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Conflicts of Interest in the International Drug Control System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

William B. McAllister
William B. McAllister
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Extract

The drug problem in the United States and elsewhere has historically received intermittent attention, most often when the problem has reached crisis proportions in a certain locale. In such times, one of the natural focal points of discussion has been the role that other nations play in supplying drugs. It has not been unusual for foreign states to be accused of being the source of the problem, while others have been identified, in varying degrees of culpability, as accessories. This often has created conflict, especially when an accused nation has viewed the issue differently. Under these circumstances, states have frequently attempted negotiations in hopes of reaching some sort of agreement that will accommodate all the affected parties.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Policy History , Volume 3 , Issue 4: Drug Control Policy. Essays in Historical and Comparative Perspective , October 1991 , pp. 143 - 166
Copyright
Copyright © The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. 0000

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References

Notes

1. There are, in addition, dozens of bilateral and regional agreements that deal with drug control. (See Rohn, Peter H., World Treaty Index (Santa Barbara, 1984)Google Scholar, for listings through 1975. A composite overview is supplied on pages 356–57 of volume 1. The present endeavor will limit its scope to the major treaties designed to deal with the issue on a worldwide basis. Also, the 1961 Single Convention was amended in 1972, but the revisions were of a relatively minor nature. See Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 as Amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (New York, 1977)Google Scholar and Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 doe at Geneva on 25 March, 1971 [U.N. document E/CN/.7/588] (New York, 1976). There is, in my opinion, no single adequate general work on this issue. Taylor's, ArnoldAmerican Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic 1900–1939: A Study in International Humanitarian Reform (Durham, N.C., 1969)Google Scholar is the most thorough account of the 1898–1939 period, but U.S. motivations and actions are viewed in an extremely favorable light. In addition, by relying almost entirely on American sources, this account describes inadequately what the other major players were doing and how they viewed the role of the United States. A necessary counterbalance is provided by Stein's, S. D. British-oriented view in International Diplomacy, State Administrators, and Narcotics Control (Brookfield, Vt., 1985)Google Scholar, but after 1920 he detours into the story of the implementation of domestic drug legislation in England and Wales. Stein's doctoral dissertation, “The Origins of the Hague Opium Convention 1912, and its Implementation in England and Wales” (University of London, June 1978)Google Scholar, at almost 700 pages, is an expanded version of the book, the extra space being taken up with an extensive discussion of political theory. Walker, William O. III, Drug Control in the Americas, revised edition (Albuquerque, 1989)Google Scholar, gives an excellent account of events in the Western Hemisphere up to about 1950 and a brief description of events since that date. This work provides a good “case study” illustration of the dilemmas surrounding the implementation of effective international drug control, but because it limits its scope to the Americas, many aspects of the issue receive too little attention. Two short historical accounts of international developments are provided in Edwards, Griffith and Arif, Awni, eds., Drugs Problems in the Socio Cultural Context: A Basis for Policies and Program Planning (Geneva, 1980)Google Scholar, and Musto's, DavidThe American Disease, expanded edition (New York, 1987)Google Scholar. Bruun, Kettil, Pan, Lynn, and Rexed, Ingemar, The Gentlemen's Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol (Chicago, 1975)Google Scholar, provides a more thorough treatment, but the historical narrative is mixed in throughout the book, making it difficult to recover in a coherent manner. Finally, readers wanting “just the facts” might consult Liu's, Hsien ChouThe Development of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Bangkok, 1979)Google Scholar. A strange little book, just an outline really, it lists the basic facts about drug control treaties up to 1953 in as brief a manner as possible. However, because of a large number of inaccuracies, this book should be used only in conjunction with other works.

2. See Stein, International Diplomacy, State Administrators, and Narcotics Control, 8–23; and Owen, David Edward, British Opium Policy in China and India (New Haven, 1934), 259–335.Google Scholar

3. Nations attending were: France, Britain, Russia, China, the United States, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Siam, the Netherlands, Japan, and Persia.

4. For an excellent discussion of the type and extent of American missionary interests in China, see Reed, James, The Missionary Mind and American East Asian Policy, 1911—1915 (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5. See Stein, International Diplomacy, State Administrators, and Narcotics Control, 73–78; Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, chaps. 4–5; Willoughby, W. W., Opium as an International Problem: The Geneva Conferences (Baltimore, 1925), 25–43Google Scholar; and Gavit, John Palmer, Opium (New York, 1927), 13–19.Google Scholar

6. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, chap. 5; Stein, International Diplomacy, State Administrators, and Narcotics Control, chap. 7; Walker, Drug Control in the Americas, chap. 2; and Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem, 43–49.

