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Managers United for Corporate Rivalry: A History of Managerial Collective Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Allen Kaufman ,
L. S. Zacharias  and
Alfred Marcus
Allen Kaufman
Affiliation:
University of New Hampshire University of Massachusetts, Amherst University of Minnesota
L. S. Zacharias
Affiliation:
University of New Hampshire University of Massachusetts, Amherst University of Minnesota
Alfred Marcus
Affiliation:
University of New Hampshire University of Massachusetts, Amherst University of Minnesota
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Extract

Students of American corporate political behavior have long asked whether or not the corporate sector acts collectively to influence the public policy process. Corporate concentration of wealth in the late nineteenth century first suggested particular business interests enjoyed a privileged political position. After World War II American pluralists, while conceding that economic concentration posed a threat to democracy, noted that economic concentration could not be translated into political privilege without a high degree of corporate political unity. In this respect, they reasoned that big business was unlikely to engage in collective action because of the divisive nature of economic competition. For a long while, this optimism about the market's policing powers assuaged most fears of corporate political domination, even though several scholars offered contrary evidence. The recent corporate political mobilization, however, has renewed the debate on corporate political unity.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Policy History , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , January 1990 , pp. 56 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. 1990

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References

Notes

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132. Committee for Economic Development, Redefining Government's Role, 13–14, 29–31, 41–44.

133. Committee for Economic Development, Redefining Government's Role, 86–90 and chaps. 6 and 7.

134. Committee for Economic Development, Redefining Government's Role, 18–19.

135. Neal, Business Power and Public Policy, 69–76.

136. Committee for Economic Development, Productivity Policy, 54–57; and Committee for Economic Development, Strategy for U.S. Industrial Competitiveness, 36–37.

137. Committee for Economic Development, Fighting Inflation and Promoting Growth, 57–59; Redefining Government's Role, 56–78; and Productivity Policy, 65–68.

138. Committee for Economic Development, Achieving Energy Independence; Key Elements of a National Energy Strategy: A Statement on National Policy (Washington, D.C., 1977)Google Scholar; and Helping Ensure Our Energy Future: A Program for Developing Synthetic Fuel Plants Now (Washington, D.C., 1979).Google Scholar

139. For example, see Useem, The Inner Circle, chap. 4; Edsall, Thomas Byrne, The New Politics of Inequality: How Political Power Shapes Economic Policy (New York, 1984)Google Scholar, chap. 3, and McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power, chap. 4.

140. Edsall, The New Politics, 120–23; and McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power, 289–96.

141. Sar Levitan, A. and Cooper, Martha R., Business Lobbies: The Public Good and the Bottom Line (Baltimore, 1984), chaps. 2 and 3.Google Scholar

142. Kirkland, Richard I., “Fat Days for the Chamber of Commerce,” Fortune, 21 September 1981, 144–58.Google Scholar

143. Committee for Economic Development, Strategy for U.S. Industrial Competitiveness, 9–18; and Business Roundtable, “Analysis of the Issues,” 12–28.

144. Neal, Business Power and Public Policy, 26–35; and Committee for Economic Development, Redefining Government's Role in the Market System, 29–39.

145. For an introduction to public affairs management, see Marcus et al., Business Strategy and Public Policy.

146. See note 125.

147. Scholzman, Kay Lehman and Tierney, John T. describe the declining importance of the trade association for the business community in Washington in Organized Interests and American Democracy (New York, 1986), 81–82.Google ScholarMiles, Robert H. describes the formation of the public affairs office in the tobacco industry in his Coffin Nails and Corporate Strategies (Englewood Cliffs, 1982)Google Scholar and offers a general theory in Managing the Corporate Social Environment: A Grounded Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 1987). Other studies that explore the interactions between the firm and trade association are John F. Mahon and James E. Post, “The Evolution of Political Strategies During the 1980 Superfund Debate,” in Marcus et al., Business Strategy and Public Policy, 61–80; Derthick, Martha and Quirk, Paul J., The Politics of Deregulation (Washington, D.C., 1985), 157–59Google Scholar; and Kaufman, Allen, “Synthetic Fuels and Public Policy: Challenges for Business Solidarity,” in Lee Preston, ed., Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy (Greenwich, 1984), 187–212.Google Scholar

148. Stephen E. Littlejohn, “Competition and Cooperation: New Trends in Issue Identification and Management at Monsanto and Gulf,” in Marcus et al., Business Strategy and Public Policy, 19–30, discusses the strategic criteria that inform corporate political coalition building. Joseph L. Bower extends the argument by providing examples of corporate/public-interest group coalitions—which Bower calls forums—that have helped shape public policy; see his The Two Faces of Management: An American Approach to Leadership in Business and Management (Boston, 1983), chap. 9. Lodge, George C. provides a similar analysis in The American Disease (New York, 1984), 147–69Google Scholar, even if he argues for a more coherent industrial policy than the corporate sector has yet been willing to endorse.

149. Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality, 138–40.

150. Kaufman et al., “Corporate Factionalism and Corporate Solidarity.” For an assessment of the conservative shift that occurred in 1980, see Burnham, Walter Dean, “Into the 1980s with Ronald Reagan,” in Burnham, Walter Dean, The Current Crisis in American Politics (New York, 1982), 268–320Google Scholar; Sundquist, James L. and Scammon, Richard M., “The 1980 Election: Profile and Historical Perspective,” in Sandoz, Ellis and Crabb, Cecil V. Jr, eds., A Tide of Discontent: The 1980 Elections and Their Meaning (Washington, D.C., 1981), 32–33Google Scholar; Edsall, Thomas Byrne, “The Changing Shape of Power: A Realignment in Public Policy,” in Fraser, Steve and Gerstle, Gary, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980 (Princeton, 1989), 269–93Google Scholar; Hibbs, The American Political Economy, 191–208; and Stein, Presidential Economics, chap. 9.

151. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation, 356–57.

152. See, for example, Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality; Levitan, Business Lobbies, 3–8; Useem, The Inner Circle; and Ferguson, Thomas and Rogers, Joel, “The Reagan Victory: Corporate Coalitions in the 1980 Campaign,” in Rogers, Joel and Ferguson, Thomas, eds., The Hidden Election: Politics and Economics in the 1980 Presidential Campaign (New York, 1981)Google Scholar; and Clawson et al., “The Logic of Business Unity.”

153. Derthick, The Politics of Deregulation; Mahon and Post, Business Strategy and Public Policy; and Marcus, Alfred and Kaufman, Allen, “Why It Is Difficult to Implement Industrial Policies: Lessons from the Synfuels Experience,” California Management Review 28 (1986), 98–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

154. Maitland, Ian, “Self-Defeating Lobbying: How More Is Buying Less in Washington,” The Journal of Business Strategy 7 (1986), 67–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ian Maitland, “Collective Versus Individual Lobbying: How Business Ends Up the Loser,” in Marcus et al., Business Strategy and Public Policy, 95–104; and Eismeier and Pollock, III, “The Retreat from Partisanship.”