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Political Learning and Economic Policy Innovation: The United States and Sweden in the Post–World War II Era

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Gary Mucciaroni
Gary Mucciaroni
Affiliation:
New York University
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Extract

The Great Depression, World War II, and Keynesian Revolution all contributed to a transformation in the role of the state in the economy. By the postwar period, it had become politically imperative, as well as intellectually sanctioned, for the state to assume responsibility for addressing unemployment. Certain Western governments were willing and able to go to great lengths to ameliorate joblessness, and in some cases prevent it, while others seemed capable or inclined to go less far. As anyone who studies unemployment in a comparative context knows, Sweden and the United States present a vivid contrast in how seriously governments undertook this responsibility and to what degree they were willing to extend the control of the state in the market conomy. It is precisely because these two nations stand at virtually opposite poles in the commitment to eliminating unemployment and in implementing policies toward that end that many scholars have sought to compare them. Compared to the United States, Sweden's policy objectives have been much more ambitious, its policy instruments more diverse and capable of intervening more extensively in the labor market, and its budgets for training, relocation, and job-creation schemes substantially larger. In short, in Sweden we find the government doing more, and in the United States we find it doing less.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Policy History , Volume 1 , Issue 4 , October 1989 , pp. 391 - 418
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. 1989

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References

Notes

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