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Towards a Cyber Secure Shipboard Radar

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2019

Boris Svilicic ,
Igor Rudan ,
Vlado Frančić  and
Djani Mohović
Boris Svilicic*
Affiliation:
(University of Rijeka, Faculty of Maritime Studies, Studentska ulica 2, 51000Rijeka, Croatia)
Igor Rudan
Affiliation:
(University of Rijeka, Faculty of Maritime Studies, Studentska ulica 2, 51000Rijeka, Croatia)
Vlado Frančić
Affiliation:
(University of Rijeka, Faculty of Maritime Studies, Studentska ulica 2, 51000Rijeka, Croatia)
Djani Mohović
Affiliation:
(University of Rijeka, Faculty of Maritime Studies, Studentska ulica 2, 51000Rijeka, Croatia)
*
(E-mail: [email protected])
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Abstract

This paper presents a comparative cyber security resilience estimation of shipboard radars that are implemented on two oil/chemical tankers certified as SOLAS ships. The estimated radars were chosen from the same manufacturer, but belonged to different generations. The estimation was conducted by means of ships' crew interviews and computational testing of the radars using a widely deployed vulnerability scanning software tool. The identified cyber threats were analysed qualitatively in order to gain a holistic understanding of cyber risks threatening shipboard radar systems. The results obtained experimentally indicate that potential cyber threats mainly relate to maintenance of the radars' underlying operating system, suggesting the need for regulatory standardisation of periodic cyber security testing of radar systems.

Keywords

Navigation SafetyRadarMaritime Cyber SecurityVulnerability Scanning
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Navigation , Volume 73 , Issue 3 , May 2020 , pp. 547 - 558
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Navigation 2019

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