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Where No Nation Has Gone Before: Domestic Politics and the First International Space Science Mission

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

W. D. Kay
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Extract

The history of the U.S. space program can be rather neatly divided into two distinct periods. The first, which begins with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and runs through the end of Project Apollo in 1972, is sometimes referred to as the “golden age” of space exploration. This period was characterized not only by its impressive scientific and technical successes but also by the fact that it possessed a highly supportive social, economic, and political environment. Buoyed by fears and rumors of Soviet achievements in space, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) of the 1950s and 1960s usually had little trouble securing an annual budget sufficient to maintain an ambitious set of projects (both manned and unmanned) that stretched from near-earth orbit to the outer reaches of the solar system.

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Articles
Information
Journal of Policy History , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , October 1993 , pp. 435 - 452
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. 1993

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References

Notes

1. A conscious effort has been made throughout this essay to use nongender-specific terminology (e.g., “automated”) in place of such words as “unmanned.” Unfortunately, there are occasions where the traditional usage is unavoidable.

2. There are a number of discussions of this period of NASA history, including Logsdon, John M., The Decision to Go to the Moon (Chicago, 1970)Google Scholar; Hutton, Richard, The Cosmic Chase (New York, 1981)Google Scholar; Needell, Allan A., ed., The First Twenty-five Years in Space: A Symposium (Washington, D.C., 1983)Google Scholar; McDougall, Walter A., The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985)Google Scholar; Murray, Bruce, Journey into Space: The First Thirty Years of Space Exploration (New York, 1989).Google Scholar

3. Hutton, The Cosmic Chase, chap. 7; Logsdon, John M., “The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?” Science 232 (30 May 1986): 1099–1105CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; McCurdy, Howard E., The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics and Technological Choice (Baltimore, 1990), chap. 2.Google Scholar

4. For a general discussion of these issues, see Smith, Bruce L. R., American Science Policy Since World War II (Washington, D.C., 1990)Google Scholar; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives International Science and Technology and Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Scientific Cooperation of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 101st Cong. 2d sess., 4 and 26 April (Washington, D.C., 1990).Google Scholar For a review of specific technologies, see U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Starpower: The U.S. and the International Quest for Fusion Energy (Washington, D.C., 1987), chap. 7Google Scholar; Gilleland, John R., Nevins, William M., and Kaiper, Gina V., “Moving Ahead with Fusion,” Issues in Science and Technology 6:4 (Summer 1990): 62–67Google Scholar; Dattner, A., “International Cooperation in High Technology: Some Reflections from the Standpoint of European Collaboration in Space,” ESA Bulletin 36 (November 1983): 56–60Google Scholar; Bortzmeyer, Hubert, “International Involvement in a Civilian ‘Space Station’ Program,” in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space (Washington, D.C., 1983), appendix CGoogle Scholar; Rea, John, “The Need for More International Cooperation in Space,” in Thompson, Wayne C. and Guerrier, Steven W., eds., Space: National Programs and International Cooperation (Boulder, Colo., 1989), 110–14.Google Scholar

5. See, for example, McCurdy, The Space Station Decision, chap. 11.

6. Perle, Richard, “Technology Security, National Security, and U.S. Competitiveness,” Issues in Science and Technology 3 (Summer 1986)Google Scholar; Seward, Bernard L. Jr., ed., Technology Control, Competition, and National Security (Lanham, Md., 1987)Google Scholar; Pollack, Herman, “International Relations in Space,” Space Policy 4 (February 1988): 24–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; U.S. OTA, Starpower; U.S. House, International Science and Technology and Foreign Policy.

7. Dickson, David, “Budget Cuts Cast Shadows Overseas,” Nature 291 (28 May 1981): 273CrossRefGoogle Scholar; U.S. House, International Science and Technology; Alexander Kenyan, The United States as a Partner in Scientific and Technological Cooperation: Some Perspectives from Across the Atlantic (New York, 1991), 75.Google Scholar

8. Murray, Journey into Space, chap. 16; Logsdon, John M., “Missing Halley's Comet: The Politics of Big Science,” Isis 80 (Spring 1989): 254–80.Google Scholar

9. Marshall, Eliot, “Space Station Science: Up in the Air,” Science 246 (1 December 1989): 110–12CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Proposed Space Station Freedom Program Revisions. Hearings before the Committee on Space, Science, and Technology, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 31 October 1989 (Washington, D.C., 1990)Google Scholar; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Space Station International Partners. Hearings before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 101st Cong. 2d sess., 30 January (Washington, D.C., 1990).Google Scholar

10. Gilmartin, Patricia A., “Bush Administration Rallies Support for Space Station as Crucial Votes Near,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (27 May 1991): 25–26Google Scholar; Swinbacks, David, Aldhous, Peter, and Dickman, Steven, “Japan, Europe Lobby U.S. over Space Station,” Nature 351 (6 June 1991): 428.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11. U.S. House, International Science and Technology; Kenyan, The United States as a Partner in Scientific and Technological Cooperation.

