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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2011
It is axiomatic that historians perform research that focuses upon past occurrences. However, research into public policy occasionally requires that historians deal with issues relating to events that have never taken place. A good example of this historical anomaly is nuclear energy policy.
1. Public Law 85–256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42 U.S.C. sec. 2210.
2. The best writings on Price-Anderson include Green, Harold P., “Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability and Indemnity,” Michigan Law Review 71 (January 1973): 479–510CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meek, Daniel W., “Nuclear Power and the Price-Anderson Act: Promotion over Public Protection,” Stanford Law Review 30 (January 1978): 393–468CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mazuzan, George T. and Walker, J. Samuel, Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946–1962 (Berkeley, 1985)Google Scholar; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Price-Anderson Act—The Third Decade (Washington, D.C., 1983)Google Scholar. See also Johnson, John W., Insuring Against Disaster: The Nuclear Industry on Trial (Macon, Ga., 1986).Google Scholar
3. Public Law 83–703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. sees. 2061 et seq.
4. This term was used regularly in the 1950s to describe a serious nuclear accident. Miscellaneous correspondence, Papers of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, National Archives, Washington, D.C, Record Group 128. See also “Insurance Asked on Atomic Power,” New York Times, 16 May 1956, 5.
5. Cole, W. Sterling, “Atomic Power and Private Industry,” Public Utilities Fortnightly 53 (10 June 1954):710.Google Scholar
6. Testimony of McCune, Francis, Hearings on S. 3323 and H.R. 8862: To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C, 1954), 334–35.Google Scholar
7. The $500 million indemnity figure was proposed by James Ramey, the Joint Committee's Executive Director. According to Ramey, the ceiling he proposed was a “normal, common sense … cut it down the middle” compromise between the nuclear industry voices calling for unlimited indemnity and voices in Congress calling for no governmental program of indemnity. James T. Ramey, personal interview, 20 January 1983; and Mazuzan and Walker, Controlling the Atom, 107–8.
8. In the 1975 amendments to the Price-Anderson Act, the “no recourse” feature of the law was discarded. New language promised that, should an accident take place causing damages above the legislative ceiling, Congress would “thoroughly review the particular incident and take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of a disaster of such magnitude.” Public Law 94–197, 89 Stat. 1111 (1975), sec. 6, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2210(e) (1976). How much faith should be placed in a promise of such a legislative study was a subject of contention until the 1988 amendments to the Price-Anderson Act discarded the congressional-review feature and replaced it with the promise that a presidential commission would be created to recommend appropriate action if liability from a nuclear accident appeared to be greater than the legislative ceiling. Public Law 100–408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988), 42 U.S.C. 2011, sec. 9.
9. One of the principal reasons for the channeling feature was to insulate from liability small companies with limited assets who sold components or services needed by nuclear power plant owners. Price-Anderson is occasionally criticized because it shields from liability not just the small suppliers but also the giant corportions with very “deep pockets,” such as Westinghouse and General Electric. Testimony of Nader, Ralph, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on H. R. 8631: To Amend and Extend the Price-Anderson Act, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., 1975), 153Google Scholar [hereafter cited as 1975 Liability Hearings].
10. Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Governmental Indemnity for Private Licensees and Atomic Energy Commission Contractors against Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C., 1956) [hereafter cited as 1956 Indemnity Hearings].
11. The dissenter in 1956 was Chet Holifield, a Democratic Representative from California. Basically, Holifield objected to the law as an uneconomic subsidy of the nuclear industry. See “Separate Views of Representative Holifield,” attached to H.R. Rep. No. 2531, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956). In the 1960s, as chairman of the Joint Committee, Holifield switched his position and became a defender of the Price-Anderson Act. Apparently he was persuaded that the nuclear industry had acted responsibly between 1957 and 1965 and that atomic energy did not realize an unfair competitive advantage from the law. Congressional Record-House 111 (16 September 1965): 24035–37.
12. In the mid-1950s fears of an “energy crisis” were not yet common in the United States. However, the problems the British and French faced in maintaining their supplies of fossil fuels with the closing of the Suez Canal in 1956 made an impression on several American policymakers who did not want to be increasingly dependent upon sources of energy that could be disrupted by events beyond the control of American industry or government.
13. 1956 Indemnity Hearings, passim. Speech of Senator Clinton P. Anderson, quoted in Congressional Record-Senate 102 (25 May 1956): 8990–91.
14. This law was known as the Civilian Atomic Power Acceleration Program Bill. S. 4146, 48th Cong., 2dsess. (1956).
15. Ramey interview; Green, Harold P. and Rosenthal, Alan, Government of the Atom: The Integration of Powers (New York, 1963), 152n.Google Scholar
16. The complete citation is U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants (Washington, D.C, 1957)Google Scholar [hereafter cited as WASH-740]. See Mazuzan and Walker, Controlling the Atom, 199–213.
