Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-30T15:05:09.401Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Corporate Influence and World War II: Resolving the New Deal Political Stalemate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Brian Waddell
Brian Waddell
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Since many scholars focus on the New Deal as the foundation for modern U.S. governance, it is widely assumed that the United States is characterized by a weak state as compared to the welfare states of Western Europe. Yet, in the wake of World War II, the United States established a national security “warfare state” that rivaled the welfare states of Western Europe in scope of authority and operations and in its isolation from popular forces. The wartime redirection of U.S. state power also resolved the political stalemate stemming from the executive-congressional and business-government tensions roused during the New Deal. In fact, the course of wartime statebuilding was in many ways a response to the political tensions of the New Deal and to the expectation that the organization of wartime mobilization would indelibly define the postwar organization of U.S. state power. As this article argues, wartime mobilization resolved the New Deal political stalemate in large part by granting various segments of the corporate community the opportunity to influence the shape of U.S. national state power.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Policy History , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , July 1999 , pp. 223 - 256
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1. Besides the debate to be reviewed below, see, for example, Amenta, Edwin and Skocpol, Theda, “Redefining the New Deal: World War II and The Development of Social Provision in the United States,” in Weir, Margaret et al., eds., The Politics of Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, N.J., 1988)Google Scholar ; Hooks, Gregory, Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War ll's Battle of the Potomac (Urbana, Ill., 1991)Google Scholar ; and Sparrow, Bartholomew, From the Outside In: World War 11 and the American State (Princeton, N.J., 1996).Google Scholar Even Plotke, David, who expresses concern about the formalism or structuralism of the “new institutionalism,” nonetheless studies the 1930s and 1940s to distill the autonomous political dynamics that governed political change. Building A Democratic Political Order (New York, 1996)Google Scholar.

2. Brown, Michael K., “State Capacity and Political Choice: Interpreting the Failure of the Third New Deal”Google Scholar ; Katznelson, Ira and Pietrykowski, Bruce, “On Categories and Configurations: Further Remarks on Rebuilding the American State”Google Scholar ; and Brown, Michael K., “On Evidence and Interpretation: Reply to Katznelson and Pietrykowski,” Studies in American Political Development 9 (1995): 187–228Google Scholar.

3. The subject of their debate is an earlier piece in which Katznelson and Pietrykowski employed Stephen Skowronek's analysis of Progressive Era state-building for an analysis of the 1940s. Katznelson, Ira and Pietrykowski, Bruce, “Rebuilding the American State: Evidence From the 1940s,” Studies in American Political Development 5 (Fall 1991)Google Scholar.

4. , Katznelson and , Pietrykowski do admit that what they describe as the ascendancy of a fiscalist state was tenable only “in tandem with the national security state—a developmental instrument par excellence—to which neither we nor Brown properly attend.” “On Categories and Configurations,” 218.Google Scholar

5. , Katznelson and , Pietrykowski, “Rebuilding the American State,” particularly 305, 310, 336-39.Google Scholar

6. Ibid., 302.

7. Skowronek, Stephen, Building the New American State (New York, 1982), 290.Google Scholar See , Katznelson and , Pietrykowski, “Rebuilding the American State,” 199, 338–39Google Scholar.

8. As Katznelson has noted elsewhere, “The metaphor of state strength requires specification of the othet (the economy and the various institutions and networks within civil society) against which the state may either strong or weak.” “The State to the Rescue? Political Science and History Reconnect,” Social Research 59 (1992): 736.Google Scholar, Katznelson and , Pietrykowski together remark that “Skowronek's treatment of the last halfcentury is too opaque about the content of the ‘environment’ of the state.” “Rebuilding the American State,” 337Google Scholar.

9. , Katznelson and , Pietrykowski, “Rebuilding the American State,” 338.Google Scholar

10. Ibid., 301. This criticism applies as well to other state-centered analyses, including Sparrow's recent study of World War II state-building, From the Outside In. While Sparrow understands that state officials may be vulnerable to resources needed by the state but held by class forces, he does not consider the possibility that class forces may thereby be in a position to influence the direction of state-building. In addition, the related tensions of the state and class forces are conceptualized only in terms of organizational struggles for resources. See , Sparrow, From the Outside In, especially 26–27Google Scholar.

