The “exceptional” nature of American politics has been a favorite theme of scholars since Tocqueville. One of the more famous “exceptions” has been the distinctive development of its welfare state. The United States has perennially been portrayed as the laggard among advanced industrial societies. Indeed, it adopted public pension and insurance programs at a later date than most European societies, and its programs cover smaller portions of the population and address fewer social problems.

The Reagan agenda embodied a single broad goal for domestic policy: to redefine the scope of public authority to limit the extent of state intervention in the market. This goal found a concrete expression in attempts to reverse welfare-state policies, restructure the tax system, and lighten the “regulatory burden.” The Reagan revolution was extended to antitrust. A number of top appointees were representatives of the Chicago school, a conservative group of economists and attorneys characterized by a faith in the efficiency-promoting nature of markets and a grave pessimism regarding government intervention in the economy. They rejected the political and social goals of antitrust and argued that the market rather than the state was best suited to determine the most efficient forms of economic organization.

In response to New Deal legislation, veteran reformer Molly Dewson exclaimed: “I cannot believe I have lived to see this day. It's the culmination of what us girls and some of you boys have been working for for so long it's just dazzling.” Historians have subsequently confirmed Dewson's judgment that female New Dealers had been hawking their agenda for a long time before Franklin Roosevelt's administration finally bought it. Indeed, Clarke A. Chambers, Susan Ware, and J. Stanley Lemons have carefully documented the activities of a large contingent of women who inaugurated their battle for public welfare programs during the Progressive Era (1890–1920), continued their fight through the 1920s—a decade that one activist called the “tepid, torpid years”—and stood ready with their programs when the Great Depression renewed the possibility of federal welfare legislation in the 1930s. Now we need an explanation for the continuity of this female commitment to public welfare programs: Why was it that middle-class women played such a prominent part in sustaining the Progressive Era's social welfare agenda into the 1930s.

Students of the exercise of emergency powers in the American governmental system have taken note in recent years of an obviously widening gap between what presidents assert they can do in emergencies and what congressional and court critics of presidents, and many serious scholars, say are the constitutional and statutory limits on executive emergency powers. The perceived widening gap is something new, though Americans seem to have accustomed themselves to it quickly enough. In the shadow of what has come to be called the era of the imperial Presidency, some say that one extreme tendency demands a compensating counterbalancing tendency toward the opposite extreme. Indeed, it is now widely believed that what had been an accelerating quantitative increase in presidential power has largely resulted in a qualitative transformation that threatens the continuance of “free government,” requiring intensified criticism of presidential practice as well as, perhaps, a temporary exercise of emergency powers by other branches of our government to restore the traditional balance of separated powers.