17. WASH-740, viii, 7, 10.
18. Ibid., 2.
19. Ibid., 6.
20. Testimony of McCune, Francis, Hearings on Government Indemnity and Reactor Safety before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C, 1957), 148Google Scholar [hereafter cited as 1957 Indemnity Hearings].
21. Mazuzan and Walker, Controlling the Atom, 208.
22. Ibid. See, for example, testimony and materials provided by Kenneth E. Black, 130–40; by Charles J. Haugh, 81–122; by Francis McCune, 144–61; and by Hubert W. Yount, 122–30.
23. H.R. Rep. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st sess. (1957); and S. Rep. No. 296, 85 Congress, 1st sess. (1957). Congressman Chet Holifield again dissented. H.R. Rep. No. 435, 35–40.
24. Congressional Record-House 103 (1 July 1957): 10725.
25. Congressional Record-Senate 103 (16 August 1957): 15057–59.
26. Congressional Record-House 103 (2 September 1957): 16783.
27. See, for example, Murphy, Arthur W., “The Problems of Protection against Atomic Hazards,” Insurance Law Journal (September 1958): 583–622Google Scholar; Kelly, Ambrose B., “Insurance against Nuclear Hazards,” Insurance Law Journal (December 1958): 777–91Google Scholar; and idem, “Insurance against Nuclear Hazards in the United States,” Insurance Lau Journal (August 1966): 457–64.
28. 1956 Indemnity Hearings, passim; and 1957 Indemnity Hearings, passim. See also Mazuzan, George T., “Conflict of Interest: Promoting and Regulating the Infant Nuclear Power Industry, 1954–56,” The Historian 44 (November 1982): 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
29. Public Law 85–256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), sec. 4, superseded.
30. Hearings before the joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Proposed Extension of AEC Indemnity Legislation, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., 1965)Google Scholar [hereafter cited as 1965 Indemnity Hearings]. Even if Congress had allowed Price-Anderson to expire in 1967, those utilities licensed to operate nuclear power plants between 1954 and 1967 would have continued to benefit from the limitation of liability and indemnity features of the law as long as they continued as nuclear licensees. Extension of the law would, however, allow nuclear power plants licensed after 1967 to be included under Price-Anderson protection.
31. I explored the battle between the coal and atomic power interests in a recent paper, “The ‘Coal Boys’ Attempt to Split the Atomic Power Lobby: A Tale of Two Technologies and Government Policy in the 1960s,” presented at the joint meeting of the Society for the History of Technology and the History of Science Society in Raleigh, North Carolina, 30 October 1987.
32. The bill became law with President Johnson's signature on 29 September 1965. Public Law 89–210, 79 Stat. 855 (1965), 42 U.S.C. sec. 2210(e).
33. “Chronology of 1964–1965 WASH—740 Re-examination,” unpublished papers on the WASH-740 reexamination, n.d., 1, located in the Public Document Room of the NRC, Washington, D.C. [hereafter cited as WASH-740 “Update Papers”].
34. WASH-740 “Update Papers,” passim. All the AEC officially told the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy about the conclusions of the aborted study was that “the theoretically calculated damages [from a serious nuclear accident] would not be less and under some circumstances would be substantially more than the consequences reported in the earlier study.” Glenn Seaborg [Chairman, AEC] to Chet Holifield [Chairman, JCAE], 18 June 1965, 1, WASH-740 “Update Papers.”
35. Myron M. Cherry to Secretary, AEC, 18 April 1973; Ann Roosevelt to Dixie [sic] Lee Ray, 19 April 1973; WASH-740 “Update Papers.” AEC Press Release #R-252, “AEC Releases Final Draft of Reactor Safety Study Report and Working Papers on 1965 Accident Study,” 25 June 1973, Public Document Room of the NRC. The AEC's effort to keep the 1964–65 nuclear safety study secret is discussed in David Pesonen, “The Ticklish Statistics,” The Nation, 18 October 1965, 242–45; and Daniel Ford, The Cult of the Atom: The Secret Papers of the Atomic Energy Commission (New York, 1982), 67–82.Google Scholar
36. R. L. Doan (Division of Reactor Licensing, AEC), cited in “Minutes of Steering Committee on Revision of WASH-740, October 21, 1964,” 18, WASH-740 “Update Papers.” I am currently at work on an account of this controversy in an essay titled “Shrouding the ‘Ticklish Statistics’: Public Relations, Safety, and U.S. Nuclear Energy Policy in the 1960s.”
37. Ramey interview; Speech of James Ramey to the Atomic Industrial Forum, reprinted in Congressional Record-House 116 (15 June 1970): 19793.