7. The reason why two meetings were convened is disputed. One hypothesis holds that this arrangement was necessary to facilitate agreement on issues that were truly separate. Another maintains that the governmental and League officials charged with responsibility for drug control were incompetent and created an unnecessary division of effort. A third interpretation is that the industrialized states of Western Europe engineered the split in order to avoid substantive controls on themselves while creating tighter restrictions for East Asian countries. This last explanation is the most convincing, for reasons that will become clear later in this article. See Buell, Raymond Leslie, “The International Opium Conferences with Relevant Documents,” World Peace Foundation Pamphlts 8:2–3 (1925): 39–330; Gavit, Opium; Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic; and Willoughby, Opium as an International Problem, for varying views on this question.Google Scholar

8. Under Article 280 of the treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920), Turkey was required to ratify the Hague Opium Convention (see Treaties of Peace 1919–1923, Volume II [New York, 1924], 886)Google Scholar, but the Turkish government never did so and refused to carry out the obligations of the Hague treaty.

9. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, chaps. 8–11; and Walker, Drug Control in the Americas, chaps, 3–4.

10. See Parssinen, Terry M. and Meyer, Kathryn B., “International Narcotics Trafficking in the Early Twentieth Century: Development of an Illicit Industry,” Past and Present (forthcoming November 1991)Google Scholar, for an excellent description of this phenomenon.

11. Illicit drugs were defined as contraband and confiscation of smugglers' assets was approved. A list of known and suspected traffickers was to be drawn up and disseminated to national police authorities, but language calling for a listing of offending companies was eliminated from the final document. Once again, colonial possessions, precisely where the majority of the problems existed, could be exempted if a signatory so chose.

12. For an overview of the system as it functioned (at least on paper) as of 1943–44, see Renborg, Bertil A., “Principles of International Control of Narcotic Drugs,” American Journal of International Law 37 (1943): 436–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and May, Herbert L., “Dangerous Drugs,” in Davis, Harriet Eager, ed., Pioneers in World Order: An American Appraisal of the League of Nations (New York, 1944), 183–92.Google Scholar

13. See Liu, The Development of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; Bruun et al., The Gentlemen's Club, 20, 39; and Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, epilogue.

14. The seven countries were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, India, Iran, and Yugoslavia.

15. This treaty entered into force on 8 March 1963, but its provisions were superseded by the Single Convention less than two years later, on 13 November 1964.

16. For the sake of clarity I have deleted some of the less important agreements from this overview.

17. See ECOSOC resolutions: 159 II D (VII) of 3 August 1948 and 246 D (IX) of 6 July 1949.

18. A good sense of the goals of individual states can be ascertained by reading the general statements that delegates were invited to make at the beginning of the conference. See United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Official Records, Volume I (hereafter referred to as 1961 Official Records, Vol. I), 4–16.

19. This law was repealed in 1969 when it became apparent that it was not effective in eliminating or even decreasing the problem. See Bruun et al., The Gentlemen's Club, 207–8.

20. For example, see Bruun et al., The Gentlemen's Club, chaps. 13, 16.

21. The categories described below are my own invention. They are derived from a careful reading of the positions taken by the national delegations to the 1961 and 1971 conferences.

22. In order to avoid cumbersome explanations within the body of the text, and in order to be as accurate as possible, certain words have been given very specific meanings for the purposes of this article. In addition to this note, see notes 25 and 26. Manufacture, manufacturing, manufacturer, & etc. refers to the fabrication of organic and/or synthetic drugs. Production, producing, producers, & etc. refers to the process of growing organic raw materials.

23. Although France would normally be expected to fall into the manufacturing states category, the French government has traditionally felt little compunction to protect pharmaceutical interests. This is because the French pharmaceutical industry is largely foreignowned. That portion which is not is decentralized, thus weakening its influence on the government. See Bruun et al., The Gentlemen's Club, 129–30.

24. The Nationalist Chinese government does not really fit the normal profile of a strict control state, but it could usually be counted on to endorse a very stringent control regime. This was primarily because a strict control position afforded Chiang's government a platform for embarassing the Communist Chinese. Throughout the 1950s accusations had been made that the mainland Chinese had been producing opium for export in a deliberate campaign to poison the West through drug addiction. The Nationalist Chinese took advantage of every opportunity to bring attention to this alleged activity. The Communist Chinese government was hampered in responding to these allegations by not being represented at the conference, a fact that the Soviet Union complained about at every possible opportunity.

25. Organic raw materials refers to the agricultural products opium, coca, and cannabis. Organic drugs or organic substances refers to drugs that can be obtained from organic raw materials. Opium is the organic raw material necessary for the manufacture of heroin, morphine, codeine, and other narcotics. In addition, raw opium can, with a minimum of preparation, be smoked, eaten, or drunk. Coca is the organic raw material necessary for the manufacture of cocaine. Cannabis refers to marijuana, hashish, and their resins.

26. Synthetic drugs of synthetic substances refers to drugs fabricated from nonorganic raw materials. Examples include amphetamines, barbiturates, and hallucinogens.

