The presidency is now thought of as a representative institution. I argue that the idea of presidential representation, the claim that presidents represent the whole nation, influenced the political development of the institutional presidency. Specifically, I show that the idea was the assumption behind creating a national budget system in the United States. While the challenge of World War I debt prompted Congress to pass the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the law’s design owes much to reformers’ arguments that the president lacked institutional tools to fulfill his representative role. Congress institutionalized presidential representation in budgeting by including two key components: a formal license for presidential agenda setting in the budget process and an enhanced executive organizational capacity with the Bureau of the Budget. However, the law also revealed the problems raised by attempting to provide the “proper organs” for presidential representation, which push against the written constitutional frame.

Histories of American economic policymaking after World War II often describe a “Fiscal Revolution,” in which Keynesian macroeconomic tools replaced the microeconomic regulations and reforms of the New Deal. This article challenges that narrative by demonstrating how the Keynesian economists responsible for the Fiscal Revolution relied upon incomes policies to ensure that inflation would not sabotage efforts to achieve full employment. In the 1960s, the White House Council of Economic Advisers pressed the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to enforce “wage-price guideposts” in order to realize the potential of the Fiscal Revolution. Yet incomes policies also encouraged policymakers to deflect responsibility for inflation onto the private sector’s behavior as an alternative to adopting the painful but necessary fiscal and monetary restraint. As a reliance on the microeconomic control of inflation persisted into the late 1970s, this approach ultimately undercut the Keynesians’ macroeconomic promises and prolonged the misery of stagflation.

The campaign to pass the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act has been misunderstood by many historians. Rather than a failed attempt to resuscitate New Deal Keynesianism by an exhausted Democratic Party, it represented a radical effort to reconfigure the political economy of the United States by embracing national planning ideas that were enjoying a revival in response to the economic crisis of the 1970s. The fact that this bill proved politically viable challenges historians’ assumptions that this decade saw the American people turn away from “big government” and toward pro-market solutions for social and economic problems. This episode also forces us to reassess our understanding of the Democratic Party in this decade. It suggests that historians have erred in drawing a sharp distinction between the party’s “New Deal” and “New Politics” factions and that the policy goals of those factions dovetailed more often than has been appreciated.

The tension between democratic institutions and the project to integrate international markets for trade and investment has been an enduring feature of the contemporary era of globalization. This article analyzes how officials in the executive branch navigated this tension in the making of inward foreign direct investment policy during the 1970s. Based on recently declassified archival sources, it traces how top officials in the Ford administration decided to establish a new interagency committee in order to appear responsive to congressional pressure and still leave its “open door” investment policy intact. Yet this measure only marked the first step in resolving their political dilemma. Lower-level functionaries then had to manage the problem of how to give the new committee the appearance of strength while also maximizing its discretion to be weak. Overall, this article contributes the first comprehensive account of both phases of the policy-making process using new archival evidence.

This article reconsiders the history of the Community Action Program (CAP). I argue that the CAP is best understood as a bold attempt at administrative experimentation and reform. Using original archival materials, I show that policymakers involved the CAP’s design outlined three models of community action: coordination, collaboration, and mobilization, which communities drew upon when implementing the program. Drawing upon an original dataset of ninety-eight community action agencies (CAAs), this article provides a synthetic assessment of the CAP’s implementation. I show that while the 1967 Green Amendment curtailed the CAP’s experimental and participatory ethos, most CAAs operated relatively harmoniously with local governments and social welfare groups to fight poverty. By looking beyond the dramatic clashes between CAAs and local governments and focusing on the multiple ways in which CAAs seized upon the CAP’s experimental nature, this article provides a more balanced and comprehensive assessment of the CAP’s historical legacy.