11. “The State to the Rescue?” 732.

12. , Katznelson and , Pietrykowski, “Rebuilding the American State,” 302.Google Scholar

13. Katznelson in fact has explicitly recognized the potential problem of treating the state in isolation from nonstate variables in “Re-thinking the Silences of Social and Economic Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 101 (1986).Google Scholar For an articulation of the theoretical issues involved in analyzing the relation of class interests and state structure, see Valocchi, Steve, “The Capitalist State and the Origins of National Welfare Policy in Nineteenth-Century Germany,” Critical Sociology 17 (1990)Google Scholar.

14. , Brown, “State Capacity,” 190, 205–6.Google Scholar

15. Ibid., 203-6.

16. Ibid., 208, 227.

17. , Brown, “State Capacity,” 207.Google Scholar Brown cites Lindblom and Block as neo-Marxists who conceive of the state as having no autonomy. On the one hand, John Manley has argued persuasively that Lindblom resides within the Pluralist camp in “Neo-Pluralismi A Class Analysis of Pluralist I and Pluralist II,” American Political Science Review 77 (1983): 368–83.Google Scholar And, on the other, Block has been cited favorably by Theda Skocpol as having taken state autonomy seriously. See “Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal,” Politics & Society 10 (1980): 155–201.Google Scholar A larger point here is that neo-Marxist insights are complex and nuanced despite the facile caricature relied upon by many critics, a point made by Barrow, Clyde in his Critical Theories of the State (Madison, Wis., 1993)Google Scholar.

18. , Brown, “State Capacity,” 208.Google Scholar Note the similarity to Nicos Poulantzas: “Through its expansion, the State does not become more powerful, but… more dependent, with regard to the economy; for such expansion corresponds to a development whereby the totality of socio-economic fields is subordinated to the capital accumulation process.” State, Poicer, Socialism (London, 1978), 169Google Scholar.

19. See O'Connor, James, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York, 1974).Google Scholar

20. Brown argues for “the centrality of fiscal capacity to state development,” but most of his analysis is directed to the development of welfare policy and not to state development per se. (Quote, “State Capacity,” 206.)

21. See Block, Fred, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State,” in Revising State Theory (Philadelphia, 1987)Google Scholar ; Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolution (New York, 1979)Google Scholar.

22. See, for instance, Sparrow, From the Outside In.

23. See especially , Katznelson and , Pietrykowski, “On Categories and Configurations,” 215.Google Scholar

24. , Skowronek, Building, especially 12-13, and 285.Google Scholar

25. Ibid., 13.

26. As E. E. Schattschneider has observed, expansions of public authority “socialize” a great variety of social and class conflicts, and so “modify private power relations.” ( The Semi-Sovereign People [Illinois, 1975], 40Google Scholar , his emphasis.) Theda Skocpol adds that “directly or indirectly, the structures and activities of states profoundly condition… class capacities.” “Bringing the State Back In,” in Evans, Peter et al., eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York, 1985), 25Google Scholar.

27. Vogel, David, “Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives,” British Journal of Political Science 8 (1978): esp. 50.Google Scholar

28. Skowronek discounts the role of class forces by arguing that “to concentrate on the external forces in the state-building process... is to leave the emergence of the new state overdetermined but little understood.” Skowronek proposes instead to treat “institutional development as a focus for analysis rather than as a mere epiphenomenon” of external forces (Building, 17, 18). But certainly this tends to set up a false dichotomy between analyzing external forces and institutional development. To investigate the interactions of state and class forces during institutional development is not ipso facto to reduce institutional change to external forces.

29. Jessop, Bob, State Theory (University Park, Pa., 1990), 362.Google Scholar See also Swenson, Peter, “Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal,” Politics & Society 25 (1997): 66–116Google Scholar.

30. Ibid. Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London, 1978).

31. A point well expressed by Piven, Frances Fox and Friedland, Roger in “Public Choice and Private Power: A Theory of Fiscal Crisis,” in Kirby, Andrew, et al., eds., Public Service Provision and Urban Development (New York, 1984), 402Google Scholar.