38. The Senate approved the extension bill by voice vote, preceded by no debate whatsoever. Congressional Record—Senate 111 (31 August 1965): 22281. The House of Representatives voted 337 to 30 in favor of extending the statute. Congressional Record-House 111 (16 September 1965): 24049.
39. Public Law 89–645, 80 Stat. 891 (1966), sec. 3, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2210(n). The concept of waiving defenses was proposed most prominently by David F. Cavers, a professor at the Harvard Law School. See Cavers, , “Improving Financial Protection of the Public against the hazards of Nuclear Power,” Harvard Law Review 77 (February 1964): 644–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cavers was the penultimate witness at the 1965 hearings of the Joint Committee. Testimony of David F. Cavers, 1965 Indemnity Hearings, 211–23. Because the issue he raised regarding the need to legislate a waiver of defenses was deemed so important, the Joint Committee held an entire set of hearings on this issue the following year: Hearings on Proposed Amendments to Price-Anderson Act Relating to Waiver of Defenses before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C., 1966).Google Scholar
40. Hertsgaard, Mark, Nuclear Inc.: The Men and Money behind Nuclear Energy (New York, 1983), 288.Google Scholar
41. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Price-Anderson Act—The Third Decade, 1–3.
42. Hertsgaard, Nuclear Inc., 282–87, and passim.
43. See, for example, Hearings before the joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Possible Modification or Extension of the Price-Anderson Insurance and Indemnity Act, 93d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C., 1974)Google Scholar: testimony of Harold P. Green at 86–93; statement of Herbert S. Denenberg at 212–17; and testimony of Gerald R. Hartman at 576–84.
44. Testimony of Ralph Nader, 1975 Liability Hearings, 149–96.
45. Public Law 94–197, 89 Stat. 1111 (1975), sees. 3 and 6, 42 U.S.C. sees. 2210(b) and 2210(e). It was not until 1982, however, that enough reactors were on line so as to extinguish the federal government's indemnity. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Price-Anderson Act—The Third Decade, 1–3.
46. The official title of the Rasmussen Report is U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study (Washington, D.C, 1975)Google Scholar. The probabilistic estimate is cited at “Executive Summary,” 9.
47. WASH-740, 6.
48. “Reactor Safety Study Log,” located in the NRC's Public Document Room, Washington, D.C.
49. Noted in Daniel W. Meek, “Nuclear Power and the Price-Anderson Act,” 435n.
50. Testimony of Norman C. Rasmussen, 1974 Liability Hearings, 638–54.
51. See, for example, the testimony of John W. Simpson, 1975 Liability Hearings, 97; testimony of Hubert H. Nexon, 1974 Liability Hearings, 109; testimony of William F. Allen, Jr., 1975 Liability Hearings, 205.
52. By the end of 1974, both houses of Congress had passed similar bills to extend the Price-Anderson Act. However, Congress had reserved the right to revoke the extension of the law if the final version of the Rasmussen Report, due in 1975, found the chances of a major nuclear accident to be excessively high. President Ford refused to sign a bill with such a “condition precedent,” so hearings were held on nearly identical extension bills in the next session. Both houses supported these bills overwhelmingly after the final version of the Rasmussen Report was received and declared satisfactory. President Ford made good on his promise to sign a definitive bill on the final day of 1975. See Johnson, Insuring Against Disaster, 76–77.
53. The complete citation of the case is Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., et al.; and United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., et al., 438 U.S. 59 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1978).
54. See “Justices Uphold Limit to Liability of Atomic Plants,” Wall Street Journal, 27 June 1978, 4; and Morton Mintz, “Liability Ceiling Upheld for Nuclear Accidents,” Washington Post, 27 June 1978, A4.
55. I have described this litigation at length elsewhere. See Johnson, Insuring Against Disaster.
56. The official government position was that radioactive emissions from the damaged reactor registered above normal but were below dangerous levels. Federal Register 45 (23 April 1980): 27593.Google Scholar
57. See Gray, Mike and Rosen, Ira, The Warning: Accident at Three Mile Island (New York, 1982).Google Scholar
58. The total compensated losses from the Three Mile Island accident were about $28 million. Most of the claims were resolved by an out-of-court settlement of a class-action suit. However, four years after the accident and two years after the settlement, only about $2.3 million had been distributed to those suffering losses. The lawyers who arranged the settlement, however, had received more than $2.5 million. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Price-Anderson Act: The Third Decade, 1–6, 1–7. See also William J. Broad, “Living near T.M.I. Plant, and Waiting,” New York Times, 27 March 1983, 20E.
59. Quoted in Hertsgaard, Nuclear Inc., 196–97.
60. Tugwell, Franklin, The Energy Crisis and the American Political Economy: Politics and Markets in the Management of Natural Resources (Stanford, 1988), 265nGoogle Scholar. See also “Pulling the Nuclear Plug,” Time, 13 February 1984, 41.
