Many retirees hope to continue earning capital market rewards on their saving while avoiding outliving their funds during retirement. We model a dynamic utility maximizing investor who seeks to benefit from holding both equity and longevity insurance. She is free to adjust her portfolio allocation of her financial wealth as well as of the annuity over time, and she can purchase variable payout annuities any time and incrementally. In this setting, we show that the retiree will not fully annuitize even without bequests; rather, she will combine variable annuities with withdrawals from her liquid financial wealth so as to match her desired consumption profile. Optimal stock exposures decrease over time, both within the variable annuity and the withdrawal plan. Welfare gains from this strategy can amount to 40% of financial wealth, depending on risk parameters and other resources; additionally, many retirees will do almost as well as the fully optimized outcome if they hold variable annuities invested 60/40 in stocks/bonds.

The under-development of existing annuity markets coupled with the secular trend away from traditional pensions towards defined contribution accounts in the U.S. raises significant concerns about the adequacy of retirement income for future retirees. We develop dynamic programming techniques to evaluate the efficacy of policies designed to address this concern by encouraging annuitization. Our analysis suggests that policies providing monetary incentives through the tax code can indeed significantly enhance annuitization among retirees: our central estimates suggest that tax-exemption based policies which have been recently proposed in Congress have the potential to increase annuitization by as much as $50,000 for each retired household, at a relatively modest revenue cost to the government. Similar sized policies based instead on refundable tax credits may be more desirable from both efficiency and distributional perspectives.

In a moral-hazard model with multiple tasks, an agent engages in different activities, labelled work, delayed retirement, and work out (investments in longevity). The latter imposes higher effort costs on weekly labor supply, but increases possibilities for life time labor supply. Work out does not affect aggregate output and does therefore not accrue to the benefit of the principal. Second-best incentives for work out are U-shaped in the agent's ability, and so is the effort level supplied by the agent. These theoretical findings are supported by recent empirical evidence on longevity, which is not always monotonically increasing in ability.

To maintain their standard of living during retirement, it is often assumed that individuals need to save enough to replace 75–80% of their final pay. This paper develops a replacement rate measure that better corresponds with a replacement of consumption by properly accounting for savings, taxes, and owner-occupied housing. Savings and investment behavior judged by standard analysis to be inadequate is shown to result in high real consumption during retirement relative to pre-retirement consumption. For example, the simulated savings and investment behavior of single individuals in this study results in retirement income of about 60% of final earnings, well below the typical adequacy threshold of 75–80%. However, this corresponds to replacing about 90% of pre-retirement consumption for renters and over 100% for homeowners who have paid off their mortgage.

In this paper, we analyse how national public pension systems can distort intra-EU movements of workers despite the existing totalization/proratization agreement. As a benchmark test, we propose the ‘Lodge Test’ of mobility neutrality: Two identical individuals who swap countries and jobs should receive the same pension claims in either of the two pension systems compared to a situation where each would have stayed at home. Using the Lodge Test, we identify those features of national pension formulae that are systematically mobility distorting and discuss possible remedies.

This paper investigates fiscal sustainability in an overlapping generations economy with endogenous growth coming from human capital formation through educational spending. We assess how budgetary imbalances affect economic dynamics and the outlook for economic growth, thereby providing a rationale for fiscal rules ensuring sustainability. Our results show that the appropriate response of fiscal policy to temporary shocks is not trivial in the absence of fiscal rules. Fiscal rules allow for a timely reaction, thereby avoiding possibly disruptive fiscal adjustment in the future: the more adjustment is delayed, the larger its necessary scale is. We perform a rough calibration of the model to simulate the effects of a demographic shock (change in the population growth rate) under different fiscal policy scenarios.

The theory of equalizing differences predicts that workers trade pay for benefits, but empirical confirmation of such tradeoffs is rare. This study investigates the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) trade pay for pension benefits. For a sample of S&P 500 CEOs, I find that an additional dollar of pension benefits is associated with a 48 cent decrease in pay. Although the tradeoff estimate is significantly different from zero, it is also significantly less than the anticipated rate of dollar-for-dollar, especially for CEOs with relatively more bargaining power over their boards of directors. This implies that the implicit price of pension benefits decreases with the CEO's bargaining power, so pooling datasets on CEOs with varying degrees of power blurs the size of the pay–pension tradeoff.