32. Domhoff, G. William, The Power Elite and the State (New York, 1990).Google Scholar

33. See , Sparrow, From the Outside In, chap. 1Google Scholar , for elaboration of his perspective.

34. Forging the Military-Industrial Complex, quotes in order, pp. 150, 161. For more extensive criticisms, see Waddell, Brian, “The Dimensions of the Military Ascendancy During U.S. Industrial Mobilization for World War II,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 23 (1995): 81–98Google Scholar.

35. See Forging the Military-Industrial Complex, 150, 37.

36. Leuchtenburg, William E., Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York, 1963), 251.Google Scholar

37. Patterson, James T., Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington, Ky., 1967), 128–36.Google Scholar

38. See Brinkley, Alan, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York, 1995)Google Scholar ; Jeffries, John W., “The ‘New’ New Deal: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Liberalism, 1939-1945,” Political Science Quarterly 105 (1990): 397–418Google Scholar.

39. Corcoran, 27 July 1938 interview with Joseph Alsop, copy in Joseph Lash Papers, Box 65, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (hereafter FDRL).

40. Leuchtenburg even entitles his chapter on the late New Deal, “Stalemate.” See FDR and the New Deal, chap. 11.

41. Forrestal, who became Under Secretary of the Navy, and Eberstadt, who headed the Army-Navy Munitions Board, were close friends who had worked together for the Wall Street firm of Dillon, Read. Forrestal and Eberstadt kept a “Good Man” list of prominent and trusted corporate associates who could be called upon in time of need. As Jeffrey Dorwart reports, “Seventy percent of those on the Good Man list went to Washington as so-called dollar-a-year men during the second world war.” ( , Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949 (College Station, Tex., 1991], 8Google Scholar .) Patterson, who would become Under Secretary of the Army, was on the list, and before and after his federal judgeship (1930-40) was a partner in a prominent New York law firm. See Burch, Philip, Elites in American History: The New Deal to the Carter Administration (New York, 1980), 74–75Google Scholar.

42. The Truman Committee (Senate Select Committee Investigating the National Defense Program) directly charged the corporate dollar-a-year advisers who dominated the Office of Production Management (predecessor to the War Production Board) with responsibility for the weaknesses in civilian-state control of mobilization responsibilities. Additional Report, 77th Cong., 2d sess., RPt. 480, Pt. 5 (1941).

43. Gunnar Myrdal, in a 1944 analysis of the postwar economic prospects of the United States, referenced a November 1941 Fortune poll in which only 7.2 percent of corporate executives “believed… that this system (of private enterprise] would actually survive the war.” Economic Developments and Prospects in America, address to the National Economic Society of Sweden, 9 03 1944, 11Google Scholar ; copy in Wayne Coy Papers, Box 7, FDRL.

44. For an analysis of prewar administrative developments, see Waddell, Brian, “Economic Mobilization for World War II and the Transformation of the U.S. State,” Politics & Society 22 (1994): 165–94.Google Scholar For an analysis of how capitalist power varies with changing political and market conditions, see Luger, Stan, “Government Policy Towards the Automobile Industry: Social Constraints, Economic Conditions, and Interest Group Power,” Journal of Policy History 4 (1992): 418–35Google Scholar.

45. “Report of the War Resources Board,” 7; President's Secretary's Files, Box 173, File “War Resources Board,” FDRL.

46. For interwar shifts in business-military relations, see Koistinen, Paul A. C., “The Interwar Years,” in The Military-Industrial Complex (New York, 1980)Google Scholar ; Millett, John D., The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces (Washington, D.C., 1954), 14–19Google Scholar ; Smith, R. Elberton, Army and Economic Mobilisation (Washington, D.C., 1959), 35-47, 73–81Google Scholar.

47. In fact, wartime congressional investigative committees assailed the military's planning and administrative inadequacies. See, for example, Senate Special Committee to Study the Problems of American Small Business (Murray Committee), 77th Cong., 2d sess., Additional Report, Rpt. 479, Pt. 2 (1942), 13Google Scholar ; Truman Committee, 77th Cong., 2d sess., Report Concerning Priorities and the Utilization of Existing Facilities, Rpt. 480, Pt. 3, reprinted First Annual Report (1942), 1934.Google Scholar See also , Smith, Army and Economic Mobilisation, 111Google Scholar ; , Millett, Army Service Forces, 283Google Scholar.