61. Washington Post, 28 April 1979, A17.
62. A recent book probes the issue of bearing the costs of abandoned reactors. See Tomain, Joseph P., Nuclear Power Transformation (Bloomington, 1987).Google Scholar
63. Hertsgaard, Nuclear Inc., 288. On the financial problems of the nuclear industry, see James Cook, “Nuclear Follies,” Forbes, 11 February 1985, cover, 82–100; “Pulling the Nuclear Plug,” Time, 13 February 1984, 34–45; and David Burnham, “Inactive Reactors: One Year's Toll of Three Mile Island,” New York Times, 16 March 1980, sec. 3, 1, 9.
64. Chris Weston, “Duke Must Reconsider Nuke Power Commitment,” Greenville [South Carolina] News, 26 April 1984, 11D. William S. Lee, personal interview, 21 July 1982.
65. On the Committee for Energy Awareness, see Hertsgaard, Nuclear Inc., 6–7, 187–91, 194, 199, 202–5, 208; “Utilities Unveil Plans to Plug Nuclear Power,” Greenville News, 19 January 1983, 3A; and Howard Kurtz, “Promoters of Nuclear Power Throw Switch on PR Blitz,” Washington Post, 20 March 1983, A17.
66. Hertsgaard, Nuclear Inc., 197–202.
67. Hertsgaard, Nuclear Inc., 288.
68. Tugwell, The Energy Crisis and the American Political Economy, 81–82.
69. The first major set of hearings on Price-Anderson in the 1980s was conducted by the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, chaired by Congressman Morris K. Udall of Arizona. It first met on this issue on 11 June 1984.
70. Besides Congressman Udall's Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, other committees and subcommittees holding hearings on Price-Anderson in the 1980s included the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee; the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee; the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee; and the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
71. Public Law 100–408, 1023 Star. 1066 (1988).
72. Ibid. The act was originally introduced by Morris Udall in the first session of the 100th Congress on 4 March 1987 as H.R. 1414. After being reported out favorably by two House committees, it was approved by the entire House on 30 July 1987. Selected provisions of the act expired on 1 August 1987 before the Senate had a chance to act on the House bill. After support from Senate committees in the second session of the 100th Congress, on 18 March 1988 the Senate passed S. 748, a companion bill to H.R. 1414. Rather than appointing a formal conference committee, the bills’ managers negotiated informally to resolve differences in the two bills. A compromise bill was hammered out and cleared both houses in early August 1988.
73. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was dissolved in 1977 by Public Law 95–110, 91 Stat. 884 (1977), 42 U.S.C. sec. 2258.
74. On the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, see generally Green and Rosenthal, Government of the Atom.
75. Morris Udall's House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment became the principal locus in the 1980s of members of Congress most willing to cast critical glances at the nuclear industry.
76. This was accomplished by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Public Law 93–438, 88 Stat. 1233(1974).
77. Two NRC commissioners most critical of the nuclear industry in the mid-1980s were James K. Asselstine and Victor Gilinsky. See, for example, the statement of Asselstine in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act of 1954, 98th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C. 1984), 4122–27.Google Scholar
78. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Price-Anderson Act—The Third Decade, IV-8.
79. Benjamin, Milton R., “Proposal Would Ease Utilities’ Liability Limit in A-Plant Accidents,” Washington Post, 18 December 1983, A15.Google Scholar
80. Cited in Martz, Larry, “The Nuclear Bargain,” Newsweek, 12 May 1986, 44.Google Scholar
81. “Congress Postpones Action on Nuclear Policy,” Greenville News, 23 October 1986, 10A; Davis, Joseph A., “Disaster Raises New Questions About Fate of Nuclear Energy,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 44 (3 May 1986): 964–66.Google Scholar
82. “Negligence Blamed for Chernobyl Disaster,” Greenville News, 20 July 1986, 3A.
83. It should be borne in mind that the containment structure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station that proved deficient in the April 1986 accident is unlike the containment structure for any American commercial plant. However, it is similar to that of DOE licensed nuclear weapons reactors at the Savannah River Plant in South Carolina and the Hanford Plant in Washington state. Both facilities have been in the news recently because of safety problems. See Davis, “Disaster Raises New Questions About Fate of Nuclear Energy,” 965–66. The subject of the regulatory environment of DOE-licensed weapons facilities is an important one that deserves greater attention from public-policy scholars.
84. Public Law 100–408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988), 42 U.S.C. 2011, sec. 2.
85. Cited in Davis, Joseph A., “Fate of Nuclear Power Tied to Liability Law,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 44 (25 January 1986): 155.Google Scholar