27. For example, see the declarations and reservations made to the 1961 Single Convention in Bruun et al., The Gentlemen's Club, appendix A.

28. Walker, Drug Control in the Americas, epilogue; see chap. 4 for pre-1945 examples.

29. Narasimhan was Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, representing the Secretary-General. For his opening statement, see 1961 Official Records, Vol. 1, 1–2.

30. For example, see 1961 Official Records, Vol. I, 64, 200–201.

31. For information pertinent to this section, see the general statements of delegations to the Vienna conference: United Nations Conference for the adoption of a Protocol on Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 11 January–19 February 1971, Official Records, Volume II [U.N. document E/CONF/. 58/7] (New York, 1973), 6–19 (hereafter referred to as 1971 Official Records, Vol. II). See also Bruun et al., The Gentlemen's Club, chap. 16.

32. The quotation is taken from the first four paragraphs of the preamble to the 1961 Single Convention. For full text, see United Nations, Treaties Series, vol. 520, 15 Iff.

33. The quotation is taken from the first five paragraphs of the preamble to the 1971 Psychotropic Convention. For full text, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1019, 175ff.

34. United Nations Conference for the adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, New York, 24 January–25 March 1961 Official Records, Volume II [U.N. document E/CONF/ 34/24/Add. 1] (New York, 1964), 297 (hereafter referred to as 1961 Official Records, Vol. II).

35. See United Nations Conference for the adoption of a Protocol on Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 11 January–19 February 1971, Official Records, Volume I [U.N. document E/CONF/. 58/7] (New York, 1973), 51–52 (hereafter referred to as 1971 Official Records, Vol. I). See also 1971 Official Records, Vol. II, 86–89.

36. See 1961 Single Convention, Articles 12–14, 18–21.

37. See 1961 Official Records, Volumes I and II, discussions of Articles 27 and 28.

38. 1971 Official Records, Vol. II, 51–54.

39. The schedules determined what kind of licensing, manufacturing, accumulation, dispensation, import, and export restrictions would be imposed on the drugs covered by the treaty. For example, in the 1961 Single Convention, the drugs considered the most dangerous (cocaine, cannabis, opium, heroine, and morphine) were put under stricter controls than those believed to be less harmful (codeine and its derivatives).

40. See 1961 Official Records, Vol. II, 95–123, 263–67, and 1961 Official Records, Vol. I, 190–201.

41. The manufacturing group did not wish to hinder the legitimate manufacture of substances such as codeine, much of which was made in industrialized countries.

42. The manufacturing states also prevailed on the important issue of derivatives. Included in the schedules were footnotes which indicated that the salts, esters, ethers, and isomers of all the substances listed were also controlled unless specifically exempted. The inclusion of derivatives in the schedules meant that it would not be necessary to list every possible chemical combination in the treaty itself, and that adding substances to the schedules at a later date would be a much easier matter. In fact, most new substances concocted from organic raw materials would automatically come under control. This was a victory for the manufacturing states because they had already set up the schedules to favor their own commercial interests. Any new substances they might invent that used organic raw materials would be subject to controls less stringent than those placed on the raw materials themselves.

43. See 1971 Official Records, Vol. I, 106–12, and 1971 Official Records, Vol. II, 110–14.

44. The salts, isomers, ethers, and esters of synthetic drugs were not included in the schedules of the 1971 treaty unless specifically noted. The committee in charge of the schedules claimed that it did not have the time to consider the issue fully, but this contention has a hollow ring to it. It is evident from the lack of objection in the plenary session to this rather lame excuse that the manufacturing states had made it clear (no doubt “off the record”) that if derivatives were included in the schedules there would be no agreement.

45. Precursors are the synthetic equivalent to “raw materials.” For example, lysergic acid is a precursor necessary to the manufacture of LSD. See 1971 Official Records, Vol. II, 75, 181.

46. 1971 Official Records, Vol. II, 181.

47. See 1961 Single Convention, Article 3.

48. See Official Records, Vol. II, 263–67. This was the criteria used by the technical committee. See also Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (New York, 1973), 74–107.

49. From Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 1971 Psychotropic Convention.

50. See 1971 Official Records, Vol. U, 128–30, 176–83.

51. See 1961 Single Convention, Article 3.

52. See 1961 Official Records, Vol. I, 19–25, 63–68, 188–90, and 1961 Official Records, Vol. II, 3–4, 33–37, 86–94.

53. 1961 Official Records, Vol. 1, 65, 67.

54. See 1971 Psychotropic Convention, Article 2.

55. See discussions concerning Articles 2 and 2 bis in 1971 Official Records, Volumes I and II.

56. It must be noted, however, that because of the domestic drug abuse problems, there was substantial support in manufacturing group states as well for controls on synthetic drugs.

57. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at December 31 1989 [U.N. document ST/LEG/SER.E/8] (New York, 1990), 268–74, and Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1990 (Washington, D.C., 1990).