48. United States Civilian Production Administration (hereafter USCPA), Industrial Mobilisation for War (Washington, D.C., 1947), 472Google Scholar ; , Smith, Army and Industrial Mobilisation, 561Google Scholar.

49. , Skowronek, Building, 238.Google ScholarEberstadt, Ferdinand, “Diary Entries, October 31, 1941,” emphasis added, Box 12, “ANMB Files,” Eberstadt Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton UniversityGoogle Scholar.

50. Sitterson, J. Carlyle, Development of the Reconversion Policies of the War Production Board, April 1943 to January 1945, USCPA Special Study No. 15 (Washington, D.C., 1946), 13–14Google Scholar ; and Peltason, Jack, “The Reconversion Controversy,” in Stein, H., ed., Public Administration and Policy Development (New York, 1952), 229–30Google Scholar.

51. Memo from C. E. Wilson, WPB Executive Vice Chairman, to members of WPB, 1 July 1944, Gladieux Papers, National Archives (NA) RG 250, Box 6, “Reconversion”; USCPA, Indus-trial Mobilisation, 739, 8013Google Scholar ; , Sitterson, Reconversion Policies, 227, 115-17Google Scholar ; , Peltason, “Reconversion Controversy,” 238–39Google Scholar.

52. Bernstein, Barton J., “The Removal of War Production Board Controls on Business,” Business History Review 39 (1965): 244, 251Google Scholar ; and, , Sitterson, Reconversion Policies, 69, 77Google Scholar.

53. Quoted in , Sitterson, Reconversion Policies, 54Google Scholar.

54. Tom Clark, U.S. Attorney General, reported in 1943: “at the beginning of our war pro-gram 175,000 companies were providing 70% of the nation's manufacturing output and 100 corporations were producing 30%. Today, two and one-half years later, this ratio has been re-versed; now 100 corporations hold 70% of the war and essential civilian contracts, while 175,000 small companies hold 30%.” Quoted in Monsees, Carl Henry, Industry-Government Cooperation (Washington, D.C., 1944), 12Google Scholar . See Smaller War Plants Corporation Report, Economic Concentration and World War II, 79th Cong., 2d sess., Doc. 206 (1946)Google Scholar.

55. Catton, Bruce, War Lords of Washington (New York, 1948), 246–48Google Scholar (quote, 247); , Sitterson, Reconversion Policies, 134Google Scholar ; and USCPA, Industrial Mobilisation, 816Google Scholar.

56. , Sitterson, Reconversion Policies, 50.Google Scholar

57. See Nelson, Donald, Arsenal of Democracy (New York, 1946), 398–99.Google Scholar

58. The (Bernard) Baruch-Hancock Report on War and Post-War Adjustment Policies served as a guide for these tasks since it focused on the nuts-and-bolts issues of getting industry quickly back to civilian production. I. F. Stone called the report a “Beveridge Plan for Millionaires.” Nation, 25 March 1944.

59. “CIO Reconversion Statement” of 1 May 1956. Robert Nathan Papers, NA, RG250, Box 230.

60. “CIO Reconversion Statement.”

61. Lekachman, Robert, The Age of Keynes (New York, 1968), 287.Google Scholar

62. See Sherry, Michael, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45 (New Haven, 1977).Google Scholar

63. On this general point, see Isaacson, Walter and Thomas, Evan, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York, 1986)Google Scholar.

64. As Schriftgeisser explains, the Employment Act “was, in fact, a conservative measure. The use of the fiscal instrument, called for in the bill, was not a revolutionary change in our economic life, but one which leaves the fundamental directives and arrangements of the free enterprise system untouched.” Schriftgiesser, Karl, Business Comes of Age (New York, 1960), 93Google Scholar.

65. Domhoff helpfully discerns that the conservative alliance between societal elites (best exemplified by nationalist and labor-intensive manufacturing firms, on the one hand, and the southern planter elite, on the other) with congressional conservatism provides a blunt barrier to most positive governmental programs that can be overcome only if the “sophisticated conservatives” of the internationalist, capital-intensive or mass consumption segment see such reforms as necessary to co-opt more radical measures or as in their own perceived economic interest. G. William Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State. See also Ferguson, Thomas, “From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression,” International Organization 38 (1984): 41–94Google Scholar.

