George McGovern and the DNC used a particular reform rhetoric that charged state parties with the corruption of the political process, necessitating rescue by an empowered national party. This focus on the nationalizing impulses behind McGovern-Fraser serves to shift our attention away from ideological struggles and toward institutional motives.

This article investigates the reasons for the adoption and rejection of liquor dispensaries in the years prior to the adoption of national prohibition in the United States. Southern municipalities were the primary dispensary locations, largely due to the permissiveness of local option laws in the South. Municipalities with dispensaries were often retreating from prohibition and dispensary supporters argued that publically run liquor stores were the next best thing. Beyond the South, states that explored dispensary adoption also were those repealing prohibition laws, suggesting a larger pattern whereby prohibition preceded dispensaries rather than following them.

The work of southern sociologist Thomas Jackson Woofter Jr. (1893–1972) is frequently cited by American historians, but his contribution to government policy on agriculture in the New Deal, Social Security in the 1940s, and demography in the Cold War remains underappreciated. He left the University of North Carolina to direct government research on rural relief in the 1930s, Social Security enhancement during and after World War II, and foreign population and manpower projections during the Cold War. Contributing to the delivery of essential programs in key agencies, he participated in internal and external debates over policy and social attitudes between 1930 and 1960. Woofter worked for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Farm Security Agency, the Federal Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, improving data-gathering and assisting transitions in federal policymaking. This article assesses his role in those agencies, using official records, other primary materials, and secondary sources.

In most accounts, the modern American “tax revolt” begins with Proposition 13, passed by California voters in June 1978. In this telling, the revolt represents an antigovernment, antiliberal shift among white homeowners instrumental in the “rise of the right” and the fall of the “New Deal order” that culminated in Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 and his subsequent tax cuts. This article challenges that account by demonstrating that the revolt began more than a decade before Prop 13 as approval rates for local levies and bonds reached all-time lows. This local revolt was not limited to whites, nor did it portend rising conservatism. Instead, it was rooted in lower- and middle-income Americans’ frustrations with steep rises in unfair, regressive taxes during the post–World War II decades. The Kennedy-Johnson “Growth Liberals,” who were busy cutting progressive federal taxes at the same time that regressive state and local taxes were soaring, missed this pocketbook squeeze, thereby setting the stage for later events like Prop 13.

NASA has put people in unique and extreme environments for over six decades. Supporting these individuals with a comprehensive health-care system has evolved over this period. As the Apollo program ended and NASA began to contemplate a space shuttle and space station program, societal pressures in the late 1960s and early 1970s caused federal agencies such as NASA to reconsider how to link the needs of the space program with a growing pressure to address societal needs by forging interagency partnerships. The Space Technology Applied to the Rural Papago Health Care (STARPAHC) project provides an example of how NASA sought to balance these two imperatives in an age of diminishing federal support. This project can provide lessons for today’s uncertain budgetary future for agencies such as NASA, which are once again being asked to find creative and innovative ways to support their missions while demonstrating their larger value to society.

Milton Friedman’s idea of flexible exchange rates was heresy for Americans until the mid-1960s. However, by the late 1970s the idea became embedded in academic thought, policymaking, and business practices. This article analyzes how floating currencies, once eschewed, became embraced as legitimate in the US through the late 1960s and early 1970s. It demonstrates how business leaders’ economic interests and laissez-faire economists’ framework for causes of and solutions to business hardships contributed to society’s acceptance of currency flexibility. Increasing societal support of flexible currencies strengthened the power of float-advocates within the US government, facilitating the transition of the international monetary system from fixed exchange rates to floating. This study highlights how material interests and policy discourses contributed to America’s new policy orientation. It also addresses the origins of the neoliberal international financial order by documenting how American elites reconstituted the state-market balance in global finance while navigating monetary crises.

In 1943, Georgia’s constitution was amended to lower the voting age to eighteen, making it the first—and for twelve years, the only—state in the Union to establish a voting-age requirement below twenty-one. Despite being widely considered at the time by several national and state political actors, Georgia’s reform represents an important and unappreciated historical puzzle. First, few would regard mid-twentieth-century Georgia as being even modestly progressive, especially regarding voting rights. Second, there is no evidence that an organized group lobbied for the reform. Further, there is no reason why lowering the voting age was inherently unique to Georgia qua Georgia. Instead, this study offers a detailed historical analysis highlighting the dedication of its young governor, and argues that Ellis Arnall’s political entrepreneurialism coupled with growing intraparty factionalism in Georgian politics and strategic timing facilitated this rare instance of electoral progressivism in the Deep South.

In the face of technology failures in preventing oil from reaching beaches and coasts after catastrophic oil spills in the 1960s and early 1970s, the oil industry and governmental officials needed to quickly reconsider their idea of prevention. Initially, prevention meant stopping spilled oil from coating beaches and coasts. Exploring the presentations at three oil-spill conferences in 1969, 1971 and 1973, this idea of prevention changed as the technological optimism of finding effective methods met the realities of oil-spill cleanup. By 1973, prevention meant stopping oil spills before they happened. This rapid policy transformation came about because the oil industry could not hide the visual evidence of the source of their technology failures. In this century, as policymakers confront invisible pollutants such as pesticides and greenhouse gases, considering ways to visually show the source of the pollution along with the effects could quicken policy decisions.

