On 5 January 1973, one month after his reelection to a second term, Richard Nixon described for Congress a major restructuring of his cabinet and White House staff. Nixon began by emphasizing his determination to “revitalize and streamline the Federal Government in preparation for America's third century,” a reference to his effort of the preceding two years to replace seven domestic executive departments and several agencies with four “superdepartments”: a Department of Natural Resources, a Department of Community Development, a Department of Economic Affairs, and a Department of Human Resources. The failure of Congress to report out of committee any of the four bills Nixon submitted in March 1971 to create these superdepartments was now prompting the president to act unilaterally to “reorder … the timeworn and in many cases obsolete relationships among top staff and line officials” in an effort to realize “the broadening of policy perspectives on the part of top managers and advisers” and improvements in “managerial effectiveness” he had hoped to achieve through comprehensive reorganization of the executive branch.

Policies of freer trade and greater economic openness became a hallmark of U.S. foreign economic policy after World War II. American policymakers came to accept that the improvement of economic conditions abroad correlated directly with prosperity at home. During that period, U.S. support for policies of economic openness assumed the compatibility of economic liberalism and national security.

Given our current preoccupation with conducting a war on drugs, we run the danger of forgetting that, once upon a time, the sale of opium was widely condoned and, in some Asian societies under colonial rule, even monopolized by the state. While this clearly encouraged the widespread use of opium in these societies, some have claimed that it at least served to keep more dangerous and addictive drugs at bay. Within Asia there is no question that the postwar era has seen a dramatic shift away from opium to other addictive drugs, in particular heroin, and that this has coincided with the introduction of anti-opium laws. Are we then justified in concluding that the success of the anti-opium movement in prohibiting opium has served to encourage the spread of heroin?

Taxation is situated at the problematic intersection of two political constants: rulers need resources to govern, and the ruled are not eager to supply them. This dilemma is inherent in political organization and has engaged political leaders from despots to democrats; as a result, no policy area has a history longer than taxation. Despite this lengthy experience, however, an optimal strategy for resource extraction has not emerged. Across diverse countries and through time the essential goal of raising revenue has remained unchanged, but there is considerable disagreement about how to go about it. This poses a classic explanatory task for the student of public policy: the policy issue is a constant, but the policies vary—so what explains the variation? Why have policymakers made different choices at different times and places?

“Heirs of the Wizard” is a rather shallow attempt to dismiss the contributions of Walter E. Williams, Thomas Sowell, and Shelby Steele to issues surrounding race. Clarence E. Walker's misunderstanding of issues discussed by Sowell and Williams is captured by his phrase “practices that raise questions about Williams's faith in the market.” Speaking for myself, and probably Sowell, it is not a faith in the market as much as evidence about the market upon which we rely.