66. First terms from Sutton, Francis X. et al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Mass., 1956).Google Scholar Second term from , Collins, Business Response to Keynes, 4956Google Scholar.

67. McQuaid, Kim, Big Business and Presidential Power (New York, 1982), 29–32Google Scholar ; , Collins, Business Response to Keynes, 56–58Google Scholar ; see also , Schriftgiesser, Business Comes of Age, 19Google Scholar.

68. , Schriftgiesser, Business Comes of Age, 17.Google Scholar, Collins also notes that BAC personnel “would fill many of the top positions in mobilization agencies.” Business Response to Keynes, 62Google Scholar.

69. Hoffman and Benton came in contact early in 1941. Hoffman wrote Benton on 12 May 1941 saying, “The big question, of course, is whether the project can be financed. Of equal importance is the question of who finances it. I believe we can find ten business men of liberal views who could be interested and who would contribute $3,000 each to the project.” Hoffman to Benton, 12 May 1941, Hoffman Papers, Box 40, “CED, 1941-1942,” Harry S. Truman Library (hereafter HSTL).

70. , Schriftgiesser, Business Comes of Age, 24.Google Scholar

71. Jones to Roosevelt, 12 June 1942, Official File 4351, Box 1, “Postwar Problems, 1942,” FDRL.

72. McQuaid views the CED as a surrogate for the BAC, which was viewed with much skepticism by traditional business conservatives. (Big Business, 114-17). See also Hill, William Steinert Jr “The Business Community and National Defense: Corporate Leaders and the Military, 1943-1950” (Ph.D. Dissertation: Stanford University, 1980), 25Google Scholar.

73. “Secretary of Commerce Jesse H. Jones to the Conference of the Committee for Economic Development, Waldorf Astoria,” Paul Hoffman Papers, Box 40, “CED First Meeting,” HSTL.

74. “Expansion of Private Enterprise and World Markets,” Hoffman before Internationalm Chamber of Commerce, London, 17 August 1945. Hoffman Papers, Box 108, “Speech File, 1945,” HSTL.

75. Clark, John M., Demobilisation of Wartime Economic Controls (New York, 1944), 202Google Scholar ; see also Bowman, John, Capitalist Collective Action (New York, 1989)Google Scholar.

76. , Schriftgiesser, Business Comes of Age, 16.Google Scholar

77. , Clark, Demobilisation, 201 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

78. Schriftgiesser describes the division of labor between the Commerce Department and the CED. Business Comes of Age, 17-27.

79. Hoffman to Truman, 4 August 1945. Nathan Papers, NA, RG 250, Box 230, “C.E.D.”

80. Gary Mucciaroni observes how the CED's efforts produced a unique form of Keynesianism. “Political Learning and Economic Policy Innovation: The United States and Sweden in the Post-World War II Era,” Journal of Policy History 1 (1989): 398, 406Google Scholar; see also Block, Fred, The Origins of International Economic Disorder (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977), 35Google Scholar.

81. As Hoffman testified to the Senate committee considering the Full Employment bill: “I think, first of all, we ought to get this Budget made automatically stabilizing insofar as we can and only go on spending as a last resort.” Hoffman before U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Part 10, 30 August 1945,940.

82. Eakins, David, “Business Planners and America's Postwar Expansion,” in Horowitz, D., ed., Corporations and the Cold War (New York, 1969), 150–53Google Scholar ; Eden, Lynn, “Capitalist Conflict and the State,” in Bright, C. and Harding, S., eds., Statemaldng and Social Movements (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1984 236–39Google Scholar.

83. , Block, Origins, 35–36, 77-79Google Scholar ; and Leffler, Melvin P., A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the CoU War (Stanford, Calif., 1992), 13-21, 36, 107, 162–63, for exampleGoogle Scholar.

84. , Eden, “Capitalist Conflict,” 2401Google Scholar ; also Hoopes, Townsend and Brinkley, Douglas, Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal (New York, 1992), 260-64, 293-95, 301–3Google Scholar.