12. Actually, the Apollo-Soyuz mission, which came several years before ISPM, could be considered the first “equal partnership.” However, it was not, strictly speaking, a science mission, but rather a test of compatible spacecraft technologies. Moreover, unlike ISPM, Apollo-Soyuz was not perceived (even at the time) to be part of an ongoing or developing association. See Oberg, James E., Red Star in Orbit: The Inside Story of Soviet Failures and Triumphs in Space (New York, 1981), 139–44.Google Scholar

In a sense, “international cooperation” has been an ongoing feature of space science since the early 1960s. Such “joint” projects, however, usually turn out to be little more than agreements concerning the sharing of data, the construction of ground-tracking stations, or foreign experiments flying on major U.S. missions. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities (Washington, D.C., 1985).Google Scholar

13. A more detailed discussion can be found in Page, D. Edgar, “Exploratory Journey out of the Ecliptic Plane,” Science 190 (28 November 1990): 845–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Marsden, Richard G., An Old Legend—New Science—Ulysses (Noordwijk, the Netherlands, 1990).Google Scholar

14. Simpson, John A., “Charged-Particle Astronomy in the Outer Solar System.” Astronautics and Aeronautics (July/August 1978): 96–105.Google Scholar

15. ESA/NASA joint press release, 30 March 1979, in NASA history office; see also European Space Agency, Newsletter 17 (October 1979): 3.Google Scholar

16. Descriptions of the original mission can be found in U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Space Science, Program Approval Document, 22 June 1979, in NASA history office; see also U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Aeronautics and Astronautics 1978: A Chronology (Washington, D.C., 1986): 11.Google Scholar

17. Strictly speaking, since NASA was providing launch from the space shuttle, U.S. expenses would in fact have been higher. It is important to remember, however, that at this time the official stance of the agency was that the operating costs of the shuttle would be negligible. Thus, launching costs were generally not included in the total estimates. See Logsdon, “The Space Shuttle Program,” and Hutton, The Cosmic Chase, chap. 7.

18. U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Exploration: NASA's Deep Space Missions Are Experiencing Long Delays (Washington, D.C., 1988)Google Scholar; and Space Exploration: Cost, Schedule, and Performance of NASA's Ulysses Mission to the Sun (Washington, D.C., 1988).Google Scholar

19. U.S. GAO, NASA's Deep Space Missions.

20. A fairly detailed narrative of events can be found in Johnson-Freese, Joan, “Canceling the U.S. Solar-Polar Spacecraft,” Space Policy 3 (February 1987): 24–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted in Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space (Malabar, Fla., 1990), chap. 7.Google Scholar

21. “NASA told to delay Space Mission with Europe,” Nature 282 (6 December 1979): 544CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Defense Daily, 1 April 1980, 164; U.S. Congress, Senate, Department of HUD and Certain Independent Agencies Appropriations for FY 1981, Hearings before Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 96th Cong. 2d sess., 24–25 April (Washington, D.C., 1980), 1591–98.

22. See Murray, Journey into Space, chap. 13; Smith, Robert W., The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, Technology, and Politics (Cambridge, 1989), 189–94.Google Scholar

23. Defense/Space Daily, 21 April 1980, 266; Wilford, John Noble, “Plan to End U.S.- European Space Effort Is Sought,” New York Times, 18 May 1980, 21Google Scholar; Marsh, Alton K., “Solar Polar Fund Threat Spurs Worldwide Protest,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (26 May 1980): 22.Google Scholar

24. Letter from ESA Director-General R. Gibson to NASA Administrator Robert Frosch, 7 May 1980; letter from Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology to 16 House and Senate Committee Chairs, 12 May 1980 (both letters in NASA history office).

25. Murray, Journey into Space, 215.

26. “Spacelab, Solar-Polar Curtailed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (23 February 1981): 18–19; Christopher Joyce, “Reagan's Hit Man Draws a Bead on Science,” New Scientist 89 (19 February 1981): 459–60; David Dickson, “Open Row about Joint Space Project,” Nature 290 (5 March 1981): 3.

