Scholars point out a tension between racial justice and disability rights activism. Although racial minorities are more likely to become disabled than whites, both disability activism and the historiography of disability politics tend to focus on the experience and achievements of whites. This article examines how disability rights activists of the 1970s sought to build a united movement of all people with disabilities and explains why these efforts were unable to overcome cleavages predicated on race. Activists drew from New Left ideas of community and self-help as well as the New Right rhetoric of market freedoms to articulate a vision of liberation for people with disabilities. Though they yearned for racial solidarity, in practice, activists could not overcome institutions that separated antipoverty and racial politics from disability policy, nor could they figure out how to incorporate minority voices in an identity-based movement forged around disability rather than color.

Efforts to modernize public assistance via the Social Security Act of 1935 met significant opposition from states. One manifestation of that resistance was state responsible relative laws in the Old Age Assistance program. Responsible relative laws enforced support by adult children as an eligibility requirement; applicants with children deemed able to provide support were either denied aid, or the grant awarded was reduced. These laws are an example of parent dependency policies that sought to enforce or encourage family members, particularly adult children, to support parents in need. States sought to ensure that all financial resources were exhausted before public funds were spent on OAA. Responsible relative laws were an arena of public assistance that remained under state discretion, and many states used them to control costs and contest federal efforts to modernize relief programs and limit state and local authority.

This article evaluates the policy positions of President James Buchanan through the concept of latent opinion, or politicians worrying less about current public opinion and more about what it will be at the next election. Though Buchanan is often viewed as disconnected from the public’s opinions, the evidence shows that his positions on Kansas statehood and the acquisition of Cuba (or Mexican territory) were shaped by his perceptions of, and concerns over, what future public opinion would be in 1860. Though Buchanan was ultimately unsuccessful on both fronts, this study reveals that he was not simply unresponsive to public opinion, which is the common interpretation. Instead, the president’s policy positions were firmly tied to his views on latent opinion. Thus, the findings add a new dimension to scholarly understandings of James Buchanan’s policy priorities while displaying how latent opinion can be a beneficial construct in policy history.

Recognizing public education as a public good, policymakers have focused on providing those with direct interest in public schools opportunities to influence educational policy making. In the nineteenth century, this often meant providing women the right to vote on and to hold public school offices. Frequently conflated, suffrage and public office holding are actually two different, yet related, citizenship rights. Using state and territorial legislative records as a starting place, this article redefines the understanding of school suffrage by complicating the traditional narrative relative to its relationship with full woman suffrage. In doing so, it also provides evidence that before 1900 women were granted the right to hold public education offices, ultimately being elected in forty-three of forty-eight states before the twentieth century, thus broadening the understanding of women’s political agency prior to attaining full suffrage.

Between the 1930s and early 1960s, U.S. economic policy underwent an important transformation, described by economist Herbert Stein as “The Fiscal Revolution in America.” During those years, policymakers utilized Keynesian ideas to promote prosperity, and the fiscal revolution reached its peak after John F. Kennedy proposed a growth-boosting tax cut despite the unprecedented peacetime consequence of running a deficit in nonrecession conditions. This article explores how that revolution developed during the postwar period. It challenges the argument that the business community shaped and consolidated the fiscal revolution in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Instead, this article shows that liberal economists played a crucial role in fashioning Keynesianism’s postwar consolidation, so much so that the brand of that doctrine implemented in the early 1960s owed much to their efforts and was significantly different to the one championed by the business community.

Public works spending was an integral component of John F. Kennedy’s fiscal policy. Drawing on a wide range of archival evidence from the Kennedy Presidential Library, we show how the administration worked to pass a $2.5 billion infrastructure bill that would give the presidency unilateral authority in determining where and when those funds would be spent. Contrary to recent accounts that emphasize Kennedy’s role in promoting massive tax cuts in 1963–64, the 1962 Public Works Acceleration Act was a key fiscal instrument that Kennedy advocated prior to the administration’s push for tax reform. Moreover, the public works policy was strictly Keynesian—designed as a proactive countercyclical “stabilizer” that would generate budget deficits in order to make up for slack in a recession. Kennedy’s plan faced stiff resistance in Congress and the history of the law offers important lessons for why infrastructure programs are often disregarded as countercyclical instruments.

The victim has become among the most important identity positions in American politics. Victimhood is now a pivotal means by which individuals and groups see themselves and constitute themselves as political actors. Indeed, victimhood seems to have become a status that must be established before political claims can be advanced. Victimhood embodies the assertion that an individual or group has suffered wrongs that must be requited. What seems new is that wounded groups assert a self-righteous claim that they stand for something larger than their particular injury. The article explores how and why victimhood has become such a powerful theme in American politics. It suggests that victimhood as politics emerged from the contentious politics of the 1960s, specifically the civil rights movement and its aftermath. Key factors include the reaction to the minority rights and women’s movements, as well as internal dynamics within the rights movements.