In the mid-1970s, Congress and the judiciary moved to regulate the National Security Agency (NSA) at a moment when such regulation might have restricted the growth of electronic surveillance. The Ford administration played a crucial role in preventing that from happening. It did so by controlling the flow of intelligence information to Congress and by establishing a flexible new legal framework for intelligence based on broad executive orders, narrow legislation, and legal opinions written by executive branch lawyers. This framework fostered a perception of legality that headed off calls for comprehensive legislation governing intelligence. The Ford administration’s actions protected NSA from meaningful regulation, preserved the growth of electronic surveillance, and sustained executive branch preeminence in national security affairs. The episode proved formative for the Ford administration officials involved—including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Antonin Scalia—and solidified the central role of executive branch lawyers in national security policymaking.

Portugal was a pioneer in state-led cooperative development. In 1867, the parliament passed legislation encouraging workers to organize their own collective businesses. In the view of the ruling elite, this would prevent the emergence of a class cleavage between labor and capital, contributing to the stability of the liberal economic and political order. Combining the historical method with John Kingdon’s multiple-streams approach to policy formulation, this article examines the complex array of domestic and external factors that shaped this policy intervention. Additionally, the study explores the impact of the policy on the involved stakeholders. Far from fulfilling the expectations of its promoters, the law on cooperatives seems to have only marginally stimulated the growth of the sector. Moreover, the government’s support to cooperatives seems to have undermined the legitimacy of the model in the eyes of a labor movement that was starting to see its interests as opposed to those of the ruling class.

This article argues that federal labor policy was a factor in causing the Great Compression, the dramatic compression of skill-based wage differentials that occurred in the 1940s, and in bringing it to an end. By giving the National Labor Relations Board the power to determine the appropriate collective-bargaining unit, New Dealers gave industrial unions the means with which to build a more egalitarian wage structure. Unskilled and semiskilled workers seized the opportunity and voted themselves big pay raises. Skilled craftsmen responded by petitioning the NLRB for permission to form their own craft bargaining units, a process known as “craft severance.” As conservatives gained influence in Washington in the 1940s, the board adopted a bargaining-unit policy more favorable to craft unions. By the early 1950s, skilled craftsmen had regained control of their wage demands and thereby helped bring the Great Compression to a halt.

The conflict between the US government and the Mormons in Utah Territory during the second half of the nineteenth century reflected shifts in the American territorial system. Through a repudiation of religious practices and dismantling of the Latter-Day Saints’ Church as an institution, the federal government demonstrated a willingness and ability to interfere with and regulate traditional local issues such as marriage and religion. This provided a foundation for the changes to the territorial system outlined by the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases. Scholars have overlooked the continuities between earlier territorial policy and the post-Insular Cases colonial system. Linking the struggle over authority in Utah Territory with the outcome of the Insular Cases as a component of territorial policy history fills this gap and helps to illuminate the policy connections between continental expansion and overseas expansion.

This article analyses the inherent conflict between public and private interest from a long time-perspective, using the example of Sweden from 1620 to 2000. The main argument is that there have been two equally decisive historical shifts in the political discourse on how to organize public services in the past: First, a shift from an early modern patriarchal discourse to a more expansive articulation of publicness during the nineteenth century. Second, a shift toward privatization and deregulation in the late twentieth century. Both these shifts must be considered to fully explain the changing forms of public organization up to the present day. Theoretically, the concept of “publicness” is used to explain the political discourses on the organization of public services. Drawing on three discursive chains, the argument is that the political development was affected by the politicians’ conception of the political community, the form of organization, and by perceptions of values such as equal access and modernity. Our results demonstrate how and why political arguments for or against private service providers have motivated profound changes in the way public services are perceived of and organized.

American pediatricians are now bearing the brunt of massive increases in demand for treatment of mental illness in children and adolescents, areas in which many pediatricians have not been well trained. It would be logical to encourage policy measures to increase pediatricians’ expertise in this area to improve access to care. But the expanses in demand for services are about much more than increased incidence of biologically-based illnesses. Instead, pediatricians are caught juggling between their traditional focus on health and prevention and a rapid rise in broad socially, culturally, and economically mediated distress among young people and their families. This article explores the historical context of pediatricians’ engagement with mental health and the hazards of the push toward treatment for mental illness. The historical perspective can help us develop policy more directed to broader goals of improving the mental health of our nation’s children and adolescents.

In 1981, around fifty conservative southern Democrats in the House of Representatives, the so-called Boll Weevils, played a crucial role in the enactment of President Ronald Reagan’s economic agenda. The significance of this episode has thus far been underappreciated. This article illustrates the importance of the Boll Weevils’ support to the early success of Reagan’s presidency, as well its implications for both the South’s political landscape and for the national Republican Party.

Though short-lived, this coalition would prove to be a significant rupture in the Democratic Party’s superiority in the South at the congressional level and highlighted the partisan fragmentation the region was undergoing. As this article will demonstrate, the events of 1981 returned southern conservatism to the center of power in Washington for the first time in over a decade and acted as a catalyst for a number of southern Democratic congressmen to move toward the GOP.

This essay examines the origins of physician-patient privilege in the United States. It concentrates an 1828 New York law that protected medical confidentiality in the courtroom—the first statutory guarantee of physician-patient privilege—as well as the rapid spread of privilege statutes throughout the nineteenth century. Using the published notes of the authors of New York’s influential statute alongside other primary sources, I argue that these early statutes are best explained as the result of nineteenth-century efforts to codify American law. The medical profession took little note of physician-patient privilege until much later, indicating that privilege emerged not as a protection of doctors’ professional status, nor as a means of protecting patients in the courtroom, but rather as an inadvertent offshoot of attempts to streamline and simply judicial proceedings. It is perhaps because of these unsystematic origins that physician-patient privilege still remains such an unevenly applied rule in American courtrooms.