85. This point is made by , Eden, “Capitalist Conflict,” 236–37.Google Scholar These advisers included W. Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson, James Forrestal, Robert Lovett, Robert Patterson, John McCloy, and Paul Nitze. For the background of Truman's advisers, see , Burch, Elites in American History, 84–87, 98-102Google Scholar ; , Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal; and Isaacson and Thomas, Wise MenGoogle Scholar.

86. , Eden, “Capitalist Conflict,” 236Google Scholar ; see also , McQuaid, Big Business, 150Google Scholar.

87. Draft of CED's “An American Program of European Economic Cooperation,” dated 14 January 1948, Means Papers, Box 31, “Marshall Plan,” FDRL.

88. Budget Director Harold Smith's diary records Truman's concern: “He was worried about the international situation. He indicated that Byrnes (Secretary of State) had expressed great con-cern to him and that he had begun to wonder if we might not be demobilizing too fast. He commented, ‘There are some people in the world who do not seem to understand anything except the number of divisions you have.’ I remarked, ‘Mr. President, you have an atomic bomb up your sleeve.’” Smith Papers, Box 3, “Conferences with President Truman,” 5 October 1945, FDRL.

89. , Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 121.Google Scholar

90. , Eakins, “The Development of Corporate Liberal Research in the United States, 1885-1965” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966), 38–67.Google Scholar

91. For the use of anti-communism in selling the Marshall plan, see , Block, Origins, 83–87Google Scholar ; , Hill, “Business Community and National Defense,” 239–44Google Scholar ; , Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 144–46Google Scholar.

92. “Interview with Harold Stein,” 7 August 1952, Harry Price Papers, HSTL.

93. , McQuaid, Big Business, 154–59Google Scholar (quote, p. 151). See also , Hill, “Business Community and National Defense,” 148–50Google Scholar ; and , Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 97–98.Google Scholar On the related issues of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, CED support also proved crucial. Schriftgiesser notes that “none of the large business organizations came to the defense of (these] proposals. Silence from the [NAM] and the [Chamber] was as effective as action would have been.… At the crucial moment … the businessmen of the [CED] intervened.” Business Comes of Age, 122; also 127-34.

94. As Hoffman wrote to a colleague shortly after taking his job: “I have to listen patiently while representatives of both the democratic and republican parties extol the merits of party hacks they want us to employ.… Despite all the efforts to force incompetents into this new organization, I am glad to report that the few people we have taken on are right out of the top drawer.” (Hoffman to E. R. Carpenter, 28 April 1948, Paul Hoffman Papers, Box 1, “Chronological File, 1946-48,” HSTL). See also , Schriftgiesser, Business Comes of Age, 133Google Scholar ; , Hogan, Marshall Plan, 139–40Google Scholar.

95. See , Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 180Google Scholar ; , Isaacson and , Thomas, Wise Men, 446Google Scholar.

96. , Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal, 105–6Google Scholar ; , Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 163, 200Google Scholar ; Block, Origins.

97. For insights into the economic containment thrust of U.S. foreign policy, see Pollard, Robert A., Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1985).Google Scholar For the shift to military containment, see , Hogan, Marshall Plan, 336ffGoogle Scholar.

98. See , Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 148–51Google Scholar ; , Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal, 102.Google Scholar In some, particularly James Forrestal, paragon of Wall Street, Secretary of the Navy, and first Secretary of Defense, security anxieties became an obsession.

99. Higgs, Robert writes about the “ratchet effect” of large-scale governmental expansions such as during World War II. Crisis and Leviathan (New York, 1987).Google Scholar And Frank Kofsky writes about the early postwar attempts to secure the military-industrial complex in Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948 (New York, 1993).Google Scholar See also Hooks, Forging the Military-Industrial Complex.

100. Myrdal, Economic Developments and Prospects in America.

101. See Sherry, Michael, The Shadow of War (New Haven, 1996).Google Scholar

102. Hooks suggests with his first hypothesis: “Administrative advances and strategic policy tools forged by the New Deal were absorbed by and adapted to the nascent national security state during and after World War II.” Forging the Military-Industrial Complex, 5.

103. Terms are Bob Jessop's, State Theory.

104. , Skowronek, Building, 290.Google Scholar