27. Dickson, David, “Europe Protests NASA Project Cancellation,” Science and Government Report 11 (15 March 1981): 6–7Google Scholar; Redfearn, Judy, “Gloom at Prospect of Cancellation,” Nature 290 (5 March 1981): 3–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jacobs, Michael E., “NASA Cuts Back Space Science Programs,” Physics Today 34 (May 1981): 73–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28. U.S. Congress, Senate, NASA Authorisation for Fiscal Year 1982. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 10 and 19 March (Washington, D.C., 1981)Google Scholar; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 1982 NASA Authorisation. Hearings before Committee on Space, Science, and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 10 and 11 March (Washington, D.C., 1981): 2123–35.Google Scholar

29. “ESA Seeks Solar-Polar Compromise,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (30 March 1981): 20–21Google Scholar; Redfearn, Judy, “Joint Project Saved?” Nature 290 (9 April 1981): 436CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Covault, Craig, “Shuttle Costs Threatening Science Programs,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (6 July 1981): 16–17.Google Scholar

30. Telex from ESA Director-General E. Quistgaard to Acting NASA Director A. M. Lovelace, 16 April 1981, in NASA history office.

31. Letter from Lovelace to Stockman, 24 April 1981, in NASA history office.

32. Letter from Stockman to Lovelace, 22 June 1981, in NASA history office.

33. Letter from Beggs to Senator Harrison Schmitt, Chair, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 2 October 1981, in NASA history office; see also “ESA Considers Options for Solar-Polar Mission,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (28 September 1981): 26, and Aerospace Daily, 16 September 1981, 81.Google Scholar

34. Lenorovitz, Jeffrey M., “Solar Polar Plans Advance Despite Pullout by NASA,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (28 December 1981): 12.Google Scholar

35. U.S. GAO, NASA's Ulysses Probe.

36. Johnson-Freese, “Canceling the U.S. Solar-Polar Spacecraft,” 33, and Changing Patterns, 42.

37. Logsdon, John M., “U.S.-European Cooperation in Space Science: A 25-Year Perspective,” Science 223 (6 January 1984): 14.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

38. U.S. OTA, International Cooperation, 385.

39. U.S. OTA, Civtian Space Stations, 200.

40. “Reductions in Space,” Nature 290 (5 March 1981): 1–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also interview with Eaton, Derek, ESA's Ulysses project manager, in Nicholas Booth, “Ulysses: The Long and Winding Road,” Final Frontier 3 (September/October 1990): 18–23.Google Scholar Oddly enough, even though they would appear to be mutually exclusive, Johnson-Freese does attempt to advance both arguments simultaneously.

41. Mueller, A., “The Agency's New Budget Structure and the Recharging System,” ESA Bulletin 31 (August 1982): 52–56.Google Scholar

42. See, for example, Logsdon, “The Space Shuttle”; McCurdy, The Space Station Decision. For an example from another technology, see Kay, W. D., “The Politics of Fusion Research,” Issues in Science and Technology 8 (Winter 1991–1992): 40–46Google Scholar; and “Congressional Decision-Making and Long-Term Technological Development: The Case of Nuclear Fusion,” in Bryner, Gary, ed., Science, Technology, and Politics: Policy Analysis in Congress (Boulder, Colo., 1992): 87–105.Google Scholar

43. For an application of this principle to science and technology specifically, see Hamlett, Patrick W., Understanding Technological Politics: A Decision-Making Approach (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1992).Google Scholar

44. This may in fact help to explain why NASA targeted the Solar-Polar Mission, rather than Galileo or the Space Telescope, for elimination in 1981: it was far more likely that Congress would restore the NASA space science budget (which many in the agency still thought possible—see Murray, Journey into Space, 219n), or that OMB might reverse its decision, if subjected to intense European lobbying. When viewed in this way, NASA's actions can be interpreted as a budget-maximizing strategy. This attempt at brinkmanship failed, however, because Congress's attention was divided by the large number of programs affected by the revised 1982 budget.

45. See note 32.

46. U.S. Senate, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1982, 403.

47. Smith, American Science Policy, 106–7.

48. U.S. Senate, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1982, 401–2.

49. See Thiebaut, W. M., “Legal Understanding of Memoranda of Understanding in the United States,” ESA Bulletin 38 (May 1984): 99–103; Johnson-Freese, “Canceling the U.S. Solar-Polar Spacecraft,” 28, and Changing Patterns, 38.Google Scholar

50. The only exception to this might be ESA's threat to withhold future cooperation. Normally such a boycott would be considered a “last resort,” a response to finding traditional institutional channels blocked.

51. “How the $8 Billion Space Station Became a $120 Billion Showpiece,” New York Times, 10 June 1990, Al, 30.

52. U.S. House, Space Station International Partners; Logsdon, John M., “International Cooperation in the Space Station Program,” Space Policy 7 (February 1991): 35–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53. Asker, James R., “Engineers Say High Station Cost Would Harm U.S. Competitiveness,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (1 July 1991): 20Google Scholar; Marshall, Eliot, “Tilting at the Space Station,” Science 253 (19 July 1991): 256–58.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed